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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis comprises three essays studying the role of social capital in 
health-seeking behaviour, survival to extreme seasonality and women 
empowerment in rural Bangladesh. The thesis employs unique cross-sectional 
data of 5600 extreme poor households from 156 villages in three northern districts 
which were collected by BRAC in 2002 as a baseline survey prior to lunching a 
specially tailored poverty alleviation programme, ‘Challenging the Frontier of 
Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP)’. The poverty dimensions 
studied in this thesis were previously unexplored for Bangladesh in relation to 
social capital.  
This first essay investigates the effect of social capital on a range of health 
behaviour and hygienic practices pertaining to the lives of the extreme poor. The 
empirical findings document a significant positive effect of social capital on the 
uses of sanitary latrine, soap for hand-washing after defecation, safe water for 
drinking and cooking, family planning methods by married eligible couples and 
wearing shoe/sandal for hygiene. The findings offer important policy implications 
on the role of social capital foiling common diseases through preventive health 
behaviour and hygiene practices for the extreme poor who cannot afford medical 
service in the event of illness. The essay accounts for endogeneity of social capital 
due to measurement errors and omitted variables by the instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation and thus establishes an unbiased effect. The exogenous differences in 
the number of open-access resources that the extreme poor can access are used as 
instrument. This variable randomly separates the extreme poor into different 
xiii 
 
groups based on the availability of the number of social capital construction 
platforms, thus usefully identifying the effect of social capital. 
The second essay explores the role of social capital securing employment 
and informal borrowing by the extreme poor during Monga, a near-famine 
situation that occurs every year in northern Bangladesh between planting and 
harvesting of Aman paddy. Monga occurs mainly due to malfunctioning of local 
labour and credit markets and has posed a long-standing challenge to the 
government and development organizations. In this context, the essay investigates 
the role of social capital in finding employment and informal loans for the 
extreme poor, which help smooth consumption during Monga. Controlling for an 
array of household and village level characteristics and adopting a similar IV 
estimation as in the first essay, this study documents the pivotal role of social 
capital for the extreme poor in obtaining wage- and self-employment during the 
Monga. However, it does not find any significant effect of social capital in 
facilitating to obtain informal loans. 
In the third essay, the role of social capital in empowering women is 
investigated. In particular, the essay analyses the effect of social capital on an 
array of women empowerment indicators at the household level, including 
purchasing necessary items by women, decision-making in household matters and 
violence against women. In the absence of valid instrument satisfying exclusion 
restriction to address the endogeneity of social capital in this setting, the study 
uses heteroskedasticy-based identification suggested by Lewbel (1997; 2012) and 
Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) in order to establish the unbiased effect of social 
capital. The empirical findings do not indicate any significant effect of social 
capital on women’s empowerment. Finding of the study, thus, warrants careful 
xiv 
 
attention of the policy planners regarding their enthusiasm to propose social 
capital as cure for all social malfunctions.  
Overall, the findings of the thesis can broadly be defined as twofold. First, 
the thesis documents the positive role played by social capital in improving health 
behaviour and hygienic practices among the extreme poor and in securing wage- 
and self-employment during economic shocks. Second, no significant effect is 
found of social capital in empowering women within the household. Thus, the 
thesis offers efficiency-enhancing and welfare-gaining effect of social capital for 
households; but no role in improving the bargaining power of women.  
  
 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The greatest of evils and the worst of crimes is poverty”. 
—George Bernard Shaw 
 
 
1.1 Background 
Combatting poverty has been a longstanding challenge and a key focus for 
policy makers, donors, development organisations and academics. Yet, as much as 
1.75 billion people globally, a staggering 30% of total world population, still live 
under multi-dimensional poverty—indicating grave deprivation in health, 
education and standard of living (UNDP 2010). About 870 million suffer acute 
malnourishment, a vast number (852 million) of whom live in developing 
countries (FAO 2012). South Asia, as a regional hub, alone masses 304 million 
people under such malnourishment (FAO 2012). Considering the urgency of these 
facts the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set their first goal as ‘eradicate 
extreme poverty and hunger’. Despite being a signatory of the MDGs the scenario 
is still critical for Bangladesh which has 49.6% of its population living under 
poverty with less than $1.25 income a day and 81% of the population living under 
$2 per day (World Bank 2011). About 41% of the children under five are living 
under malnutrition, the under-5 mortality rate is 52 per 1000 and the maternal 
mortality rate stands at 340 per 100,000 live births (World Bank 2011).  
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Researchers have identified various factors behind poverty. 
Unemployment, seasonality in agricultural income, spiral of essential prices, 
depletion of savings, incidence of natural calamities, civil unrest, power and 
gender-power relations, disability and ill health are among factors triggering 
poverty (Sen 1981; Deaton 1989; Paxson 1993; Townsend 1994; Datt and 
Ravallion 1998; Kabeer 2003; Leon 2010).  
Scholars also document various methods to combat poverty. Two 
approaches are noteworthy: the top-down (or trickle-down) approach, and the 
bottom-up approach. At the peak of the rhetoric of the top-down approach is the 
critical role of economic growth in eliminating poverty. A number of studies find 
evidence of economic growth reducing poverty through creation of jobs, 
infrastructure and investment in human and social capital (e.g., Contreras 2001; 
Ravallion and Datt 2002; Besley and Burgess 2003; Lopez 2004; Kraay 2006). 
Some researchers also emphasise on the composition of growth rather than growth 
per se (e.g., Khan 1999; Ravallion and Chen 2007; Loayza and Raddatz 2010). 
Accordingly, growth of unskilled labour intensive sectors such as agriculture, 
construction and manufacturing are important to accelerate poverty reduction. De 
Janvry and Sadoulet (2010) and Christiansen, Demery and Kuhl (2011), for 
example, argue for the particular role of agriculture to reduce headcount poverty 
in developing countries. Studies (e.g., Coxhead and Warr 1991; 1995) also 
emphasise the role of technology in agricultural production such as, irrigation, 
biological and chemical technology to reduce poverty in Asian countries. 
Liberalisation of international trade and investment is also advocated by many 
(e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1997; Hasan, Mitra and Ural 2007; Dutt, Mitra and 
Ranjan 2009; Topalova 2010) as a means to combat income poverty in line with 
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the standard Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. The essence of these literatures is that 
economic growth benefits the poor and pulls them out of poverty by improving 
the economy as a whole.  
Conversely, the literature at the bottom-up approach emphasises on certain 
factors such as education, employment, social welfare system and microcredit to 
combat poverty. The literature (e.g., Mukherjee and Benson 2003; Datt and 
Jolliffe 2005; Woolard and Klasen 2005; Buddelmeyer and Verick 2008) 
emphasises the role of education as an effective instrument to exit from poverty. 
This literature argues that education can effectively contribute to building human 
resources, skills and productivity that not only contribute to increased income for 
the poor but also eliminate inequality in the income distribution. Promotion of 
non-farm activities is also favoured by researchers to alleviate poverty considering 
the low return in farm activities and fragmentation of farm lands (e.g., Lanjouw 
and Lanjouw 2001; van de Walle and Cratty 2004). Accordingly, non-farm 
activities can absorb surplus labour in agriculture and contribute to an increase in 
real wage and income in the agro-based households.  
On the other hand, the importance of social safety net in the ‘protection’ 
and ‘promotion’ out of poverty is mentioned by Ravallion, van de Walle and 
Gautam (1995), Devereux (2002), Long and Pfau (2009) and Dutta, Howes and 
Murgai (2010). They argue that in an agrarian society with seasonality in income 
and employment, social safety nets in terms of cash transfer and supply of food 
could help families cope from shock and vulnerability. Development practitioners 
also argue for widening microcredit to halt poverty. They argue that microcredit 
may help the poor seeking productive employment, use entrepreneurship skills 
and earn regular income throughout the year (e.g., Hossain 1988; Todd 1996; Pitt 
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and Khandker 1998; Matin and Hulme 2003; Khandker 2005). However, the 
efficacy of microcredit to generate sustainable income and alleviate poverty 
remains questionable to many arguing that not all poor are entrepreneurs; and that 
microcredit is not reaching the poorest of the poor (e.g., Amin, Rai and Topa 
2003; de Aghion and Morduch 2005; Stewart et al. 2010).  
Apart from physical and human capital, a growing stream of literature 
argues for the role of social capital in the well-being of households in both the 
developing and developed country contexts. It is argued that social capital 
facilitates economic exchange in the agrarian setting (Bardhan 1984; Basu 1986), 
smooths shocks for the family (Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert 
2007), establishes close-market for petty businesses (Borjas 2012; Evans 1989), 
facilitates labour exchange (Krishnan and Sciuba 2009) and formal and informal 
borrowing (Townsend 1994; Udry 1994; Fafchamps and Lund 2003). To this 
strand of literature, being poor in physical and human capital, the poor and the 
extreme poor can benefit by exploiting the stock of social capital in the material 
and non-material well-being of the households and in particular, to cope with 
shocks and economic contraction. 
In line with the core interest of this thesis, the next section makes a brief 
inroad into the concept of social capital. 
 
1.2 Social Capital  
The concept of social capital is as old as Durkheim (1895), who first 
emphasised the implication of groups in fostering material well-being of the 
people. In 1920 Hanifan formally introduces the term ‘social capital’ in the 
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literature. The concept has been popularised in recent times due to the seminal 
works of Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993; 2000).  
Hanifan (1920) refers to social capital as good will, sympathy, fellowship 
and social network of a group of people. Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital in 
terms of the social characteristics of a group of people. Accordingly, social capital 
is “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group 
by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationship or mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu 1986: 248-249). 
Coleman (1988), conversely, defines social capital by its function. Accordingly, 
social capital, “is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two 
characteristics in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure and 
they facilitate certain actions of the individuals who are within the structure. Like 
all forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the attainment of 
certain ends that would not be possible in its absence.” Coleman (1988: 98).  
In defining social capital, Putnam (1993; 2000) attributes it to the 
community rather than individuals. Accordingly, social capital is “the features of 
social organisation, such as trust, norms and networks that can improve the 
efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putnam 1993: 167). To 
Putnam, at the core of social capital is the participation of people in informal as 
well as formal social networks. Accordingly, social capital contributes to the 
improvement of collective action, fosters reciprocity and facilitates informational 
flow. By embodying coordinated actions and success of past collaborations, social 
capital helps to build a platform for future cooperation as well (Putnam 2000).  
However, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002: 438) define social capital 
as individual’s social qualities and associations. Accordingly, social capital is, “a 
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person’s social characteristics including social skills, charisma and networks 
which enable him to reap market and non-market returns from interaction with 
others”. They consider social capital as individual’s intrinsic abilities as well as 
the result of social capital investment. Accordingly, individual’s accumulation of 
social capital is positively correlated with its return and that individual invests and 
accumulates higher social capital when private return is higher. 
Thus, at the core of social capital are social relationships that help 
individuals to attain certain economic and non-economic outcomes. These 
relationships possess certain features in common: first, they are ‘social’ as 
individuals harness them only by making relationships with others and unlike 
physical and human capital it does not belong to the individuals; and second, that 
they are resources (and hence capital) as they pay off to individuals engaged in 
such relationships. 
The implication of social capital in the well-being of households are 
emphasised by scholars from various perspectives. It is argued that the essential 
feature of social capital lies in the participation of people in both informal and 
formal social networks which alters their attitudes compared to what they would 
do individually (Durkheim 1895). Coleman (1988) states that the collective 
conscience, practices and beliefs rigorously guide individuals in a society. It is 
argued that an individual outcome is a systematic function of social dynamics like 
relationships and social cohesion. The importance of social capital is, therefore, 
advocated to improve hygienic practices and health behaviour—which is 
important to increase productivity and labour force participation for the extreme 
poor. 
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The literatures (e.g., Durkheim 1895; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993) also 
claim social capital as a key productive asset that helps individual attain certain 
economic outcomes when all other means may not function properly. 
Accordingly, social networks, links, trust and reciprocity help economic 
exchange, particularly in an agrarian society where formal institutions are 
generally missing (Bardhan 1984; Basu 1986). They facilitate financial contracts 
of the rural poor who are largely illiterate and rely on social trust more than 
anything for contract enforcement (Karlan 2005; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
2004). It is, therefore, argued that social capital can play pivotal role for the poor 
and extreme poor in smoothing consumption and income seasonality and to help 
combatting economic hardship.  
The importance of social capital is further emphasised in facilitating 
informational flow and eliminating misconception and prejudice prevailing 
(Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Collier 1998; Woolcock 2001). It is argued that 
social network helps restoring trustful relationships and is helpful during conflict 
and confrontation. It leads to cognitive and psychological development for the 
disadvantaged (e.g., the poor, the women) essential to increase agency and 
bargaining in their life choices. Researchers also claim that network and solidarity 
groups are important fostering collective consciousness and resistance to 
oppression which are essential to increase well-being of the poor (Schuler et al. 
1996; Kabeer 2001; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2006; Haile, Bock and Folmer 
2012).  
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1.3 Extreme Poor in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is a low income country with per capita income of $590, with 
50% of its 150 million population living under $1.25 income a day and 81% under 
$2/day, adult literacy rate stands at 55% and average life expectancy at birth of 66 
years (World Bank 2011).  Poverty and the deprivation of basic human needs such 
as literacy, employment, food security, health and shelter posit longstanding 
challenges for the country. In line with the MDGs, the government of Bangladesh 
has set 2015 as the deadline to halve the numbers of poor but progress towards the 
goal so far is dismal. About 41% of the children under five are still suffering from 
malnutrition and the under-5 mortality rate is 52 per 1000 live births (World Bank 
2011). There are only 43000 beds in the government hospitals (1860 people/bed), 
55000 registered doctors (2785 people/doctor), 62% of the population (58% rural) 
uses sanitary latrines and only 55% of the households (43% rural) have electricity 
connection at their residence (BBS 2010). Women are further marginalised in this 
patriarchal society with the maternal mortality rate at 570 per 100000 live births, 
as low as 18% of births attended by professional health personnel, 31% of women 
completing secondary education compared to 39% of men and female labour 
force participation at 61% compared to that men of 85% (UNDP 2010). The 
situation of poverty is worse in the rural areas where population under poverty is 
around 44% compared to 28% in urban areas (BBS 2006). Among the rural 
population 28.6% live under extreme poverty and are often victims of hunger, 
malnutrition, ill health and succumb to death to diseases like cholera and 
diarrhoea that could be easily treated and prevented (BBS 2006). 
However, there exists tremendous heterogeneity among the poor in 
Bangladesh and the extreme poor are the most vulnerable. The extreme poor lag 
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behind the average poor in various aspects including education, employment, 
consumption and asset holding. Even the NGOs that champion poverty alleviation 
initiatives exclude the extreme poor from microcredit programmes as they are not 
considered creditworthy (Amin, Rai and Topa 2003). Thus, while an NGO 
borrower household—an average poor household covered by the NGOs—owns 
about 0.87 acres of land (Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2006), it is only about 
0.04 acre for the extreme poor households considered in this dissertation. 
Similarly, the mean value of the dwelling houses (excluding land), which can be 
considered as a proxy for asset value, is about Taka 8000 for the extreme poor 
compared to Taka 1200 for the NGO-targeted poor (Halder 1998). About 20% of 
the average poor covered by NGO programmes uses sanitary latrine (Mallick 
1998) compared to 13% for the extreme poor households. Per capita consumption 
is 2284 calories per day for the NGO-targeted poor (Halder 1998), while more 
than 52% of the extreme poor cannot even manage food twice a day. Only 6% of 
consumption of the extreme poor comes from fish and meat compared to 16% for 
the average poor (Halder 1998). All these statistics justify a separate analysis for 
the extreme poor studied in this dissertation.  
 
1.4 This Thesis 
This thesis comprises three essays investigating the role of social capital 
on some pertinent issues relating to poverty in the context of rural Bangladesh:  
i) Social capital and health behaviour among the extreme poor in rural 
Bangladesh;  
ii) Social capital, employment and borrowing in the lean season among 
the extreme poor in rural Bangladesh; and  
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iii) Social capital and women empowerment in rural Bangladesh. 
These essays are preceded by a review of literature on social capital in Chapter 2: 
Social capital: relationships and embedded resources.  
The thesis uses data from 5600 extreme poor households collected by 
BRAC in 2002 as a baseline survey prior to lunching a unique poverty alleviation 
programme ‘Challenging the Frontier of Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra 
Poor (TUP)’. Data were collected from 156 villages from three northern districts 
of Bangladesh: Rangpur, Kurigram and Nilphamari. The households at the bottom 
25% in the participatory wealth ranking (PWR) by the villagers are identified as 
extreme poor and all the extreme poor households are surveyed. The data included 
information, among others, individual and household characteristics, economic 
endowment such as income, employment, land and non-land assets, labour force 
participation, health and hygienic practices, shocks and coping strategies, dowry 
and family planning, women’s agency and violence against women, village level 
infrastructure, presence of government and non-government organisations and 
social capital. The extensive dataset allows for the investigation of a diverse 
dimension of poverty not investigated earlier in relation to social capital in the 
developing country context. 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation discusses in detail various aspects of social 
capital, including its definition, early theories, its forms (bonding, bridging and 
linking social capital), as well as other surrounding issues like trust, reciprocity, 
social support and community. Also provided is the discussion of social capital as 
‘capital’ and its potential positive and negative effects on economic exchange.  
Chapter 3, the first essay, Social capital and health behaviour among the 
extreme poor in rural Bangladesh, explores the role of social capital in health 
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behaviour and hygienic practices among the extreme poor households. It 
investigates an array of health behaviour including use of sanitary latrines; hand 
washing with soap after defecation; wearing sandals/shoes at home for 
cleanliness; use of safe water for drinking and cooking; awareness of arsenic 
contamination in water; use of packed salt; and use of family planning methods by 
married eligible couples. The investigation is crucial considering, for instance, 
that most child deaths are arguably due to ignorance about hygienic practices and 
the use of unsafe water for drinking and cooking (Curtis and Cairncross 2003). 
The index of social capital is constructed from three facts of social interaction: an 
invitation received from a non-relative neighbour in last one year; help received 
from a non-relative neighbour in last one year; and participation in the informal 
social adjudication (shalish). Using instrumental variable (IV) regression 
considering endogeneity in social capital it finds strong positive and significant 
effect of social capital on certain health behaviour. These include: use of sanitary 
latrines; washing hand with soap after defecation; using shoes/sandals at home; 
use of safe water for drinking and cooking; and use of family planning methods. 
The results are robust using the individual component of social capital and have 
important policy implications. Considering that the extreme poor cannot access 
and afford medical services in the event of illness, social capital can help improve 
health behaviour and hygienic practices to prevent common diseases such as 
cholera and diarrhoea in developing countries like Bangladesh.  
The second essay in Chapter 4, Social capital, employment and borrowing 
in the lean season among the extreme poor in rural Bangladesh, investigates the 
role of social capital in securing employment and informal borrowing to smooth 
consumption during the lean season. Extreme seasonality of income and 
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employment is a regular phenomenon observed almost every year in northern 
Bangladesh occurring after plantation but before harvesting of Aman paddies. The 
sharp decline in employment in agriculture causes a famine-like situation, locally 
termed as Monga (Khandker 2011). Food security of the households becomes 
worse as the extreme poor are further excluded from formal credit markets, even 
by NGOs (Pitt and Khandker 2002; Amin, Rai and Topa 2003). This essay 
investigates the role of social capital in securing both wage and self-employment 
across genders and securing loans from informal sources for the extreme poor 
households as a way to smooth consumption during Monga. The essay addresses 
endogeneity in social capital using IV regression to obtain consistent estimates. 
The results document positive and significant effects of social capital on both 
wage and self-employment, for both males and females. However, the results do 
not show any effect of social capital on informal borrowing. One reason for the 
latter finding might be that the extreme poor are not considered creditworthy from 
a lender’s point of view. The results are robust to OLS and Tobit regressions and 
using each component of social capital. 
Chapter 5, the third essay, Social capital and women empowerment in 
rural Bangladesh, investigates the role of social capital in improving women’s 
position within the household. Empowerment of women is sought as a 
prerequisite to end poverty, inequality, social injustice and to enhance human 
development (UNDP 1995; Sen 1999). Conversely, social capital is considered an 
important channel to eliminate misconception and prejudice prevailing in a 
society to empower women. The essay addresses endogeneity in social capital to 
obtain its unbiased and consistent estimates using heteroskedasticiy based 
identification due to Lewbel (1997; 2012) and Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) in the 
 Chapter One 
 
~ 13 ~ 
 
absence of a credible instrument to be used in IV regression satisfying exclusion 
restriction. The essay investigates the effect of social capital on an array of 
indicators of women empowerment within households including: purchasing 
necessary items; participation in household decision-making; and violence by 
husbands. After controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables such as 
demographic characteristics, economic conditions and village level infrastructure 
the essay does not document robust evidence of social capital empowering 
women. The results are in contrast with previous studies, for example, Pitt, 
Khandker and Cartwright (2006), Hashemi, Schuler and Riley (1996) and Kabeer 
(2001) which find women’s social network especially in the form of microcredit 
intervention to contribute to empower women in rural Bangladesh. However, the 
measure of social capital in this essay excludes NGO intervention and thus the 
findings are free from any intervention effect evidenced in the previous literature. 
The results are important from a policy consideration that any development 
intervention attempting to empower women through the creation of women’s 
social network and solidarity (e.g., self-help groups) may not offer sizeable 
improvements and that, such intervention may need to be bundled with other 
subtle weapons to materialise the beneficial effect of social capital. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis. 
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 CHAPTER TWO SOCIAL CAPITAL: RELATIONSHIPS AND EMBEDDED RESOURCES 
 
“No one travels that road entirely alone. The social context within 
which individual maturation occurs strongly conditions what 
otherwise equally competent individuals can achieve.” 
—Loury (1977: 176) 
 
2.1 Defining Social Capital  
By ‘social capital’ scholars generally refer to the institutions, norms, 
networks and trust of people in a group they share to shape interactions and 
benefit from, materially and psychologically. The concept of social capital is as 
old as Durkheim (1895) who emphasises the implication of groups fostering 
individual well-being. In 1920, Hanifan formally introduces the term social 
capital in the literature, while Loury (1977) and Bourdieu (1977; 1986) re-
introduce it in the modern era. The term, social capital, is however popularised 
after the seminal works of Coleman (1988; 1990) and Putnam (1993; 2000) in the 
recent times.  
Hanifan (1920) uses the term social capital to refer good will, fellowship, 
sympathy and social network of a group of people from which the entire 
community and the individuals might benefit. Accordingly, by social capital,  
“I do not refer to real estate, or to personal property or to cold cash, but rather to 
that in life which tends to make those tangible substances count for most in the 
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daily lives of a people: namely goodwill, fellowship, sympathy, and social 
intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit….. If 
an individual comes into contact with his neighbour, and they with other 
neighbours, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may 
immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality 
sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole 
community. The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its 
parts, while the individual will find in his associations the advantages of help, 
the sympathy, and fellowship of his neighbours. First then, there must be an 
accumulation of community social capital” (Hanifan 1920: 130-131).  
 
Bourdieu (1977; 1986) defines social capital in terms of social 
characteristics of a group of people. Accordingly, social capital is “the sum of the 
resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or group by virtue of 
possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationship or 
mutual acquaintance and recognition…….The profits which accrue from 
membership in a group are the basis of the solidarity which makes them possible” 
(Bourdieu 1986: 248-249). Bourdieu argues that social network is not something 
to exist naturally. People construct it by investing in their part either individually 
or collectively to transform some contingent relationships into social relationships 
and to benefit using such relationships in the short or long period of time. 
Bourdieu (1986) further argues that the most effective hereditary transmission 
comes not from wealth or economic capital but from cultural capital, as wealth are 
subject to taxation but being hidden, cultural capital is not subject to such control.  
Loury (1977) considers social capital in terms of family ties, kinship 
networks and acquaintances. He studies income variation in the US across 
different racial groups and concludes that black children do not get a level playing 
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field in the US labour market despite the fact that there was no racial 
discrimination. He evidences that there are two certain social characteristics 
detrimental to the ability of the black children: first, being their parents are poor 
they do not obtain proper education; and second, due to limited possession of 
information, they lag behind others. He, therefore, points that individual outcomes 
are not only the result of one’s personal attributes, rather, are systematic function 
of the social context within which individual accomplishment takes place (Loury 
1977).   
Coleman (1988) views social capital by what it does. Accordingly, social 
capital is the social structure that facilitates certain actions. To him, social capital, 
“is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics 
in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structure and they facilitate 
certain actions of the individuals who are within the structure. Like all forms of 
capital, social capital is productive, making possible the attainment of certain ends 
that would not be possible in its absence” Coleman (1988: 98). However like 
Bourdieu, he considers that though social capital often appears important for 
individual benefit, can be equally detrimental to some others. He mentions that, “a 
given form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be 
useless or even harmful for others” (Coleman 1988: 98).   
In defining social capital, Putnam (1993; 2000) attributes it to the 
community instead of individuals. In Making Democracy Work, he defines social 
capital as “the features of social organization, such as trust, norms and networks 
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” 
(Putnam 1993: 167). Putnam further mentions that the core of social capital is the 
participation of people in informal as well as formal social networks. In Bowling 
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Alone, Putnam (2000) argues that social capital contributes to the improvement of 
collective action, fosters reciprocity and facilitates informational flow. By 
embodying coordinated actions and success of past collaborations it helps to build 
a platform for future cooperation as well. Accordingly, physical capital refers to 
physical objects and human capital indicates the prosperities of individuals, 
whereas social capital refers to the social connections and networks of the 
individuals and the shared norms of trustworthiness and reciprocity arises in such 
networks (Putnam 2000: 19). To Putnam (1993; 2000), social capital is a form of 
capital like economic or human capital that influences productivity of the 
individuals and groups. In explaining the economic performances of different 
regions of Italy, Putnam (1993) evidences different levels of civic engagement, 
trust and networks to affect economic outcomes. He further mentions that there 
was a sharp decline in social capital in the US in 1960s manifested by the decline 
in citizen participation in voting, less church attendance and less civic engagement 
by people which in turn resulted in increasing crime rates, poor public education, 
and poor health services during this period.  
Fukuyama (1995), on the other hand, considers ‘social trust’ at the core of 
social capital. He argues that economic activities, big and small, are subject to 
certain degrees of social cohesion. “As economists argue, the ability to form 
organizations depends on institutions like property rights, contracts, and a system 
of commercial law. But it also depends on a prior sense of moral community, that 
is, an unwritten set of ethical rules or norms that serve as the basis of social trust” 
(Fukuyama 1995: 90). He mentions that inter-personal trust may help reducing 
costs of business: costs of transaction, negotiation and enforcement and to attain 
efficiency.  
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Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002: 438) define social capital as 
individual’s social qualities and associations. Accordingly, social capital is, “a 
person’s social characteristics including social skills, charisma and networks 
which enable him to reap market and non-market returns from interaction with 
others”. They argue that individual’s social attribute like popularity is something 
that comprises his innate ability as well as his effort to develop it over time. They 
further mention that individual’s accumulation of social capital is positively 
correlated with the return of it. Accordingly, individuals invest and accumulate 
higher social capital when private return is higher. 
Thus, at the core of social capital are social relationships that help 
individuals to attain certain economic and non-economic outcomes. These 
relationships possess certain features in common: first, the relationships are 
‘social’; individuals exploit it only by making relationship with others; and 
second, that these are resources (and hence capital) and pay off to individuals 
engaged in such relationships. 
 
2.2 Early Theories and the Evolution of ‘Social Capital’  
Although the social capital theory is popularised in the past two decades 
with substantial works across the broad spectrum of research including sociology, 
economics and health science among others; the root of the social capital theory 
dates back to long early history. The earliest works are presented by Durkheim 
(1895; 1897) in which he documents how social relationships and cohesion appear 
critical to affect suicide rates in a society. He argues that individual outcome is a 
systematic function of social dynamics like relationships and social cohesion. 
Durkheim (1897), thus, evidences that suicide rate goes up when people are 
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distracted from their usual social network. He mentions that suicide rates are 
higher for the divorced men than divorced women as men are more disgraced by 
the brake-up and were more benefitting from the regulative marriages. To him, 
strict social rules may also lead to higher suicide rates if people are unwilling to 
accept such strict commandments, e.g., in the armies. In contrary, he argues that 
in a Catholic society where taking own life is seriously condemned, suicidal crime 
is also lower. Durkheim (1897), thus, points that the available statistics of suicides 
were not correlated with biological or cosmic phenomena; rather they are 
correlated with social phenomena such as family, society, religion and politics. 
He, therefore, argues that collective conscience, practices and beliefs rigorously 
guide the individuals in a society. Durkheim, however, did not introduce the term 
‘social capital’ at that time.  
Prior to the evolution of the term social capital, there are theories, e.g., 
‘exchange theory’ and ‘attachment theory’ to explain two sided transactions and 
exchanges among agents. According to Emerson (1976), the functional elements 
of the exchange theory are rooted in resources, rewards, reinforcement, 
opportunity, payoff and transaction. Blau (1977), Mayhew (1980) and Cook and 
Whitemeyer (1992) later incorporate social structure into the discussion of 
exchange theory. Cook and Whitemeyer (1992) argue that exchange theory has to 
incorporate social structure, defined in terms of social relations and positions 
among agents, both at micro and macro levels. They argue that “all important 
social phenomena can be explained primarily, if not completely, by social 
structure” (Cook and Whitemeyer 1992: 114). To these authors, exchange theory 
explains people’s interaction and the structure of relationship based on two 
principles; first, individuals are motivated by interests, rewards and punishment; 
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and second, interactions and exchanges generally comprise of valued things, may 
or may not be of material item necessarily.  
The attachment theory, on the other hand, tends to emphasise on 
individual’s attachment with others that gives him certain bondage and feeling of 
safety within a confined network (Bowlby 1988). The early attachment, according 
to Bowlby, comes from the family. A children-mother bond, for example, at the 
childhood gives the first attachment to an individual that is later extended through 
marriage, meeting friends, joining clubs and organizations and so on. According 
to attachment theory, bonding attachment at the childhood provides individuals 
love, care, safety and self-confidence. However, at the mature ages attachment 
grows with social interaction of the people to foster individual’s aspiration and 
necessity of works, employment, leisure and recovery from losing some other 
attachment.  
Although these earlier works provide a ground of explaining social 
phenomenon to affect individual outcomes, a complete and comprehensive link 
was still missing. As Coleman (1988) argues, the exchange theory failed to 
incorporate economic principles, i.e., the principle of rational action, into 
consideration. On the other hand, the attachment theory is solely based on the 
principle and norm of reciprocity. Coleman (1988), thus, points that these theories 
focus on distributive justice rather than rational action of the actors. In contrary, 
the notion of social capital pioneered by Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam, 
attempts to use economic principle in the analysis of social structure and to 
explain individual outcomes taking social organization in the process. As 
Coleman (1988: 98) states, “social capital constitutes a particular kind of resource 
available to an actor…..Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, 
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making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be 
possible”. 
 
2.3 Forms of Social Capital: The Bonding, Bridging and Linking Social 
Capital 
In terms of relationship and networking, social capital is characterised by 
three forms: bonding, bridging and linking social capital (Harper and Kelly 2003; 
Szreter and Woolcock 2004; Flora, Flora and Fey 2004). Bonding social capital is 
defined as the closer connections between people, e.g., between family members, 
close friends and immediate neighbours, between people with same ethnicity, 
social status and location and featuring strong bond among them (Harper and 
Kelly 2003; Flora, Flora and Fey 2004; Poortinga 2006). According to Szreter and 
Woolcock (2004), “bonding social capital refers to trusting and co-operative 
relations between members of a network who see themselves as being similar, in 
terms of their shared social identity”. Harper and Kelly (2003) term it as good 
relationship for ‘getting by’ in life. Thus, the focus of the bonding social capital is 
to explain individuals’ behaviour and relationships within a homogenous network. 
This is a kind of horizontal relationship based on trust, reciprocity, respect, norms, 
social support and sense of community at the micro level of the society (Flora, 
Flora and Fey 2004). 
Bridging social capital indicates relationship of people beyond their 
immediate networks, family ties and neighbourhood who may not be on equal 
footing. It comprises “relations of respect and mutuality between people who 
know that they are not alike in some socio-demographic (or social identity) sense 
(differing by age, ethnic group, class, etc)” (Szreter and Woolcock 2004). 
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Bridging social capital can be considered as the distant and weaker but a cross-
cutting relationship between people e.g., friends of friends, distant neighbours, 
collaboration with other groups and formal institutions (Harper and Kelly 2003; 
Flora, Flora and Fey 2004; Poortinga 2006). The relationship is centred on micro 
and meso levels and social ties are used by the people to capitalise resources out 
of their immediate network. Bridging social capital, thus, emphasises on the 
relationship of people for ‘getting ahead’ (Harper and Kelly 2003). It is, thus, both 
horizontal and vertical in nature. Reciprocity, trust, norms, social networks and 
civic engagement are important constructs of bridging social capital.  
Finally, linking social capital is focused on organisational and formal 
networking of people, with state machineries and institutionalised resource and 
power centres. Szreter and Woolcock (2004) define linking social capital as, 
“norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are 
interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalised power or authority gradients 
in society”. To World Bank (2002) and Harper and Kelly (2003), linking social 
capital is the connection of individuals with people in the hierarchy of power and 
resources and thus connecting people across different levels of authority and 
standing. It focuses on the relationship at the macro level of the society and 
describes interactions of people not on equal footing. According to Flora, Flora 
and Fey (2004) and Poortinga (2006), linking social capital describes the ability of 
the individuals and groups to connect and extract benefit from the external sources 
of power and resources. It is useful for the individuals as it provides necessary 
scope to use resources from institutional networks. Civic engagement, political 
participation and trust on formal institutions are important constructs of linking 
social capital. Putnam (1993), for example, mentions that participation in voting 
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reflects people’s trust on the existing political system of a country. Similarly, 
people’s trust on the judicial system and other formal institutions are manifested 
through people’s interaction with those. 
The bonding, bridging and linking social capital resemble that people have 
different sets of relationships and networks in the society. Some people may have 
stronger family ties and neighbourhoods (bonding social capital) while others 
might possess stronger social connection (bridging and linking social capital). 
Literatures, however, have differences in their opinions on the efficacy of a 
particular form of social capital. Smylie and Evans (2006), for example, 
emphasise more on the linking social capital stating that it links the public-private 
divide from which people can benefit the most. Putnam (2000), on the other hand, 
argues that such vertical relationship was, in fact, largely responsible for the 
decline in the bonding social capital in US in the 1960s and led the American 
youth to go for ‘bowling alone’—for which the society witnessed violent crimes 
and deterioration in the quality of life. Poortinga (2006), however, argues for 
necessity of all the bonding, bridging and linking social capital in the well-being 
of the people. Accordingly, bonding social capital is important for necessary 
social support; bridging social capital helps widening solidarity and respect across 
social strata; and finally linking social capital is worthwhile for institutional 
connection and effective political mobilisation (Poortinga 2006: 256).  
 
2.4 The Constructs of Social Capital 
 The literature documents different elements that facilitate social 
interaction of people and construct social capital. Although researchers often use 
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particular construct of social capital dealing with specific contexts, some pertinent 
constituents are established in the literature.  
 
2.4.1 Trust 
 Trust is essential to form social relationships and thereby, social capital. 
Fukuyama (1995) and Harpham (2008) consider trust at the centre of the social 
capital. Accordingly, trust is the core of social capital while social interaction is 
the consequence of social capital based on trust (Fukuyama 1995). Baum and 
Ziersch (2003) classify three forms of trust to construct social capital:  
a) Trust of familiars: trust within family, close friends and immediate 
neighbours. 
b) Generalised trust: trust that is extended to the distant neighbours, to the 
strangers and distant people. 
c) Institutional trust: trust of people to the formal institutions and 
organisations. 
Trust of familiars is, thus, closely related and the basis for the formation of 
bonding social capital within the close network of the people. While generalised 
trust is the basis of bridging social capital; and institutional trust forms the core of 
linking social capital. Dasgupta (2000) further claims that inter-personal trust and 
trust on formal organisations are closely linked with each other. He argues that if 
trust on the efficacy of the enforcing agency deteriorates, individuals cannot trust 
but doubt on the commitment of others in contract agreement (Dasgupta 2000). 
Trust is, thus, emphasised as the central to all economic transactions. To Ouchi 
(1981), much of the economic activities are guided by trust and that productivity 
goes hand in hand with trust. Sicillia and Cruikshank (1999), thus, conclude that, 
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“trust is at the root of any economic system based on mutually beneficial 
exchange. If a significant number of people violated the trust upon which our 
transactions are based, our economy would be swamped into immobility”. 
 
2.4.2 Norms and Values 
Hanifan (1920) and Putnam (1993) consider norms and certain values 
important to construct social capital. Norms and values refer to standard practices 
that are expected to be followed by people in general. Hofstede (1980) defines 
values by the collective preferences of certain practices. Values are at the ‘core’ in 
Hofstede’s (1980) onion model of culture which is largely invisible but ties 
everything intact. To him, if the core is in trouble or is rotten, then the surface 
layers of the onion will count little. That is, the importance of the entire onion is 
no better than the core. To Harper and Kelly (2003), norms and values are 
considered by people as ‘good things’ to maintain social network and 
relationships. They state that people comply with such norms and values to be 
considered as good and trustworthy to others and fear that failure to comply those 
norms may lead to exclusion by the people from their networks. 
 
2.4.3 Reciprocity 
 Reciprocity refers to the norm of expectation between people involved in a 
group of relationship. Reciprocity indicates to the golden rule, “do to others what 
you expect others to do to you” (Warren 2001). It, thus, creates both values and 
obligations: if you help me I will help you in return and if you are good to me I 
will be equally good. Reciprocity fosters social capital and encourages 
individual’s attention to the welfare of others (Putnam 2000). It is the basis of 
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people’s willingness to co-operate each other and to form social capital thereby 
(Harper and Kelly 2003). As Coleman (1988) states, social capital arises from 
three distinct elements: obligations, expectations and trustworthiness. He explains 
that if individual A does something for individual B, this creates an expectation in 
A and an obligation for B. Accordingly, the depth of the social relationship 
depends on the level of this trustworthiness and reciprocity.  
 
2.4.4 Social Networks 
 Social networks describe the structure of social relationship people hold. 
Coleman (1988) mentions that social capital arises from and exists within the 
network of social relation. He terms social capital as the resources embedded 
within social structure. To Adler and Kwon (2000; 2002), social capital is the 
structure of social relations that can be mobilised to facilitate certain actions of 
people. Accordingly, economic capital can be found in bank accounts and human 
capital in people’s mind, but it is the structure of the social relationship that makes 
social capital (Adler and Kwon 2000). Narayan (1999) argues that social capital is 
not a private property and it does not belong to anyone. It exists only when it is 
shared and embedded in the social structure. Baum and Ziersch (2003) define 
social networks as ties between individuals and groups. They term it as the 
structural element of social capital. Social networks can both be formal and 
informal to develop relationship between friends, families, neighbours and 
organisations. The scope and characteristics of social networks, on the other hand, 
are based on the type, size and social support that the members receive from such 
networks (Baum and Ziersch 2003).  
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2.4.5 Social Support 
 Harper and Kelly (2003) define social support as the support and care from 
family and friends that people acquire in exchange. The amount of support and the 
nature of the exchange, however, depend on the people in a social network and 
their level of partnership. Szreter and Woolcock (2004) emphasise on the 
expectation of the people in forming social network arguing that people form 
social network with the expectation that to get cooperation, help and support from 
others when needed. To Heaney and Israel (2002), social support can take four 
forms in general: first, emotional—comprising love, trust, sympathy and care; 
second, instrumental—consisting of supply of resources and services; third, 
information sharing; and fourth, constructive feedback, affirmation and 
comparison.  
 
2.4.6 Sense of Community 
 Sense of community refers to the perception of people towards their 
neighbourhood, social bond, community and organisations. It describes people’s 
perception about how social, economic and physical characteristics of the 
community are valued which is important to construct social capital in that 
community (Baum and Ziersch 2003). To Goodman et al. (1998), sense of 
community refers to people’s concern for community issues, respect to social 
practices, services to others, sense of connection with place and people and 
participation in social organisations. Sense of community is cognitive in nature 
and is important to construct bridging and linking social capital (Szreter and 
Woolcock 2004; Flora, Flora and Fey 2004).  
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2.4.7 Participation and Organisation Membership 
 Networks from participation and membership in organisations have 
measurable benefits to the participants and leads directly or indirectly to higher 
levels of well-being (Grootaert 1999). It forms homogenous networks of the 
individuals as well as across heterogeneous groups who are connected with others 
with such membership. However, meaningful participation of the individuals in 
organisational activities depends much on the perception and opportunity of the 
individuals for such involvement (Grootaert 1999). According to Goodman et al. 
(1998) people join in an organisation considering its benefit and cost: joining is 
likely when its benefits exceed the associated direct and indirect costs. However, 
Putnam (1993) considers that participation can include non-group activities as 
well like voting in the election which manifests people’s attitude, trust, confidence 
and eagerness to participate in the decision making process.  
 
2.4.8 Collective Efficacy 
 Collective efficacy refers to the perception of people in a group and its 
ability and capacity to function as a group effectively (Lochner, Kawachi and 
Kennedy 1999). It emphasises group’s ability to act with competence that is 
usually unattainable by the individuals other than in a group. Collective efficacy 
helps social relationship to achieve certain common goals to benefit everyone in 
the group (Cagney and Wen 2008; Kawachi, Subramanian and Kim 2008). 
Sampson, Morenoff and Earls (1999), however, argue collective efficacy as 
mutual engagement of the group in a task specific basis. Accordingly, individuals 
may vary in terms of their capacity but they can form collective effort to achieve 
common goals without emphasising much on social ties or associations.  
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2.5 Social Capital: Individual or Collective Attributes 
 The literatures also document social capital as different level attributes 
arising in different perspectives. Some researchers consider social capital as an 
individual level attribute; some consider it to exist at the community level, while 
others consider it at the multi-level.  
 
2.5.1 Individual Level Analysis 
 In this approach social capital is assumed to be an individual level 
attribute. It considers participants as the unit of measurement and uses social 
capital at the individual level (Krishna and Uphoff 1999; Narayan and Pritchett 
1999; Hyyppa and Maki 2003; Liukkonen et al. 2004). Glover (2006) argues that 
although social capital is a resource embedded in the social structure, it’s access 
and uses ultimately lies on the individuals. Accordingly, people within a social 
structure have different level of access in it and consequently, their benefits 
accrued from such networks are different as well. Stone (2003) categorises people 
based on different levels of individual social capital: ‘social capital rich’: those 
who have stronger social ties across all the bonding, bridging and linking social 
capital; ‘social capital limited’: those who have stronger bonding but limited 
connection with outside world and bridging/linking social capital; and ‘social 
capital poor’: people having limited connections with family, friends, neighbours 
and institutions.  
 Gaag and Webber (2008) advocate four facts to consider social capital at 
the individual level: (a) social networks are beneficial for individuals by adding 
individual’s personal resources, culture, human and political capital; (b) social 
networks provide unique resources that cannot be produced or purchased to 
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satisfaction individually; (c) social networks actively provide help without asking; 
and (d) social networks form the identity of one’s social network to the outside 
world which may help advertise for an individual.  
 
2.5.2 Community Level Analysis 
Putnam (1993), Lochner, Kawachi and Kennedy (1999), Poortinga (2006) 
and Lindstrom (2006) consider social capital at the community level. According 
to Lochner, Kawachi and Kennedy (1999), social capital is a public good rather 
than individual and is different from social networks and social support that are 
individual attributes of the people. To Wacquant and Wilson (1989), the network-
based resources are subject to the socio-economic conditions of the community 
where people live. The nature, the amount and the quality of such network-based 
resources vary with the variations of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
community (Wacquant and Wilson 1989). Adler and Kwon (2002) and Pierce, 
Lovrich and Moon (2002) also consider social capital at the community level. 
Accordingly, social capital is not a private property, instead it is a collective 
property owned by the people within the social structure. Neighbourhood 
measures of social capital, specifically neighbourhood trust are commonly 
considered by researchers to represent community level analysis of social capital. 
 
2.5.3 Network Level Analysis 
 Social capital is often defined in terms of the network-based resources like 
social support and social network. The network level analysis discusses social 
capital from the dimension of networks individuals possess (Carlson 2004; 
Veenstra 2005; Islam et al. 2006; Sundquist and Yang 2007; Kawachi, 
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Subramaniyam and Kim 2008). Accordingly, social capital comprises different 
levels of networking relationship: network constraint, centrality and cohesion. 
The network constraint refers to the homogeneity of the group and discusses how 
close each member of the group is to others. It refers to the bonding social capital 
among close families, friends and neighbours. Centrality, on the other hand, 
examines how influential is the central member of the network. Presence or 
absence of such a member in the network is vital to transmit informational flows 
and risk sharing within the network, and hence, it closely links with bridging 
social capital. Finally, cohesion measures social capital within the subgroup and 
the larger networks. It, thus, largely relates with linking social capital.  
There are also some studies which consider social capital both at the 
individual and community level. Subramanian, Kim and Kawachi (2002), for 
example, consider social trust both at the individual and community level to 
investigate the association of self-reported health with social capital. 
 
2.6 Social Capital as ‘Capital’: The Debate 
In neoclassical economics capital is the factor of production used to 
produce goods or services. It is the good that is produced but not directly 
consumed, though it may depreciate in the production process. It is one of the four 
factors of production besides land, labour and organisation (Samuelson and 
Nordhaus 2004). Capital may consist of anything that enhance one’s ability and 
performance in economically useful work—a stone or an arrow is capital for a 
hunter as hunting instrument and similarly roads and bridges are capital for the 
city dwellers. Likewise, investment in education and skill improving is considered 
as human capital development, while intellectual capital refers to the investments 
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in intellectual property development. In a very similar fashion, the proponents of 
social capital argue social capital as the value of inter-personal networks and 
trusting relationships between individuals, groups and organisations in an 
economy. 
However, two Nobel laureate economists Kenneth J. Arrow (1999) and 
Robert Solow (1999) raise question on the validity of the term ’capital’ in social 
capital arguing that social capital does not hold the essential features of capital. 
Arrow (1999: 5) points out that physical capital has three distinguished features in 
it: (a) extension over time, (b) purposeful sacrifice of the present for future use, 
and (c) alienability. Arrow expresses his doubt of social capital to have any 
calculation or sacrifice. He also doubts about the transferability of social capital 
from one person to another. Solow points out that a stock of capital consists of the 
past flows of investment. Furthermore, for capital there is a rate of return 
associated with it as well as the depreciation on usage that can easily be calculated 
which is largely absent in case of social capital. Solow (1999: 7) argues that “if I 
told you that the return on social capital had fallen from 10 percent a year to 6 
percent a year since 1975, would that convey any clear picture to you?” Robison, 
Schmid and Siles (2002), on the other hand, refuse to consider social capital as 
‘capital’ lacking the essential features of capital including measurability by a 
common currency, substitutability, transferability and opportunity for direct 
investment.  
Durlauf (1999) criticises that social capital is ill defined and is ambiguous. 
He argues that social capital is defined in terms of its effect as well as its 
characteristics resulting confusion in definition. Fine (2001), on the other hand, 
argues that social capital is non-economic and of limited or no use for policy 
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intervention. Astone et al. (1999) also do not find any justification as to why 
actors should work to expand social capital when rationally they can put effort for 
individual interest. Accordingly, exchange within family, friends and neighbours 
cannot be readily put into the utilitarian motivational framework. 
Both Solow and Arrow, however, were not entirely rejecting the effort of 
these social capital proponents rather their objection was terming it as ‘capital’. 
As he states, “I am going to be critical of the concept of social capital and the way 
it is used. That does not mean I think the underlying ideas are unimportant or 
irrelevant to economic performance. On the contrary, I think that those who write 
and talk about social capital are trying to get at something difficult, complicated, 
and important: the way a society’s institutions and shared attitudes interact with 
the way its economy works. It is a dirty job, but someone has to do it. My problem 
is that I want to see the job done well” (Solow 1999: 6). Solow, thus, accepts that 
a lot of economic behaviour is socially determined, enforced by social pressure, 
social norms and religious instructions.  
In response to these critics, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) argue 
that social capital is not something that exists naturally. Rather, individuals make 
calculative decisions to make their networks, joining clubs and maintain 
relationships with a clear hope for future benefits. Grootaert (1999), thus, argues 
that capital is factor that requires resources, especially time, to produce and is 
subject to accumulation and decumulation. If individuals can invest in it and can 
expect positive returns from, it can be considered as capital. He argues that social 
capital is capital as it is harnessed from formal and informal settings although 
investment in social capital is much more difficult than in human capital (e.g., 
building schools, training teachers and upgrading curriculum).  
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Similarly, Sobel (2002) argues that like material and physical capital, 
social capital is also transferable to some extent from one person to another. He 
provides example of reputation of a shop. The reputation is partly transferable 
from one owner of the shop to other from its selling. Transfer of the shop’s 
ownership does not reduce its reputation to ‘zero’ rather the new owner instantly 
enjoys part of the reputation from its previous ownership. Sobel (2002), thus, 
argues that social capital can be accumulated and transferred in this way over 
time. Ostrom (1999), on the other hand, argues that the novelty of social capital is 
that it is not depreciating with use, rather it appreciates. The more individuals 
engage themselves in extended networks and trusting relationships, the more 
productive is social capital.  
Thus, despite such critics and limitations in the conceptualisation, the 
implication for social capital is increasingly recognised in economic decision 
making. Modern economic theory cannot but accept in many instances that the 
market needs support and supplementation of non-market relations to attain 
efficiency, even in the liberalised and advanced market economies (Glaeser, 
Laibson and Sacerdote 2002; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004; Karlan 2005). 
Coleman (1988) provides the classic example of New York diamond market 
which is entirely based on trust. He argues that in that market a diamond seller 
usually leaves his jewels-bag to the potential buyer. The buyer keeps the bag for 
days, examines privately when get time. The seller does not think whether the 
buyer will change his jewels with inferior stones or some replica. Coleman claims 
that this trust and trustworthiness of the sellers and the buyers reduces cost of 
monitoring, increases efficiency in trading and in absence of such trust trade 
might not occur at all. Thus, Coleman (1988: 98) argues, “social capital is 
 Chapter Two 
 
~ 42 ~ 
 
productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence 
would not be possible”. Lang and Hornburg (1998) state that personal networks 
help the lenders know their local communities to foresee the likely outcome of 
loans. The local networks, in this way, serve as the bridge that links the 
marginalised section of the society and smaller enterprises to the outside world, 
help to build civic infrastructure and to transform an entire community at the end. 
Similarly Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002), Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 
(2004) and Karlan (2005) argue that social capital helps financial institutions to 
better understand the lending, savings and repayment behaviour of the borrowers 
even with incomplete information. Portes (1998; 22), a strong critic of social 
capital, is convinced that, “as a label for the positive effects of sociability, social 
capital has, in my view, a place in theory and research provided that its different 
sources and effects are recognised and that their downsides are examined with 
equal attention”. 
 
2.7 The Positive Effects of Social Capital  
There are bunch of studies to document positive effects of social capital. 
Arrow (1972) emphasises importance of social connection improving financial 
transaction. He argues that social connection facilitates costly legal necessities 
required to make investment and financial transactions. Putnam (1993) explains 
development differences across different regions of Italy due to social capital. In a 
different study, Putnam (2000) also documents significant effect of social capital 
on the quality of public schooling, health and juvenile delinquency in the US. 
Coleman (1988), on the other hand, mentions social capital to lower drop-out rate 
in schools. Knack and Keefer (1997) find social capital to affect economic growth 
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of a country.  They evidence in their study that a one-standard deviation increase 
in the level of trust is likely to increase economic growth by about one-half 
standard deviation even after controlling for levels of law and order situation. La 
Porta et al. (1997), on the other hand, mention trust as an important correlate to 
increase judicial efficiency and reduce corruption.  
The literature also provides evidence on the effect of social capital to help 
the poor combating income and employment shocks (e.g., Bardhan 1984; Basu 
1996; Udry 1994; Townsend 1994; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007). The classic 
Grameen Bank example is given by Bardhan (1995) and Karlan (2005) that social 
capital helps poor borrowers to repay their loan instalments in time. Bebbington 
(1996) evidences the effect of rural organisation in Bolivia and Ecuador to 
increase poor people’s access to local markets and government institutions. 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) mention ‘link’ to 
be important for the households to pool and share risk within a confined network 
particularly within family and friends.  
There is also literature to mention significant effect of social capital 
improving certain indicators of health and health behaviour, e.g., mortality rates 
(Islam et al. 2008); elderly health (Veenstra 2000); worker’s health (Liukkonen et 
al 2004); self-rated health (Ichida et al. 2009); and physical and mental health 
(Borgonovi 2010). As Putnam (2000) argues social capital has psychological and 
biological influences that affect people’s health and quality of life. The literature 
also documents the effect of social network to increase female autonomy, mobility 
and collective consciousness in the event of violence against women (Hashemi, 
Schuler and Riley 1996; Kabeer 2001; Mahmud 2003; Pitt, Khandker and 
Cartwright 2006). The empirical works, thus, support the views of Putnam (1993) 
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and Coleman (1988) that social capital, like physical and human capital, is equally 
productive and beneficial for the individual and society. The literatures share a 
common view that social capital is a resource and have positive effects improving 
efficiency across various socio-economic outcomes. 
 
2.8 The Downside of Social Capital 
Social capital is neither a panacea to all market failure and inefficiencies, 
nor a blessing for granted. Social capital cannot cure all the problems and has 
limitations too (Coleman 1988; 1990; Portes and Landolt 1996; Gargiulo and 
Bernassi 1997; 1999; Putzel 1997; Portes 1998). Coleman (1988; 1990) warns that 
social capital may be harmful for or can exclude some people from accessing 
certain social networks, resources and opportunities. Portes (1998) provides a 
systematic analysis about the negative consequences of social capital. First, it can 
tie some people together but can exclude some others as well. Second, it can 
reduce the entrepreneurship ability of people relying much on other members of 
the group and thus can create a free rider problem. Third, the bonding relationship 
can sometimes lead to strong and oppressive social control to the group members 
resulting strong social sanction and punishment for the deviants. Brody and 
Lovrich (2002), for example, evidence that the presence of strong social capital 
often creates strong resilience against petty crimes and refuses to accept 
criminal’s basic rights (e.g., opportunity to defend) in the society. Fourth, social 
capital of a group can be used against the greater interest of the larger community.  
Thus, though social capital can bring positive externalities to the society, it 
cannot guarantee overall social improvement. Grootaert (1998), Warren (2001) 
and Sobel (2002) find evidence that social capital of certain groups (e.g., the 
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Mafia and the militia) are often used for purposes subversive to the welfare of the 
society. Findings of these literatures confirm that a segmented section of the 
society might benefit from social capital among them but can be detrimental to 
others in the larger community. Durlauf (1999) also evidences that group 
homogeneity of the whites were responsible for the discrimination against the 
blacks in southern US. He argues that while social capital can help people in a 
group to achieve particular desirable outcome, it can equally bring hostility in the 
intra-group relations. Warren (2001) further argues that people in a 
neighbourhood can organise themselves for single-family housing zone for a quiet 
residential area but this can go against the interest of the newcomers and may 
raise the prices of housing.  
There are also feminist authors (e.g., Parcel and Menaghan 1994; Astone 
et al. 1999; Morrow 1999; Lowndes 2000; Blaxter and Hughes 2000; Molyneux 
2002) who strongly criticise the idea of social capital of Putnam and Coleman for 
gender blindness. Molyneux (2002) argues that by emphasising more on the 
‘traditional networks’, social capital doctrines in fact are promoting ‘traditional 
families’ with complete male domination at the end. She points that women are 
inappropriately focused in the literature of social capital because, first, they are 
usually excluded from such networks that bring economic opportunities; and 
second, female works typically take the form of volunteerism. In similar studies, 
Hall (1999) and Patterson (1999) evidence that men enjoy more social trust 
compared to women in the society. They explain that since the position of the 
women is lower in a patriarchal society, men are considered more trustworthy and 
capable to comply with trusting relationship and economic transactions. Rahman 
(1999), on the other hand, evidences increased violence against women in micro-
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credit group. Kusakabe (2001) argues that although women with higher social 
capital in the micro-vendor groups prosper, this comes at the cost of their 
compromises in male subordination. He mentions that “with the effort to be 
integrated into the mainstream society and economy, women members can opt for 
acting and thinking that conforms to dominant gender norms and identity 
(Kusakabe 2001: 35). 
Fine (2003) also criticises the celebrated argument of trust in the New 
York diamond market example of Coleman (1988). He argues that this diamond 
market itself is the longest standing cartel starting from 1870 in the Kimberley 
mine, with the crudest form of colonial exploitation of labour and producing 
unruly high prices of diamond. DeFilippis (2001) also joins this criticism stating 
that the diamond market is completely closed off to anyone who is not part of the 
Jewish ethnic group. Fine (2003), thus, accuses social capital of creating instead 
of addressing market imperfections and inefficiency which its proponents often 
claim.  
However, Coleman (1988), the leading social capitalist, accepts the 
potential dark side of social capital in his work. He argues that social capital is a 
resource and like any other resources its effect will be determined by its usage. He 
argued that “like physical capital and human capital, social capital is not 
completely fungible but may be specific to certain activities. A given form of 
social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be useless or even 
harmful for others” (Coleman 1988: 98). That is, some people can be better off 
from a given social network while for some others it can be of no use or even 
harmful. Thus, the negative and positive effects are context specific and one has 
to be careful in the study of social capital. 
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2.9 Social Capital in This Thesis 
In this dissertation, social capital is constructed using answers from the 
following three questions: i) if received any invitation from non-relative 
neighbours in last one year, ii) if received any help from non-relative neighbours 
in last one year1, and iii) if invited to participate in shalish (a social system for 
informal adjudication of petty disputes by community members). A value of 1 is 
assigned to each ‘yes’ answer and 0 to each ‘no’ answer. The social capital index 
is then constructed by aggregating these answers employing principal component 
analysis (PCA). A similar index has also been employed by, among others, 
Krishna and Uphoff (1999), Narayan and Pritchett (1999) and Mallick (2013). For 
robustness check of the empirical results, it also uses each component of social 
capital separately. 
Looking at the constructs of social capital (Section 2.4), the first indicator 
measuring social capital in this thesis namely, Invitation, manifests bondage of the 
household in a given ‘social network’. Invitation also indicates that the household 
is valued and included in the community by others, and thus it also measures 
‘sense of community’ in a passive sense. Help, on the other hand, represents one’s 
involvement in a network of group with care, support and commitment in need. 
Household receiving help in distress time is also expected to extend hand to others 
when required (Coleman 1988). Help, thus represents household’s possession of 
social capital in terms of ‘trust’, ‘reciprocity’, ‘social support’, and ‘social 
network’. Finally, Shalish is called by the villagers to settle petty dispute among 
                                                 
1 Help includes i) cooked food and food items such as rice, salt, egg, pulse and spices as 
gift or loan; ii) accompany to visit doctor, hospital and pharmacy; iii) assistance in 
buying/selling productive assets  such as cow and tree; and iv) information about job, 
relief and informal loan. 
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themselves without heading for costly legal procedures. It gives punishment and 
reprimands to person who violates certain norms and values of the society and 
upholds sense of community. It shows people’s belonging to a bonded 
relationship, guided by certain norms and values. Shalish, thus, manifests social 
capital in terms of ‘collective efficacy’, ‘sense of community’, ‘norms and values’ 
and ‘trust’. 
In terms of dimension, the measures of social capital (e.g., Invitation, Help 
and Shalish) of this thesis correspond to the notion of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ 
social capital (Section 2.3). All these indicators measure social capital of the 
household with a network of the group of people in both horizontal and vertical 
relationships. Household gets Help and Invitation both from people of their own 
footing as well as across strata. Similarly, the arrangement and the invitation for 
Shalish include people who live in a common bondage in a given social network 
irrespective of their wealth and positions in the society. The linking social capital 
is absent in the measure of social capital used in this thesis. This is because the 
extreme poor households, the cohort of the dataset of this study, do not belong to 
any organisational membership, even are excluded from microcredit groups 
(Amin, Rai and Topa 2003).  
 
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
Social capital is multi-dimensional, in terms of its definition, construction 
as well as the externalities it generates. Like other forms of resources social 
capital is not equally productive all the time, nor that everyone can access to the 
social relationships without effort and even can face hindrances to do so. Some 
bonding relationships can materialise explicit benefits to its members while others 
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can see it as potential cause of their misfortune and in extreme cases social capital 
can be detrimental to the welfare of the greater community and the nation-state. 
There might be cases when state policies are complement to the development of 
social capital and there might also be cases when it undermines. It is also apparent 
from above discussion that social relationships in terms of bonding, bridging and 
linking social capital are of particular use for people in specific context. Careful 
thoughts and investigation are, therefore, required in the study of social capital. 
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 CHAPTER THREE SOCIAL CAPITAL AND HEALTH BEHAVIOUR AMONG THE EXTREME POOR IN RURAL BANGLADESH 
 
“People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of 
development is to create an enabling environment for          
people to live long, healthy and creative lives.” 
—Human Development Report, 1990, UNDP 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The association between social capital and health has attracted considerable 
attention in the recent literature. There is ample evidence, though mainly in the 
context of developed countries, that social capital has significant impact on health 
outcomes such as elderly health (Veenstra 2000; Nummela et al. 2008), worker’s 
health (Liukkonen et al. 2004), self-rated health (Fujiwara and Kawachi 2008; 
Ichida et al., 2009), mental health (Borgonovi 2010), child health (Bhalotra, 
Valente and van Soest 2010), survival (Bygren, Konlaan and Johansson 1996) and 
mortality rate (Kawachi et al. 1997; 1999; Islam et al. 2008; Oksanen et al. 2012). 
There is a burgeoning literature documenting a sizeable correlation between social 
capital and health-related behaviour such as fertility (Munshi and Myaux 2006; 
Gayen and Raeside 2007), contraceptive use (Kincaid 2000; Gayen and Raeside 
2010), sexual risk and AIDS (Crosby et al. 2003), and smoking, drinking and 
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risky behaviour (Aarino et al. 2002; Clark and Loheac 2007). The literature shares 
a common view that health is an integral part of socio-economic development and 
social capital plays a pivotal role in health outcomes and long-term poverty and 
inequality reduction. There is also a strand of literature which highlights the 
importance of hygienic practices, such as hand-washing, sanitation, and domestic 
cleanliness (for instance Zeitlyn and Islam 1991; Curtis, Cairncross and Yonli 
2000; Larson et al. 2001; Cairncross et al. 2005; Waterkeyn and Cairncross 2005). 
However, with the exception of Waterkeyn and Cairncross (2005), none of these 
studies mention social capital, nor do they relate hygienic practices to social 
capital. On the other hand, the papers that study social capital focus almost 
exclusively on health outcomes, not on health behaviour and hygienic practices.  
This essay contributes to the literature on social capital and health by 
investigating the effect of social capital on a range of health behaviour and 
hygiene practices in rural Bangladesh. It deviates from the extant literature in 
three major respects. First, it focuses on the extreme poor, rather than the poor in 
general. This is crucial because the poor are heterogeneous and the extreme poor, 
who consist of nearly 30% of the population in rural Bangladesh, are mostly 
illiterate, do not have access to radio or TV and are largely excluded from the 
government and NGO-based development or health awareness programs. This 
offers the major advantage that the effect of social capital is not contaminated by 
other confounding sources of information, suggesting that the extreme poor are 
the ideal cohort to isolate the potential effect of social capital. Second, it advances 
methodologically over other studies by addressing the measurement error in social 
capital, which in turn helps obtain unbiased and consistent estimates. Third, it 
considers an array of health-seeking behaviour and hygiene practices, some of 
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which have not been explored in prior studies. The health behaviour and hygienic 
practices under consideration include: i) use of sanitary latrine, ii) hand-washing 
with soap after defecation, iii) wearing sandal/shoe at home by all household 
members, iv) use of safe water for drinking, v) use of safe water for cooking, vi) 
awareness of arsenic contamination in water, vii) use of packed salt, and viii) use 
of family planning methods by eligible married couples.  
This investigation is crucial for the following reasons. In Bangladesh 
under-five mortality rate is considerably high in rural areas at 77 per 1000 birth 
(BBS 2006). Remarkably, about half of the children under five are underweight 
and many of the child deaths result from cholera, diarrhoea and other common 
diseases (BBS 2006). The lack of and ignorance about hygienic practices and use 
of unsafe water for drinking and cooking are the main reasons for the widespread 
of cholera and diarrhoea (Curtis and Cairncross 2003). A large section of the rural 
population in Bangladesh has inadequate iodine consumption, battling with severe 
mental retardation and thyroid problems, especially women and children. Arsenic 
contamination is also severe in a large percentage of three million tube-wells 
across Bangladesh, which is the only source of drinking water in rural areas, 
resulting in various skin-related diseases. Studying health behaviour for the 
extreme poor is thus critical because they do not have ready access to medical 
services in the event of illness and preventive health and hygiene practices are the 
main instruments for reducing the risk of common diseases. 
Here it is pertinent to ask: why social capital? The central reasoning is that 
social capital is a powerful tool that affects human behaviour by mitigating 
information asymmetries among the individuals. The core of social capital lies in 
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that participation of people in both informal and formal social networks alters 
their attitudes compared to what they would do individually (Durkheim 1895).2  
However, social capital is also a broad concept. While this has resulted in 
a lack of consensus on its definition and measurement, the literature has 
commonly used some proxies that track individuals’ participation in community 
events.3 In this paper, we follow Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) and 
Karlan (2005) and define social capital as social characteristics such as social 
skills and networks which enable an individual to overcome the imperfect 
information problems and reap market and non-market returns from interaction 
with others. Also, following the practice in the literature, we construct an index of 
social capital out of frequent social interactions that include invitation received 
from non-relative neighbours, help received from non-relative neighbours and 
participation in the social informal adjudication (shalish). As a robustness check, 
we also study each individual component separately. Our measure of social capital 
                                                 
2 Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) are the pioneers in popularizing the concept of 
social capital. They define social capital as a feature of social structure such as the levels 
of interpersonal trust, norms of reciprocity and mutual aid that act as resources for 
collective action. For a review on social capital, see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006). 
 
3 The following are some examples of the proxies for social capital. Kawachi, Kennedy 
and Glass (1999)-membership in groups, civic trust and helpfulness of others; Islam et al. 
(2008)-voter turnout and crime rates; Veenstra (2000)-voting, writing letters to editors, 
and paying attention to the community, socialisation with colleagues at work; Hyyppa 
and Maki (2001), Viswanath, Steele and Finnegan (2006)-different participating 
activities; Campbell, Wood and Kelly (1999)-local identity; Campbell, Williams and 
Gilgen (2002)-members of the local sporting clubs; Latkin et al. (2003)-church 
attendance; Gayen and Raeside (2007)-networking and social relationships; Waterkeyn 
and Cairncross (2005)-club membership; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004)-blood 
donation. 
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has a significant advantage over other measures in the literature in that it is not 
contaminated by the ‘intervention effect’ of the organisational membership.4  
Given that all the dependent variables are binary, our benchmark 
estimation strategy is the probit model. However, use of any proxy metric for 
social capital is susceptible to the problem of error-in variables. Furthermore, 
other unobservable factors that affect both social capital and health behaviour can 
mar the reliability of the estimation. To overcome this issue, we employ the 
instrumental variable (IV) method. Our identification strategy, discussed in detail 
in Section 3.4, exploits the exogenous differences in the number of open-access 
resources available to the extreme poor. The key feature of our instrument is that 
it acts as a quasi-random experiment in that it randomly separates the extreme 
poor into different groups based on the availability of the number of social capital 
construction platforms, thus usefully identifying the effect of social capital. We 
also establish that the instrument has no independent effect on the outcome 
variables. Our dataset is a household survey data which include 5600 households 
from 156 villages in three districts in northern Bangladesh. After controlling for a 
rich set of explanatory variables such as demographic characteristics, economic 
conditions, access to alternative sources of information and village level 
infrastructure, we document strong and robust evidence for the pivotal role played 
                                                 
4 For instance, Waterkeyn and Cairncross (2005), one of the notable exceptions studying 
social capital and hygienic practices, measure social capital in terms of membership at 
Community Health Clubs in Zimbabwe. However, the effects of the health clubs can also 
be considered as an ‘intervention effect’, rather than social capital effect. This is because 
the purpose of these health clubs is to organise training sessions, motivate people for 
sanitation and so on. Club members receive repeated training and materials that also 
requires funding.  
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by social capital in health-seeking behaviour and hygiene practices. The results 
are also robust even when each individual component of social capital is 
considered.   
Our results offer significant policy implications. A solid understanding of 
the health behaviour of the extreme poor is important for the attainment of the 
Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations. Improving this behaviour 
can lead to improved health, reduced infant and maternal mortality and better 
child weight which, in turn, contribute to improved demographic composition and 
work force participation. Our findings suggest that building and exploiting 
existing social capital can be an important avenue for promoting basic health and 
health care. Our results also have key methodological implications. When the 
measurement errors in social capital are accounted for by the IV method, the 
marginal effect of social capital is appreciably higher, exhibiting even a reversed 
sign in some cases, compared to the benchmark results. For example, in our 
benchmark estimation, one standard deviation increase in social capital index 
increases the likelihood of soap use by only about three percentage points, which 
is the largest among all dependent variables. Correcting the measurement error, 
the same change in social capital index multiplies this likelihood by six times to 
18 percentage points. Thus, researchers must take a due care in measuring social 
capital.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the 
background on health behaviour and hygienic practices and the extreme poor 
households in Bangladesh. Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 explains the 
estimation strategy, and Section 3.5 presents the results. Finally, Section 3.6 
concludes.  
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3.2 Background of the Study 
3.2.1 Health Behaviour and Hygiene Practices in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh has experienced persistent income inequality and deprivation 
of basic human needs such as literacy, health and sanitation facilities. Much of 
these needs are inaccessible by the poor because of the lack of awareness and 
inadequate government and non-government initiatives. The situation is worse in 
rural areas where population under poverty is around 44% compared to 28% in 
urban areas. Among the rural population, 28.6% live under extreme poverty (BBS 
2006). The government of Bangladesh has set 2015 as the deadline to achieve 
‘health for all’, but the progress towards the goal so far is dismal.  
The WHO report (2003) documents that more than half of the world 
population lacks access to proper and adequate defecation facilities and the four-
fifth of those live in South Asia. Evidence also suggests the importance of health 
behaviour and hygienic practices in reducing the extent of common diseases and 
the resulting deaths. Hoque et al. (1995) and Curtis and Cairncross (2003) for 
example, find that inadequate hand-washing after defecation and anal cleaning are 
major sources of transmission of enteric diseases in countries like Bangladesh and 
India. Lack of hand-washing after defecation, especially by children, is also an 
important cause of diarrhoea transmission (Curtis, Cairncross and Yonli 2000). 
Wilson and Chandler (1991) document that use of soap can reduce children’s 
diarrhoea by as much as 89% in Indonesia. Similar results are also obtained by 
Zeitlyn and Islam (1991) and Gorter et al. (1998). These authors mention that 
hand-washing, domestic cleanliness and the use of diaper/underclothes by 
children have substantial effect to lower the risk of diarrhoea. However, none of 
these studies relate hygienic practice to social capital. 
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Similar dismal scenario is also prevalent in the use of iodised salt. Iodine 
deficiency causes mental retardation and thyroid problems (WHO 2003). For 
majority countries in the world, iodine is a nutrient present in vegetables sufficient 
for body requirement. However, low level of iodine in the soil in Bangladesh 
results in low level of iodine content in vegetables. Experts, in this circumstance, 
advise to use iodised salt to meet iodine deficiency. UNICEF (1999), however, 
reports that only 71% of the rural people in Bangladesh consume iodised salt and 
only 22% take iodine adequately.  
The use of safe water for drinking, cooking and domestic cleaning has also 
raised serious concerns. Tube-wells are considered as the safest source of water in 
Bangladesh especially in rural areas where safe ‘supply-water’ is absent. 
However, a large percentage of the three million tube-wells in Bangladesh contain 
arsenic above the permissible level as prescribed by the WHO (Rammlet and Boes 
2004). As a result, various contagious skin-related diseases are widespread across 
the country despite government’s endeavour to tackle the problem. One temporary 
solution is to raise consciousness among the people to use safe water. Taha et al. 
(2000) document that training programs for the use of safe water and latrine 
improve the behaviour of the village people. They find that 45.7% of the trained 
women use safe water for domestic purposes compared to 32.8% among the 
untrained. Similar effects of training are observed on the use of sanitary latrine. 
Although the government, with the support from donors, has been trying to 
improve the access to safe water and sanitation, the success is still elusive.  
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3.2.2 Why the Extreme Poor? 
The poor in Bangladesh are not homogeneous. The extreme poor differ 
considerably from the poor in general in many respects including education, 
income, consumption and asset holding. The extreme poor are even excluded 
from the microfinance programs because they are not considered creditworthy by 
NGOs (Amin, Rai and Topa 2003). To get a sense of the differences, consider the 
poor who are targeted by NGOs and the extreme poor who are left out. Table 3.1 
presents comparison between the two groups in some important dimensions. On 
average, an NGO borrower household owns about 0.87 acres of land compared to 
only about 0.04 acre owned by an extreme poor household. Value of the dwelling 
house (excluding land), which can be considered as a proxy for asset value, is 
about Taka 8000 and 1200 for the NGO-targeted poor and extreme poor, 
respectively. Per capita consumption is 2284 calories per day for the NGO-
targeted poor, while more than 52% of the extreme poor cannot even manage food 
twice a day. Table 3.1 also provides information about similar differences in other 
dimensions. This justifies a separate analysis for the extreme poor.   
 
Insert Table 3.1 here 
 
 
We have also an econometric advantage of focusing on the extreme poor. 
In our sample, more than 98% of the households do not own radio or TV and 
more than 92% do not have NGO membership. Average year of schooling among 
the adults is only 0.86.5 The effect of social capital on health and hygiene 
                                                 
5 This information is based on the authors’ calculation from the data.  
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practices will therefore not be confounded by these alternative sources of health-
related information.  
 
3.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data was collected as part of a baseline survey for BRAC’s6 
‘Challenging the Frontier of Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP)’ 
program. In 2002, BRAC initiated a new poverty alleviation program targeting the 
extreme poor. Three northern districts in Bangladesh (Rangpur, Kurigram and 
Nilphamari) were chosen for launching the TUP program.  
In each village a complete household listing and ranking was conducted 
through participatory wealth ranking (PWR) exercises to select the potential 
program participants.7 Households ranked as the poorest in these PWRs were 
considered as the ‘community defined extreme poor’. According to these wealth 
rankings, just over 25% of the households were identified as extreme poor, which 
is consistent with the national statistics. The survey was conducted among these 
extreme poor prior to launching the TUP program to create a baseline and 
evaluate the program impact in the future.8 One-third of the program villages were 
randomly selected and all the extreme poor households therein were interviewed. 
                                                 
6 BRAC is one of the largest NGOs in the world. Previously BRAC stood for Bangladesh 
Rural Advancement Committee, now it is a brand name. 
7 Matin and Halder (2007) discuss in detail about the selection of program participants by 
the PWR.  
8 The households were revisited in 2005 and 2008, but this panel data cannot be used to 
investigate the effect of social capital. The extreme poor were provided, among other 
assistance, support for building social capital for about two years. Therefore, the 
contribution of social capital cannot be disentangled from the program impact. Baseline 
data is immune to this problem. 
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The total sample size is 5600 households in 156 villages. The collected 
information included, among others, individual and household characteristics, 
economic endowments such as income, land ownership, employment, assets, 
social capital and awareness, labour force participation, organisational 
membership, health, hygiene and reproductive behaviour and village level 
infrastructure.  
Insert Table 3.2 here 
 
The descriptive statistics of the health behaviour and hygiene practices at the 
household level are presented in Table 3.2. Only about 13.5% households use 
sanitary latrine. Members in more than 61% households wear sandal/shoes9 but 
only 36% use soap after defecation.10 More than 96% households in the sample 
use tube-well water for drinking and cooking. This result is not surprising because 
of near universal use of tube-well water in rural Bangladesh. However, only 19% 
households are aware of the arsenic contamination in tube-well water. Only 8.3% 
households use packed salt11 and 38% among the married eligible couples use any 
type of family planning methods12. 
                                                 
9 The floor of the house of the extreme poor is typically made of mud/soil/sand. 
Household members wear shoe/sandals at home for cleanliness and hygienic purpose. 
 
10 The extreme poor use laundry soap for multiple purposes such as washing clothes, 
hands and body because it is relatively inexpensive. Anti-bacterial, cosmetic or beauty 
soap is a luxury for them. We do not make any distinction among the type of soap.  
 
11 The rural poor usually buy unpacked loose salt left in the open air in grocery stores and 
mix with dust and unhealthy particles. This is convenient for the poor because they can 
buy any smaller quantity. However, unpacked salt does not contain iodine. On the other 
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There are only 7.6% households that have NGO membership. The average 
age of the household head is 42 years and 69% of them are male and 25% are self-
employed. Average education level of all household members of school going age 
and above is less than one year.  
 
3.4 Estimation Strategy  
To investigate the role of social capital, we estimate the following model: 
 
  i i iH Sα β ε= + + +iX δ ,     (3.1) 
 
where iH is the indicator of health behaviour and hygienic practices in household 
i, iS  is an index for social capital and the iX  vector consists of a range of controls. 
The dependent variable, iH , includes the health behaviour and hygienic practices 
specified in the Introduction. Since the outcome variables are binary, we estimate 
a probit regression and report the marginal effects. It is expected that the marginal 
effect of social capital will be positive and statistically significant for all the 
outcome variables under consideration.   
Our main focus is on β , the coefficient of social capital. We construct a 
measure of social capital from answers to the following three questions: i) if the 
                                                                                                                                     
land, packed salt may or may not contain iodine. If it does, iodine content is mentioned 
on the packet. But illiterate people cannot read the information and may be deceived 
packed salt as iodine salt. Thus, most illiterate people, like those in our sample, treat 
packed salt as iodine salt.  
 
12 Family planning method refers to any contraceptive method such as pill, condom, 
injection, vasectomy, ligation or withdrawal. Data on the type of method is not available.   
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household received any invitation from the non-relative neighbours in last one 
year, ii) if the household received any help from the non-relative neighbours in 
last one year13, and iii) if any household member was invited to participate in 
shalish (a social system for informal adjudication of petty disputes by community 
members). A value of 1 is assigned to each ‘yes’ answer and 0 to each ‘no’ 
answer. The social capital index is then constructed by aggregating these answers 
by employing the principal component analysis (PCA). A similar index has also 
been employed by, among others, Krishna and Uphoff (1999), Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) and Mallick (2013). To check robustness of our results, we 
investigate each component of social capital separately. 
The control vector iX  contains a rich set of variables including 
demographic characteristics, economic conditions and village level infrastructure. 
Gender, age and employment status (self vs. wage) of the household head, 
household size, average education, number of household members engaged in 
income-generating activities and average months of employment of the adult 
members also determine the level of social capital in addition to their effects on 
health behaviour. Average level of education for all household members of 
school-going age and above is intended to account for the human capital 
externality within the household since higher education level is both a means of 
acquiring information and facilitates information dissemination. The amount of 
land owned and the value of the dwelling house excluding land (proxy for non-
land assets) are also included in the model to account for economic endowments 
                                                 
13 Help includes: i) cooked food and food items such as rice, salt, egg, pulse and spices as 
gift or loan; ii) accompany to visit doctor, hospital and pharmacy; iii) assistance in 
buying/selling productive assets  such as cow and tree; and iv) information about job, 
relief and informal loan. 
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of the household. Ownership of radio or TV controls for access to alternative 
sources of information. Developed physical infrastructure facilitates 
communication among people. To account for this potential effect, we control for 
the village level physical infrastructure. We construct a vibrancy index using the 
PCA from the following variables—distance from thana (sub-district) 
headquarter, nearest bank, all-weather road, bazaar, bus stand and high school, 
and percentage of households in the village having electricity connection. In 
addition, the TUP program may select the program villages based on poverty 
incidence rather than randomly. The above measure of physical infrastructure also 
accounts for the potential non-randomness of program placement at the village 
level. Finally, we control for NGO membership of the households as NGOs often 
create and extend personal networks among the members and also provide basic 
health awareness. We do not include NGO membership in the social capital index 
because it would confound the true effect of social capital by the ‘intervention 
effect’. 
As mentioned earlier, social capital is a broad concept. Therefore, our 
index, although similar to many others in the literature, may be measured with 
errors. Other unobservable factors, such as religiosity, that might affect both 
health behaviour and social capital can also lead to endogeneity. For example, a 
pious Muslim cleans parts of his/her body and rinse with water before prayer 
(ablution) and prayer at mosque also creates social capital.14 This is likely to bias 
the estimates because of a non-zero correlation between social capital and the 
                                                 
14 Friday prayers in Islam are meant to create social capital. However, given that a large 
fraction of our respondents are female and females are not allowed to enter mosque (a 
cultural, not Islamic, phenomenon), such a missing channel may not be strong. We 
therefore consider measurement error as the main reason for endogeneity. 
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residual in the regression equation. We therefore need a valid instrument that has 
no independent effect on the health behaviour and hygiene practices of the 
extreme poor but works through social capital, the endogenous variable.  
Our instrument for social capital is the number of open-access resources in 
the neighbourhood where the extreme poor can have access to. These resources 
include, i) fallow lands, ii) water bodies, and iii) small forests and woodlands. 
These resources can be both private and public. However, in our case, only small 
river (and canal) is public property but the land on the riverbank is privately 
owned, so that the extreme poor cannot relocate to these places and establish 
ownership. The extreme poor are not concentrated, unlike slums in the cities, in 
any particular part of the village. It is important to mention that Bangladesh is 
very homogenous in terms of language, ethnicity and religion with the 
predominant majority being Muslims. People, even the extreme poor, in 
Bangladesh, unlike the (lower caste) Hindus in India or Nepal, are not 
concentrated based on caste (which is prohibited in Islam) or occupation. This 
rules out any selection issue in access to open resources. 
The above places often serve as informal gathering for the extreme poor 
since other meeting areas in the village, such as shops, tea stalls or playgrounds 
are occupied by the relatively well-off (and male) members. The extreme poor 
interact among themselves in this process, thus creating new relationships and 
cementing the existing relationships.15 It is important to mention that villagers in 
Bangladesh utilise common property resources (which are publicly owned as 
opposed to the open-access resources that we consider), if available, for 
                                                 
15 Traditionally, in rural Bangladesh, the owners of the open-access resources, who are 
usually relatively rich, allow others to use as long as the property is not damaged.  
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subsistence consumption. For example, fallow lands are visited for collecting 
cow-dung used as fuel after drying. Water bodies, such as small river (canal) and 
swamp, are visited for fishing and collecting water lilies and green leaves for 
food. Small forests and woodlands are visited for collecting dry leaves and fallen 
tree branches for fuel and firewood. However, access to these open-access 
resources does not affect their health behaviour. For example, given that almost 
every rural household in Bangladesh has access to tube-well water,  proximity to 
river or canal does not affect their use of tube-well water for drinking or cooking; 
river or canal is used mainly for bath and washing clothes.16 Similarly, proximity 
to woodlands does not affect wearing shoe/sandal at home. Poor people cannot 
afford to buy shoe/sandal frequently, so they usually wear it when they go outside 
(wearing shoe/sandal outside also gives social status) rather than when they stay at 
home so as to minimise depreciation of shoe/sandal. Access to open-access 
resources does not also substantially increase consumption (or income) of the 
extreme poor so as to improve their health behaviour because of the private 
ownership on them. For example, although most of the extreme poor visit open-
access resources, only 8.6% of the households in our sample collected any 
consumption item from them and that constituted only 2.6% of their weekly 
household consumption. The maximum correlation of consumption (share in total 
consumption) from these resources with the health outcomes under consideration 
                                                 
16 Anecdotal evidence might be useful to explain the consciousness about safe water use 
in Bangladesh. During the flood in 1998, when many parts of the country remained 
submerged under flood water for long time, many people took shelter in the nearest 
available highland under the open sky. Instead of using water around them for drinking 
and cooking, people commuted by boat even several kilometers to fetch water from the 
tube-well not affected by the flood. People in the shelter place also learned from each 
other about the harmful effects of using unsafe water.   
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is 0.03 (0.05). Not surprisingly, probit regression coefficients of all health 
outcomes on consumption from open-access resources (both with and without 
controls) also give insignificant coefficients. Therefore, our instrument has no 
independent effect on the health outcomes.17 
On the other hand, social capital of the extreme poor does not affect the 
number of open-access resources, suggesting that the latter is exogenous. Given 
all these features, our IV resembles a quasi-random experiment whereby the 
extreme poor are grouped along a single dimension in terms of open-access 
resources and the social capital level of different extreme poor groups differs by 
the extent of their access to these resources. 
Accordingly, we estimate the model with the aggregate social capital 
index by the IV probit method. However, this method is not appropriate when 
individual components of social capital are considered because both the outcome 
variable and the components of social capital are binary. We estimate a bivariate 
probit model by jointly maximising the (log) likelihood functions of the outcome 
and the selection equations. The outcome equation is given by equation (3.1), 
while the selection equation relates the component of social capital with the 
instrument and other control variables.  
 
  
                                                 
17 The following are the magnitudes (t-statistics) when other controls from equation (3.1) 
are included. Toilet use: -0.003 (0.003); family planning: 0.001 (0.002): soap use: 0.002 
(0.002); shoe: -0.001 (0.002); knowledge about arsenic contamination: -0.004 (0.003); 
source of drinking water: 0.006 (0.005), source of cooking water: 0.001 (0.003); use of 
packed salt: 0.001 (0.003).  
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3.5 Results  
3.5.1 Benchmark Results 
We start with simple probit regressions as the benchmark. The results for 
all health behaviour and hygienic practices are summarised in Table 3.3. For the 
sake of brevity, we report only the marginal effect of social capital. For each 
dependent variable, four models are estimated—one for the aggregate social 
capital index and the other three for each individual components of the aggregate 
index. Column 2 presents the marginal effect of the aggregate indicator. In the 
case of hand-washing with soap after defecation, wearing shoe/sandal, use of 
tube-well water for drinking and cooking and contraceptive use by eligible 
married couples, the marginal effect of social capital is positive and statistically 
significant at least at the 5% level. On the other hand, in the case of using sanitary 
latrine and packed salt, the marginal effect of social effect is negative and 
statistically significant, which is contrary to our expectation. Finally, there is no 
significant effect of social capital on the knowledge of arsenic contamination in 
water.  
 
Insert Table 3.3 here 
 
The marginal effects of the components of social capital are presented in 
columns 3-5. The previous results for the social capital index are not robust to 
each individual component. The sign of the marginal effect even changes across 
different components of social capital in the case of uses of sanitary toilet, soap, 
shoe/sandal and knowledge about arsenic in water. However, in all cases the 
marginal effect is very small and close to zero. Note that these estimates are likely 
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to be biased downward because measurement error in a variable biases its 
coefficient towards zero (Greene 2003, p. 85). In the following, we correct the 
bias by employing the IV regression.  
 
3.5.2 Endogeneity-corrected Results 
Before proceeding with correction for endogeneity by the IV, we first 
discuss the first-stage regression of the aggregate social capital index on the IV.18 
The coefficient of the instrument is 0.094 with a large t-statistics of 4.04. The F-
statistic is 16.33, which is higher than the Stock-Yogo (2002) cut-off value of 
9.86, thus suggesting that the instrument is strongly correlated with social 
capital.19  
The results for IV probit (which is bivariate probit regression for 
individual components of social capital) for different health behaviour and 
hygiene practices are presented in Tables 3.4-3.11. We discuss the findings by 
each dependent variable. Starting with the use of sanitary latrine, presented in 
Table 3.4, the marginal effect of social capital is positive and significant at the 1% 
level (column 2), while the benchmark estimate without correcting for 
endogeneity was negative and significant. The marginal effect 0.31 implies that 
                                                 
18 Since all regressions contain the same set of controls, the first-stage regression is the 
same for all outcome variables. This first stage regression is not relevant in the case of 
bivariate probit estimation for individual component of social capital.  
 
19 The Stock-Yogo (2002) test may not be applicable in the case of probit regression 
because in the IV-probit regression a joint log-likelihood function is maximised rather 
than the predicted values are obtained in the first-stage. Nonetheless, we do it to get a 
sense of the weak instrument problem. 
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one standard deviation increase in social capital increases the likelihood of using 
sanitary latrine by 0.31 percentage points.  The marginal effect is estimated to be 
0.024, 0.012 and 0.013 when social capital is measured by help, invitation and 
shalish, respectively, and all are significant at the 1% level (columns 3 to 5).20 
Average education level in the household increases the likelihood of sanitary 
latrine use, thus suggesting human capital externality within the households 
although the magnitude is small. However, the significance is not robust to all 
specifications.   
 
Insert Tables 3.4-3.11 here 
 
Table 3.5 presents the results for hand-washing using soap after 
defecation. The marginal effect of social capital is positive and strongly 
significant at the 1% level as in the benchmark estimation. The result is also 
robust for invitation and help. However, the magnitudes are considerably larger 
than those obtained in benchmark estimations. The likelihood of using soap is also 
greater in the households with higher average education level and NGO 
membership.  
The results for wearing shoe/sandals by all household members are 
displayed in Table 3.6. The marginal effect of social capital is positive and 
significant in all specifications and in addition, the magnitudes are noticeably 
                                                 
20 Since social capital index is constructed by the PCA, it has a 0 mean and 1 standard 
deviation. On the other hand, individual component of social capital is a binary variable. 
Therefore, the magnitudes of these marginal effects are not comparable. However, the 
marginal effects of different components of social capital are comparable.  
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larger than those in benchmark estimations. Other significant determinants that 
increase the likelihood include average education level in the household, smaller 
household size and ownership of radio/TV.  
Table 3.7 shows the results for tube-well water use for drinking. The 
marginal effect of social capital is robustly positive and significant across all 
specifications.  However, the magnitudes are substantively larger compared to the 
benchmark results. There is no clear pattern of the sign and significance of other 
determinants. The results for the use of tube-well water for cooking are similar to 
that for drinking water both in terms of marginal effect of social capital and other 
determinants (Table 3.8).  
Continuing with the knowledge of arsenic contamination in tube-well 
water, the results are presented in Table 3.9. The marginal effect of social capital 
changes sign across specifications but insignificant in all cases. Average 
education level in the household and engagement in income-generating activities 
increase the likelihood.  
The results for the use of packed salt are displayed in Table 3.10. The 
marginal effect of social capital is positive and significant only for invitation as 
opposed to the negative and significant effect in benchmark estimation. None of 
the other determinants are estimated to be significant.  
The positive and significant impact of social capital on the use of any 
family planning method by eligible married couples is evidenced in Table 3.11. 
Furthermore, the coefficients are found to be many times larger compared to the 
benchmark regressions. The marginal effect of the social capital index is 0.24 and 
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strongly significant at the 1% level. The results also indicate that the likelihood is 
higher if the household head is male and young.  
  The overall results suggest that social capital has significant positive 
impact on most of the health behaviour and hygiene practices under consideration. 
The only two exceptions are the knowledge of arsenic contamination in tube-well 
water and the use of packed salt for cooking. The reason for the first result may be 
attributed to lesser presence of arsenic in the northern region of Bangladesh 
(Kinniburgh and Smedley 2001), the same region observed in this study. The 
latter result can be explained by the fact that the extreme poor often borrow small 
quantities of different food items such as salt and spices from their neighbours; 
therefore, social capital decreases the likelihood of purchasing a whole packed of 
salt. Comparison of the results also suggests that average education level in the 
household is the only household characteristic that significantly predicts some 
health behaviour and hygiene practices. We also find that NGO membership does 
not have any effect except for use of soap. The reason may be that the extreme 
poor are usually excluded from the microfinance program, which is the main 
poverty alleviation instrument of the NGOs in Bangladesh. Since other ancillary 
services are usually accompanied with microfinance, the extreme poor are also 
excluded from all types of NGO benefits.   
The marginal effect of social capital on different health behaviour and 
hygiene practices cannot be quantitatively interpreted because social capital is an 
intangible capital and also a constructed index. However, the marginal effect can 
be compared for different health behaviours. It is the largest for the use of tube-
well water followed by the use of sanitary latrine and sandal/shoe wearing and the 
smallest for the soap use after defecation.  
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3.5.3 Robustness Check 
One may argue that the instrument of this study (open access resources) 
may have correlation with unobserved factors that might affect both social capital 
and health. For example, villages with more open access resources are likely to be 
richer in income and also practice more healthy behaviour. It is, therefore, 
imperative to investigate if the estimated effects of social capital are due to the 
income effect. To examine this hypothesis we estimate equation 3.1 excluding the 
indicators permanent income such as ‘land’, ‘non-land assets’, ‘occupation’, 
‘number of months household members are employed’ and ‘number of household 
members currently engaged in income generating activities’. The estimated OLS 
results, presented in Table 3.12, show that the effects of social capital remain 
largely similar compared to the results including all controls (presented in Table 
3.3) for all outcome indicators of health and hygienic behaviour. For example, the 
estimated results with all controls in Table 3.3 show that social capital is likely to 
increase the use of soap after defecation by 2.7%, while this effect is 2.6% when 
we exclude the income controls (Table 3.12). The results hold for all health 
indicators and across all four specifications of social capital employed in the 
study. The results also hold for IV regressions but are not reported. The results, 
thus, rule out the possibility that the effects of social capital on health behaviour 
are essentially due to the income effect. 
 
Insert Table 3.12 here 
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3.5.4 Further Analysis 
Comparison of the benchmark and the IV results in the previous section 
indicates that the marginal effect of social capital increases manifolds when the 
measurement errors in social capital are accounted for by the instrument. The sign 
even reverses from negative to positive in the cases of use of sanitary latrine and 
packed salt. It is well known that measurement errors bias the coefficient towards 
zero, a fact which we confirm in Table 3.3. Conversely, the direction of bias due 
to the omitted variable is unknown because it depends on the sign of the 
correlation of the endogenous and omitted variables. For example, personal trait 
such as religiosity is positively correlated with social capital and its omission in 
the regression will bias upward the coefficient of social capital. On the other hand, 
disability is negatively correlated with social capital and its omission in the 
regression will lead to a downward bias of the coefficient of social capital.21 
However, the magnitude of bias seems to be so large that it warrants a further 
discussion. 
Consider the case of sanitary latrine use for which the marginal effect is 
close to zero but negative. Only about 13% of the households in the sample use 
sanitary latrine. Estimation of a simple linear probability model (LPM) including 
both the social capital index and its square shows a negative coefficient of social 
capital (-0.026) but a positive coefficient for the squared term (0.009). Both are 
significant at the 1% level. Simple calculations suggest a negative relationship 
between social capital and sanitary latrine use up to the social capital value of 1.4 
and a positive relationship thereafter. Note that 89% of the sample households 
                                                 
21 The near-zero marginal effect of social capital in our benchmark estimation suggests 
measurement errors as the main reason.  
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have social capital up to this threshold value. Given that about 13% of sample 
households both below and above this threshold level use sanitary latrine, the 
result of a negative coefficient of social capital is driven by a disproportionately 
larger number of households below this threshold level. Once we address the 
measurement errors in social capital, the negative relation reverses to positive. 
The reason is that more households now have higher levels of social capital, as 
suggested by the predicted value of social capital in the first-stage regression, 
which in turn implies that measurement errors are large for relatively lower level 
of social capital.  
 
Insert Table 3.13 and 3.14 here 
 
 To further verify our conjecture, we retrieve the residuals from the first-
stage regression of social capital index on the IV (and other exogenous variables), 
and include it as an additional regressor in the regression of sanitary latrine use on 
social capital (with the full set of controls)22. The residual serves as a proxy for 
the measurement errors in social capital. This exercise can also be considered as 
an alternative to the IV regression. For simplicity, we estimate a LPM. The 
coefficient of social capital now increases to 0.555,23 and the coefficient of the 
first-stage residual is -0.571. The difference between the two coefficients is -
                                                 
22 Similar technique is also used by Terza and Rathouz (2008) for non-linear regressions 
who find that the conventional two-stage predictor substitution IV estimator is 
inconsistent while two-stage residual inclusion is consistent. 
 
23 The comparable magnitude is the marginal effect in IV probit regression of 0.311 
reported in Table 3.4. This difference can be attributed to different estimation 
technique—IV probit vs. LPM.  
 Chapter Three 
 
~ 84 ~ 
 
0.015, which is exactly the same as the marginal effect of social capital in the 
benchmark regression without correcting for endogeneity reported in Table 3.3. 
We replicate this procedure for all other dependent variables and summarise the 
results in Table 3.13. In all cases, the coefficient of social capital is very close to 
the marginal effect in IV regressions. The difference between the coefficient of 
social capital and the first-stage residual is also very close to the marginal effect in 
benchmark regressions. This finding suggests substantive endogeneity in social 
capital, most probably because of measurement errors.  
It is necessary to mention that about 97% of the households use tube-well 
water for drinking and 96% for cooking. Because of such skewed distribution of 
the dependent variables, the assumption of the normal distribution of the residual 
term can be suspected. We therefore estimate the model for these two variables by 
extreme value regression which is based on the cumulative distribution function 
for type-1 extreme value distribution (Greene 2003). To account for the 
endogeneity, we extract the residual from first stage regression of social capital on 
the instrument (and other controls) and include it as an additional regressor in the 
second-stage regression. The results are reported in columns 2-5 in Table 3.14. 
The results, presented in Table 3.14 show that social capital is significant for both 
the source of drinking and cooking water across all measures of social capital. For 
both variables, the coefficient of social capital index is larger than those estimated 
by LPM and including the residual form the first-stage regression, but lower than 
those obtained by the IV regressions. For the individual components of social 
capital, a comparison is difficult to make because those were estimated by the 
bivariate probit model. However, our main conclusion about the impact of social 
capital on these variables does not qualitatively change. 
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the impact of social capital on health behaviour and 
hygiene practices of the extreme poor in rural Bangladesh. After controlling for a 
rich set of variables including education level in the household, access to 
alternative sources of information and NGO membership and also correcting for 
measurement errors in social capital, we find a significant positive effect of social 
capital on various health behaviour and hygiene practices.  In particular, we 
document a robust and positive effect on uses of sanitary latrine, soap after 
defecation, shoe/sandals at home, safe water for drinking and cooking, and family 
planning method. The results are potentially important for policymakers both at 
the government and NGO level. As the extreme poor lack access to medical 
services in the event of illness, building and enhancing their social capital can be 
an important avenue to prevent many types of common diseases by improving 
hygiene and preventive practices. While it is not possible to conclude that this is 
the most cost-effective method without comparing with alternative methods, the 
positive externality of social capital extends the benefit beyond health such as, 
among others, consumption smoothing and coping with unforeseen crises. 
The paper also contributes on methodology by addressing the endogeneity 
of social capital. The prime reason of endogeneity is suspected to be measurement 
errors in it. The endogeneity not only bias the effect of social capital, but may 
even reverse the sign of the coefficient, thus leading one to conclude in the wrong 
direction. This important result is relevant in all branches of applied research 
investigating the effect of social capital.  
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Tables 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of some selected socio-economic indicators between 
the NGO-targeted poor and the extreme poor 
Socio-economic indicators NGO-targeted 
poor 
Extreme poor*  
Average year of schooling of the adult 
members  
1.85a 0.86 
Year of schooling of the household head 2.82a 0.53 
Amount of land owned (in acre) 0.87a 0.04 
Value of the dwelling house excluding 
land (in Taka) 
7,968b 1,200 
Household using toilet (%) 20c 13.5 
Per capita calorie consumption per day 2,284b Only 47.5 % of 
household can feed 
twice a day 
Share of fish and meat in total 
consumption (%) 
15.56b 5.77 
 
* The authors’ calculation from the dataset. 
a.  Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006, p. 805).   
b. Halder (1998, p. 43).  
c. Mallick (1998, p.74). 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Notation Mean (standard 
deviation) 
% of households using sanitary latrine TOILUSE 0.135 
% of households using soap SOAP 0.359 
% of households with all members 
wearing shoe/sandal 
SHOE 0.609 
% of households using tube-well water 
for drinking 
DRINKSR 0.976 
% of households using tube-well water 
for cooking 
COOKSR 0.965 
% of households (the respondent) aware 
of arsenic in water 
ARSENIC 0.187 
% of households using packed salt PKSALT 0.083 
% households with eligible members 
using any family planning method 
FAMPLN 0.382 
Age of the household head (years) AGE 42.207 (12.945) 
Average years of schooling of 
households members aged above 5 years 
EDUAV 0.858 (1.235) 
Household size FSIZE 3.878 (1.699) 
Number of months an average household 
member employed in last year (full- or 
part-time) 
EMPLOYMONTH 9.986 (2.272) 
Number of household members involved 
in any income-generating activities 
during the survey (June-July) 
IGA 1.462 (0.708) 
Value of the dwelling house excluding 
land (Taka) 
LIVROOM 1200 (2282.53) 
Amount of homestead land owned 
(decimal) 
HMLAND 2.402 (4.701) 
% of male household head GEND 0.691 
% of household head self-employed SELFEMP 0.247 
% of households owning radio or TV RADIOTV 0.013 
% of households with NGO membership NGOMEM 0.076 
Social capital score  SOCIALCAP Min[-0.822], max 
[3.729]* 
% of households received invitation INVITATION 0.264  
% of households received help HELP 0.147  
% of households attended shalish SHALISH 0.129  
Sample size**  4937 
      * By construction, social capital index has a 0 mean and 1 standard deviation. 
     ** For SOCIALCAP and IGA, the sample size is 4696 and 4840, respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Probit regression results for different health behaviour and 
hygiene practices 
Indicators  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Aggregate 
social capital 
index 
Invitation Help Shalish 
Sanitary latrine use -0.015***  
(-2.99) 
-0.032***  
(-3.10) 
-0.040***  
(-3.22) 
0.012  
(0.80) 
Soap use after 
defecation 
0.027***  
(4.16) 
0.085***  
(5.22) 
-0.011  
(-0.53) 
0.070***  
(3.26) 
Shoe/sandals use at 
home 
0.014***  
(2.62) 
0.072***  
(4.54) 
-0.002  
(-0.11) 
0.013  
(0.62) 
Source of drinking 
water 
0.006***  
(3.09) 
0.010*** 
(2.70) 
0.008  
(1.53) 
0.014***  
(3.34) 
Source of cooking 
water 
0.006***  
(2.71) 
0.009  
(1.63) 
0.008  
(1.22) 
0.020***  
(3.66) 
Knowledge about 
arsenic contamination 
0.001  
(0.37) 
0.012  
(0.90) 
-0.052***  
(-3.60) 
0.056***  
(3.14) 
Use of packed salt for 
cooking 
-0.007**  
(-2.01) 
-0.004  
(-0.51) 
-0.026***  
(-2.66) 
-0.013  
(-1.18) 
Use of family 
planning 
0.014**  
(2.15) 
0.017 
(1.04) 
0.024  
(1.13) 
0.050**  
(2.25) 
N 4,603 4,811 4,614 4,826 
All regressions include constant and other controls but not reported. 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, 
**, and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: Social capital is the aggregate index constructed by the principal 
component analysis. Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish 
respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of the use 
of sanitary latrine (1 = if use sanitary latrine, 0 = no) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.311***(12.70)    
INVITATION  0.024*** (8.79)   
HELP   0.012*** (7.46)  
SHALISH    0.013*** (3.59) 
GEND 0.011 (0.72) 0.001 (1.35) -0.000 (-0.42) -0.002 (-1.24) 
AGE -0.002***(-3.56) 0.000 (0.01) 0.000 (0.49) 0.000 (1.41) 
EDUAV 0.003 (0.41) 0.002* (1.89) 0.000 (0.54) 0.002* (1.84) 
SELFEMP 0.004 (0.29) 0.000 (0.50) 0.000 (0.53) -0.000 (-0.47) 
FSIZE -0.010***(-2.25) -0.000 (-0.71) 0.000 (0.28) 0.000 (0.10) 
EMPLOYMONT 0.005** (2.05) 0.000 (1.30) 0.000 (0.24) -0.000 (-0.84) 
IGA -0.006 (-0.60) 0.001 (1.53) 0.000 (0.51) 0.000 (0.04) 
LIVROOM 0.003 (0.99) 0.000 (1.42) 0.000 (0.48) 0.000 (1.35) 
HMLAND 0.002 (1.44) 0.0004* (1.69) 0.000 (0.48) 0.000 (1.44) 
RADIOTV -0.138** (-2.30) 0.003 (1.02) 0.000 (0.25) 0.004 (1.10) 
NGOMEM -0.008 (-0.31) 0.004 (1.47) 0.001 (0.62) 0.006 (1.56) 
VIBRANCY -0.007* (-1.78) 0.000 (1.25) 0.000 (0.50) 0.000 (0.43) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-8667.67 -4528.98 -3630.21 -3648.60 
Predicted 
probability 
0.3533 0.0039 0.0002 0.0048 
N 4,603 4811 4614 4826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, 
**, and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 3.5: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of hand-
washing using soap after defecation (1 = if wash hand with soap, 0 = no) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.176** (2.08)    
INVITATION  0.091*** 
(3.82) 
  
HELP   0.039*** 
(3.16) 
 
SHALISH    -0.038 (-0.55) 
GEND 0.066*** (3.21) 0.019 (1.51) 0.002 (1.09) -0.006 (-0.35) 
AGE -0.004*** (-7.33) -0.001* (-1.77) -0.000 (-0.67) 0.000 (0.50) 
EDUAV 0.022*** (2.57) 0.008* (1.64) 0.003 (1.45) 0.006** (2.22) 
SELFEMP 0.052*** (2.90) 0.008* (1.80) 0.008 (1.34) -0.006 (-0.44) 
FSIZE -0.005 (-0.97) -0.000 (-0.10) 0.001 (1.21) 0.003 (1.04) 
EMPLOYMONTH 0.002 (0.54) 0.000 (0.45) -0.001 (-0.96) -0.005 (-1.20) 
IGA -0.015 (-1.28) 0.002 (0.70) 0.001 (0.59) -0.013 (-1.17) 
LIVROOM 0.006 (1.27) 0.002 (1.34) 0.000 (0.77) 0.002 (1.29) 
HMLAND 0.004** (2.19) 0.001 (1.50) 0.000 (0.21) 0.001* (1.86) 
RADIOTV 0.047 (0.55) 0.031 (1.27) 0.011 (1.11) 0.071* (1.83) 
NGOMEM 0.085** (2.36) 0.026* (1.81) 0.013 (1.64) 0.041*** 
(2.65) 
VIBRANCY -0.011** (-2.27) 0.000 (0.45) -0.000 (-0.29) -0.001 (-0.53) 
Log pseudolikelihood -9858.47 -5754.99 -4806.43 -4877.70 
Predicted probability 0.368 0.0322 0.0136 0.0868 
N 4,603 4811 4614 4826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, **, 
and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the principal 
component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model is 
estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 3.6: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of 
shoe/sandal wearing (1 = if all household members wear shoe/sandal, 0 = no) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.256*** (4.63)    
INVITATION  0.136***(4.46)   
HELP   0.079***(8.17)  
SHALISH    0.049** (2.19) 
GEND 0.082*** (3.17) 0.045***(3.40) 0.005* (1.76) 0.006 (1.32) 
AGE -0.003*** (-4.77) -0.000 (-1.33) 0.000 (1.20) 0.000 (1.31) 
EDUAV 0.017* (1.81) 0.014***(3.47) 0.003* (1.72) 0.005***(2.65) 
SELFEMP 0.044** (2.40) 0.014** (2.09) 0.009* (1.68) 0.001 (0.12) 
FSIZE -0.060*** (-5.48) -0.017***(-4.59) -0.004** (-2.05) -0.007***(-3.78) 
EMPLOYMONT 0.008*** (2.63) 0.002 (1.57) -0.000 (-0.56) -0.002 (-1.47) 
IGA 0.002 (0.21) 0.011** (2.08) 0.003 (1.29) -0.003 (-0.83) 
LIVROOM 0.013* (1.85) 0.005 (1.67) 0.001 (1.06) 0.003 (1.50) 
HMLAND 0.003 (1.27) 0.002** (1.97) 0.000 (0.25) 0.001** (2.02) 
RADIOTV 0.197* (1.71) 0.116*** (3.03) 0.035* (1.82) 0.074***(2.67) 
NGOMEM -0.024 (-0.82) 0.012 (1.00) 0.004 (0.91) 0.015 (1.34) 
VIBRANCY -0.014*** (-3.13) 0.001 (0.62) -0.000 (-0.46) -0.001 (-1.08) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-9896.89 -5788.36 -4840.13 -4914.18 
Predicted 
probability 
0.5830 0.0671 0.0136 0.0358 
N 4,603 4811 4614 4826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, **, 
and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the principal 
component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model is 
estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 3.7: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of the source of 
drinking water (1= tube-well, 0 = otherwise) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.334*** (14.31)    
INVITATION  0.133***(17.70)   
HELP   0.065***(10.39)  
SHALISH    0.060***(13.97) 
GEND -0.031* (-1.89) 0.048*** (4.11) -0.025**(-2.32) -0.024**(-2.40) 
AGE -0.002*** (-2.53) 0.001 (1.37) 0.001*** (3.37) 0.001*** (3.48) 
EDUAV -0.110 (-2.11) 0.015***(3.94) 0.002 (0.62) 0.003 (1.12) 
SELFEMP 0.004 (0.25) -0.003 (-0.24) 0.017* (1.81) -0.014* (-1.72) 
FSIZE -0.009**(-2.11) -0.000 (-0.12) 0.005* (1.89) 0.003 (1.02) 
EMPLOYMONT 0.002 (0.88) 0.002 (1.00) -0.003** (-1.97) -0.005***(-3.42) 
IGA -0.025** (-2.57) 0.014* (1.88) 0.006 (1.06) -0.016***(-2.65) 
LIVROOM 0.004 (0.86) 0.004* (1.86) 0.001 (0.50) 0.002 (1.12) 
HMLAND -0.001 (-0.91) 0.001 (1.31) -0.002* (-1.79) 0.001 (0.78) 
NGOMEM -0.018 (-0.61) 0.035* (1.83) 0.015 (0.93) 0.032** (2.08) 
VIBRANCY 0.002 (-0.49) 0.011*** (3.27) 0.005* (1.90) 0.002 (0.66) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-7362.72 -3237.82 -2402.86 -2347.12 
Predicted 
probability 
0.665 0. 211 0.101 0.091 
N 4,545 4,811 4,614 4,826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, **, 
and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
RADIOTV perfectly predicts the dependent variable, so dropped from the regression. 
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Table 3.8: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of the 
source of cooking water (1= tube-well, 0 = otherwise) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.331*** (13.74)    
INVITATION  0.139***(15.38)   
HELP   0.075***(14.55)  
SHALISH    0.068***(17.31) 
GEND 0.021 (1.34) 0.043*** (3.73) -0.024** (-2.44) -0.022** (-2.29) 
AGE -0.002*** (-3.78) 0.000 (1.07) 0.001*** (3.32) 0.001*** (3.56) 
EDUAV -0.011** (-2.19) 0.014*** (3.79) 0.002 (0.54) 0.003 (1.10) 
SELFEMP 0.001 (0.07) 0.006 (0.06) 0.019** (2.16) -0.010 (-1.22) 
FSIZE -0.009** (-2.06) -0.000 (-0.07) 0.007** (2.21) 0.002 (0.93) 
EMPLOYMONT 0.003 (0.97) 0.002 (0.91) -0.003** (-2.06) -0.005***(-3.40) 
IGA -0.022** (-2.25) 0.014** (1.96) 0.005 (0.93) -0.014** (-2.41) 
LIVROOM 0.005 (0.99) 0.004 (1.61) 0.001 (0.51) 0.002 (1.214) 
HMLAND -0.001 (-0.94) 0.001 (1.35) -0.002* (-1.93) 0.005 (0.63) 
NGOMEM -0.035 (-1.30) 0.029 (1.63) 0.010 (0.66) 0.027* (1.85) 
VIBRANCY -0.003 (-0.52) 0.010*** (2.89) 0.005* (1.76) 0.002 (0.75) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-7550.11 -3432.92  -2588.36 -2534.50 
Predicted 
probability 
0.665 0. 221 0.097 0.085 
N 4,545 4,811 4,614 4,826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** 
and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
RADIOTV perfectly predicts the dependent variable, so dropped from the regression. 
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Table 3.9: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of knowledge 
about arsenic contamination in tube-well water (1 = if aware, 0 = no) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.062 (0.77)    
INVITATION  0.016 (0.44)   
HELP   -0.043 (-0.39)  
SHALISH    -0.010 (-0.10) 
GEND -0.020 (-1.37) 0.007 (1.06) -0.014 (-0.74) -0.010 (-0.61) 
AGE -0.002***(-3.03) -0.000 (-1.58) 0.000 (0.32) 0.000 (0.25) 
EDUAV 0.021*** (3.70) 0.009* (1.68) 0.006 (1.21) 0.005 (0.77) 
SELFEMP -0.012 (-0.88) -0.003 (-0.80) 0.007 (0.52) -0.007 (-0.56) 
FSIZE -0.018***(-3.92) -0.004 (-1.63) -0.000 (-0.04) -0.001 (-1.09) 
EMPLOYMONT 0.003 (1.15) 0.001 (0.98) -0.001 (-0.47) -0.002 (-0.49) 
IGA 0.048*** (4.76) 0.015* (1.67) 0.017 (1.02) 0.005 (1.33) 
LIVROOM 0.005* (1.81) 0.002 (1.37) 0.001 (0.40) 0.002 (0.65) 
HMLAND 0.000 (0.04) 0.000 (0.97) -0.001 (-0.68) 0.000 (0.47) 
RADIOTV 0.068 (1.18) 0.035 (1.38) 0.030 (0.94) 0.041 (0.58) 
NGOMEM -0.008 (-0.36) 0.004 (0.57) 0.006 (0.44) 0.010 (0.48) 
VIBRANCY -0.017***(-3.65) -0.002 (-1.34) -0.002 (-1.40) -0.003 (-1.19) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-9085.89 -4970.84 -4018.12 -4076.83 
Predicted 
probability 
0.183 0.0366 0.0543 0.0377 
N 4,603 4811 4614 4826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, 
**, and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 3.10: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of the use 
of packed salt (1 = if use packed salt, 0 = no) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.025 (0.43)    
INVITATION  0.018***(2.73)   
HELP   -0.003 (-0.05)  
SHALISH    -0.011 (-0.44) 
GEND 0.001 (0.13) 0.002 (0.43) -0.002 (-0.25) -0.003 (-0.73) 
AGE -0.001 (-1.58) -0.000 (-0.44) 0.000 (0.23) 0.000 (0.62) 
EDUAV 0.000 (0.01) 0.000 (0.48) 0.000 (0.25) 0.001 (0.58) 
SELFEMP 0.040*** (3.77) 0.003 (0.52) 0.008 (0.30) 0.004 (1.18) 
FSIZE -0.002 (-0.51) -0.000 (-0.16) 0.001 (0.24) 0.000 (0.48) 
EMPLOYMONT 0.002 (0.85) 0.000 (0.34) -0.000 (-0.15) -0.001 (-0.89) 
IGA 0.004 (0.59) 0.001 (0.42) 0.002 (0.26) -0.001 (-0.51) 
LIVROOM 0.002 (1.38) 0.000 (0.39) 0.000 (0.31) 0.001 (0.93) 
HMLAND 0.001 (1.17) 0.000 (0.43) -0.000 (-0.12) 0.000 (0.98) 
RADIOTV -0.051 (-1.05) -0.001 (-0.28) -0.004 (-0.27) 0.003 (0.28) 
NGOMEM 0.007 (0.39) 0.001 (0.42) 0.003 (0.25) 0.007 (0.90) 
VIBRANCY 0.003 (0.88) 0.000 (0.42) 0.001 (0.25) 0.007 (0.85) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-8231.69 -4087.78 -3173.72 -3203.41 
Predicted 
probability 
0.083 0.0036 0.0105 0.0178 
N 4,603 4811 4614 4826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** 
and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 3.11: Endogeneity-corrected probit regression: Determinants of family 
planning by married eligible couples (1 = if use any family planning method, 0 = 
otherwise) 
Explanatory 
Variables 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
SOCIALCAP 0.244*** (3.98)    
INVITATION  0.066*** (5.51)   
HELP   0.039*** (4.94)  
SHALISH    0.041*** (9.27) 
GEND 0.347*** (6.53) 0.064*** (3.55) 0.022* (1.74) 0.012 (1.32) 
AGE -0.007***(-7.53) -0.001*** (-3.35) -0.000* (-1.91) -0.000 (-1.31) 
EDUAV -0.010* (-1.69) 0.003** (2.03) 0.000 (0.45) 0.000 (0.62) 
SELFEMP -0.040** (-2.38) -0.007* (-1.81) -0.000 (-0.29) -0.002 (-1.07) 
FSIZE 0.038*** (3.56) 0.008*** (3.03) 0.004 (1.57) 0.002 (1.14) 
EMPLOYMONT 0.002 (0.88) 0.001 (0.81) -0.000 (-0.99) -0.000 (-1.02) 
IGA -0.003 (-0.26) 0.005* (1.83) 0.002 (1.21) -0.001 (-0.78) 
LIVROOM -0.009*** (-2.70) -0.001 (-1.59) -0.001 (-1.17) -0.000 (-0.94) 
HMLAND -0.002 (-1.53) -0.000 (-0.09) -0.000 (-1.14) -0.000 (-0.34) 
RADIOTV -0.080 (-1.14) 0.020 (1.38) 0.004 (0.60) 0.005 (0.94) 
NGOMEM 0.015 (0.50) 0.014* (1.83) 0.006 (1.19) 0.006 (1.24) 
VIBRANCY -0.000 (-0.07) 0.003** (2.29) 0.001 (1.30) 0.000 (0.76) 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-9362.28 -5247.57 -4300.24 -4355.84 
Predicted 
probability 
0.367 0.0303 0.0111 0.0047 
N 4,603 4811 4614 4826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** 
and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 3.12: OLS regression results with limited controls for different health 
behaviour and hygiene practices 
Outcome Variables  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Social 
capital index 
Invitation Help Shalish 
Sanitary latrine use -0.013*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.029*** 
(-2.74) 
-0.042*** 
(-3.30) 
 
0.012 
(0.78) 
 
Soap use after 
defecation 
0.026*** 
(4.19) 
0.082*** 
(5.21) 
-0.008 
(-0.39) 
0.068*** 
(3.31) 
Shoe/sandals use at 
home 
0.016** 
(2.52) 
0.068*** 
(4.50) 
-0.002 
(-0.09) 
0.009 
(0.45) 
 
Source of drinking 
water 
0.006*** 
(3.39) 
 
0.011** 
(2.47) 
0.009 
(1.54) 
0.016*** 
(3.45) 
 
Source of cooking 
water 
0.006*** 
(2.84) 
0.009 
(1.52) 
0.009 
(1.27) 
0.020*** 
(3.34) 
 
Knowledge about 
arsenic contamination 
0.002 
(0.48) 
0.016 
(1.22) 
-0.054*** 
(-3.75) 
 
0.055*** 
(3.08) 
 
Use of packed salt for 
cooking 
-0.006* 
(-1.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
-0.022** 
(-2.12) 
-0.015 
(-1.37) 
 
Use of family 
planning 
0.011** 
(2.02) 
0.013 
(0.93) 
 
0.022 
(1.32) 
 
0.031* 
(1.79) 
 
N 4,603 4,811 4,614 4,826 
Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, **, and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. Regression includes all controls but HMLAND, 
LIVROOM, IGA, EMPLMNTH and SELFEMP. 
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Table 3.13: Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimation 
Dependent variables   Model-1   Model-2 
 (2)  (3)  (4) 
Aggregate 
social capital 
index 
Aggregate 
social capital 
index 
First-stage 
residual  
Use of sanitary latrine -0.015*** 
(-2.99) 
0.555***   
(7.41) 
-0.571*** 
(-7.55) 
Use of soap after defecation 0.027*** 
(4.16) 
0.196*(1.86) -0.171 
(-1.61) 
Use of shoe/sandals at home by 
all households 
0.014***  
(2.62) 
0.323***  
(3.04) 
-0.308***   
(-2.89) 
Use of tube-well water for 
drinking 
0.006*** 
(3.09) 
0.188***  
(6.02) 
-0.182***  
(-5.94) 
Use of tube-well water for 
cooking 
0.006*** 
 (2.71) 
0.240*** 
(6.25) 
-0.234***  
(-6.17) 
Knowledge about arsenic 
contamination in tube-well water 
0.001 
(0.38) 
0.055 
(0.69) 
-0.053 
(-0.05) 
Use of packed salt -0.007** 
(-2.06) 
0.024(0.45) -0.031 
(-0.57) 
Use of any family planning 
method 
0.014** 
(2.15) 
0.285***  
(2.94) 
-0.273*** 
(-2.82) 
Model 1: LPM estimates of different health behaviour and hygienic practices on social 
capital (and other controls). 
Model 2: LPM estimates of different health behaviour and hygienic practices on social 
capital (and other controls) and the residual obtained from the first-stage regression of 
social capital on the instrument.  
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. 
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Table 3.14: Extreme value regression for the determinants of drinking and 
cooking water 
Dependent 
variable 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
Aggregate 
Social Capital 
Index 
Invitation Help Shalish 
Drinking water 0.255*** 
(4.87) 
1.159*** 
(4.74) 
0.932*** 
(4.87) 
1.353*** 
(4.83) 
Cooking water 0.310*** 
(5.27) 
1.417*** 
(5.14) 
1.138*** 
(5.27) 
1.650*** 
(5.22) 
Observation 4603 4811 4614 4826 
Marginal effects are reported. Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. *** 
indicates 1% significance level.  
All models include the controls and the residual extracted from the first-stage 
regression of Social Capital on the Instrument.  
Column 2: Social capital is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis.  
Column 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish, respectively.
 CHAPTER FOUR SOCIAL CAPITAL, EMPLOYMENT AND BORROWING IN THE LEAN SEASON AMONG THE EXTREME POOR IN RURAL BANGLADESH 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Seasonality in employment and income of the rural households in 
developing countries is well-known. Typically caused by rain-dependence in 
agriculture (Chaudhury and Paxson 2002), seasonality in employment and income 
may sometimes be extreme enough to result in starvation and hunger. 
Malfunctioning of the rural labour and credit markets, and the aggregate nature of 
the shock across families and communities constrain the opportunity for 
consumption smoothing across seasons are the main reasons for these extreme 
fluctuations (Sen 1981; Burgess and Stern 1991; Paxson 1993; Jacoby and 
Skoufias 1998). The Monga in northern Bangladesh is a unique example of such 
extreme seasonality.24 It is a near-famine situation in the lean season that recurs 
almost every year from mid-September to mid-November and is mainly because 
                                                 
24 Monga is a Bengali dialect referring to unemployment, food scarcity, hunger and 
starvation in northern Bangladesh. Khandker (2011) describes Monga as the period of 
virtual economic inactivity and seasonal food deprivation which sometimes rises to the 
level of famine.  
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of plummeting employment and credit opportunities for the extreme poor in the 
pre-harvesting period of the Aman crop (the main rice crop in Bangladesh) (Sen 
1981; Rahman 1995; Berg and Emran 2011).25 The contraction of the rural 
economic activity and the resulting lack of employment opportunity during the 
Monga not only reduces the possibility of selling labor in the spot market, but also 
lowers significantly the proceeds of advance sales of labor in the future market to 
as low as 50% of that in the spot market. This situation is exacerbated by the 
absence of the rural credit markets, both formal and informal, increasing the need 
for an effective consumption smoothing (Pitt and Khandker 2002; Amin, Rai and 
Topa 2003). Dealing with the Monga has been a grave policy concern for the 
government of Bangladesh and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
With their significantly weak economic potential and almost non-existent 
physical or human capital or other form of productive assets, the extreme poor, 
who comprise the 25% of the population in Bangladesh and 40% in the northern 
districts, are the most vulnerable cohort affected by the Monga problem. A 
comparison between the extreme poor and the average poor (typically called the 
“NGO-covered poor”) is instructive to illustrate the plight of the extreme poor 
(see Appendix A4.1). While an average NGO-borrower poor owns about 87 
decimals of land, an extreme poor household owns only a tiny 4 decimals, which 
is no more than a homestead. 47% of the extreme poor (as covered by our sample) 
                                                 
25 In studying the 1974 famine in Bangladesh, Sen (1981) documented that at the peak of 
the Monga, employment dropped to as low as 10% to that of the previous three-month 
average. Wage laborers and several service providers (such as boatmen and petty traders) 
whose livelihood depends on daily wages suffered the most from. This resulted in a 
decline of “entitlement” of food, causing starvation and death. As much as 45% victims 
of the famine were day laborers, while small farmers (owning less than 0.5 acre of land) 
constituted a further 39%. 
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own no land at all. Also, the value of the dwelling house (excluding land), which 
can be considered as a proxy for non-land asset value, is about Taka 8,000 and 
1,200 for the average poor and extreme poor, respectively. Moreover, although 
the average poor can extensively borrow through microfinance programs, the 
extreme poor are categorically excluded from these schemes because of their lack 
of creditworthiness. Furthermore, whereas the head of an average poor household 
owns 2.83 years of schooling, that of the extreme poor owns only 0.53. On a more 
existential comparison, per capita consumption for the NGO-targeted poor is 
2,284 calories per day, while more than 50% of the extreme poor cannot even 
manage food twice a day. All these features make the extreme poor the most 
susceptible “economic” agent to the afore-mentioned severe seasonality. Further, 
following these statistics, it is not difficult to predict that “normal” economic 
relationships are hardly operational in the lives of the extreme poor. 
This paper investigates the role of social capital, a non-standard factor 
endowment, in securing employment and informal loans for the extreme poor as a 
means of consumption smoothing during the Monga. We interpret the improved 
employment and credit opportunities of the extreme poor during this period as 
indicating their increased likelihood for consumption smoothing and reduced 
exposure to hunger and famine. Consequently, our analysis adopts several 
employment and loan indicators as dependent variable, enabling us to capture the 
diverse mechanisms through which social capital may help consumption 
smoothing, including wage-employment and self-employment, and both 
disaggregated by gender. We also investigate the role of social capital in obtaining 
informal loans. Our focus on informal borrowing is predicated on the fact that the 
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extreme poor in Bangladesh are invariably denied access to formal financial 
institutions (Amin, Rai and Topa, 2003). 
Social capital is the only form of capital that the extreme poor can possibly 
own in the present context. The proponents of social capital argue that such assets 
as networks, trust and reciprocity assist households greatly during economic 
hardships and shocks (Durkheim 1895; Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). For 
example, social capital helps economic exchange, particularly in an agrarian 
society where formal institutions are largely absent (Bardhan 1984; Basu 1986). 
Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) and Karlan (2005) define social capital as 
social characteristics which enable an individual to overcome imperfect 
information problems and reap market and non-market returns from interaction 
with others.26 Despite this productive and problem-solving nature, social capital’s 
role in Monga remains unexplored in the literature. Our paper not only studies the 
role of social capital, but also quantifies its reward. 
To measure social capital of the household, we construct an index from 
three distinct types of social interactions: i) whether or not invitation received 
from non-relative neighbors, ii) whether or not help received from non-relative 
neighbors, and iii) whether or not participated in the shalish (a social system for 
                                                 
26 Social capital is a broad concept with no clear agreement on its measurement. The 
literature commonly uses some proxies that track the individuals’ participation in 
community events. The following are some examples of the proxies for social capital. 
Kawachi (1999)-membership in groups, civic trust and helpfulness of others; Islam et al. 
(2008)-voter turnout and crime rates; Veenstra (2000)-voting, writing letters to editors, 
and paying attention to the community, socialization with colleagues at work; Hyyppa 
and Maki (2001)-different participating activities; Campbell, Williams and Gilgen 
(2002)-members of the local sporting clubs; Latkin et al. (2003)-church attendance; 
Gayen and Raeside(2007)-networking and social relationships; Waterkeyn and Cairncross 
(2005)-club membership; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004)-blood donation. 
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informal adjudication of petty disputes by community members), all in past one 
year. This information is available in our dataset only in binary form, rather than 
in count form. Despite this shortcoming, social interactions in the past one year 
can give a sufficient sense of whether or not an extreme poor household can be 
considered to own social capital. Our dataset shows that 27%, 16% and 13% of 
the extreme poor households participated in invitation, help and shalish, 
respectively. These figures clearly demonstrate that social capital is not a resource 
widely available across the extreme poor but, in fact, is a scarce asset, just like 
other type of economic resources. Linking the afore-mentioned indicators to 
social capital theory, we next generate an index aggregating the three attributes 
via principal components. Each attribute is also considered individually.  
Our analysis exploits a rich household survey data for 5600 extreme poor 
from 156 villages in three Monga-prone districts in northern Bangladesh, which 
exhibit substantial variation at the household- or village-level for the key 
variables. A methodological challenge is the endogeneity of social capital. This 
problem can arise due to reverse causality, measurement error in social capital, 
and/or unobservable factors in the econometric model, all of which are likely to be 
prevalent in our case. For instance, employment and financial transactions can 
create social capital, or ability, entrepreneurship, or risk-taking features of the 
households can affect both social capital levels and employment opportunities. 
Thus, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach, with our IV being the 
number of open-access resources in the neighborhood of the extreme poor. This 
IV categorizes the households into different groups with randomly varying access 
to social capital construction platforms, hence usefully identifying the unbiased 
effect of social capital (see Section 4.4 for details).  
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Controlling for a multitude of explanatory variables that include the 
available physical and human capital, and demographic and economic conditions 
at the household- and physical infrastructure at the village-level, we find robust 
evidence that social capital exerts a positive, and economically and statistically 
substantive, effect on the employment of extreme poor during the Monga season. 
This effect primarily works through increased opportunities of both wage- and 
self-employment. For instance, a help received from a non-relative neighbor in the 
past one year increases an average household’s wage-employment by 16% and 
self-employment by 23%. Considering gender disaggregation, this difference can 
be as high as 28% in the case of male self-employment and 26% for female self-
employment. Our investigation also points to the relative importance of social 
capital being considerably higher for obtaining self-employment than wage-
employment. For instance, our coefficient estimates suggest that a given level of 
social capital (as measured with the aggregate index) is up to three times more 
likely to increase the self-employment opportunity for the extreme poor than 
wage-employment. Our analysis also identifies a temporal heterogeneity of social 
capital for wage employment, showing that it indeed helps finding wage work 
during and after the Monga season, but not before the said period. This curious 
finding strongly points to the role of social capital in mitigating seasonal 
economic shocks, with important policy implications. On the other hand, our 
analysis indicates a much weaker and less robust effect of social capital on 
obtaining informal loans during the Monga season. This finding can be explained 
by the lack of creditworthiness of the extreme poor from lenders’ point of view, or 
simply by weak ‘supply’ of informal loans in the local economy. As anticipated, 
schooling and land, where available, do not economically help obtain any 
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significant employment. This latter finding is consistent with “normal economics 
don’t work” prediction for the extreme poor. Our results overall suggest that, in 
the absence of other functional assets, social capital is an extremely powerful 
leverage for consumption smoothing for the “un-economic” agents of Bangladesh. 
Our findings are robust to alternative econometric approaches.  
This paper has several distinct contributions to the literature. First, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the only study that investigates the role of social 
capital in combating the Monga. Second, we study the extreme poor because they 
are the most vulnerable cohort to the Monga problem. That the extreme poor are 
typically illiterate, and their resulting lack of access to alternative sources of 
information such as NGO or radio/TV, offers the major advantage that the effects 
of social capital are unlikely to be confounded by other sources of information. 
Third, we address the endogeneity of social capital through the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. Prior literature on social capital categorically ignored this 
problem, raising serious doubts about the reliability of the previous estimates.  
Our work is situated in a burgeoning literature that finds strong connection 
between social capital and household well-being during economic hardships. 
While this literature investigates the role of social capital in mitigating 
idiosyncratic shocks, our study explores the same effect in alleviating an 
aggregate shock that occurs at the regional level. Our work also resembles Berg 
and Emran (2011), who demonstrate an important role for microfinance in 
reducing the adverse effects of the Monga. We differ from their study in terms of 
our focus on social capital and the extreme poor who are excluded from the 
microfinance program.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
background for the Monga problem. Section 4.3 explains the data and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4.4 presents our estimation strategy and Section 4.5 discusses 
the results. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.  
 
4.2 Background and the Monga Problem 
About 75 million people in Bangladesh live under poverty, hunger and 
consumption rationing (FAO 2010). The extreme poor are the most vulnerable 
cohort to hunger and food insecurity as they lack productive assets, depend on 
irregular daily wage income, and face severe income shocks (Halder and Mosley 
2004). The situation is worse in the northern part of the country where population 
under poverty is significantly higher and income seasonality is much more 
pronounced. For example, about 56% population in the greater Rangpur region27 
lived below the poverty line and 40% under extreme poverty in 2005 (Khandker, 
Khalily and Samad 2010), while the national average in 2006 was 40% and 
28.6%, respectively (BBS, 2006). The data in Appendix A4.2 show that northern 
districts lag behind the rest of the country with per capita income being as low as 
71% of the national average, and share of manufacturing being only 10% of the 
same (BBS, 2002). Daily wage rate is also 28% lower in the region compared to 
the rest of the country (Khandker, Khalily and Samad 2010). This situation 
exacerbates the vulnerability of food provision for agricultural day laborers during 
the lean season, resulting in a famine-like situation. Households opt for advance 
sale of crops and labor in unfavorable terms, leading to chronic poverty. For 
                                                 
27 Rangpur is one of the seven administrative sub-divisions in Bangladesh (also a district 
in the same division). 
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example, a day-laborer gets as low as 50% from selling advance labor compared 
to that in the spot market (Rahman 1995). 
The Monga occurs between two harvesting periods every year in five 
northern districts— Kurigram, Gaibandha, Lalmonirhat, Nilphamari and 
Rangpur—in the Rangpur sub-division.28 The harvesting periods in Bangladesh 
are divided into two major cropping seasons—Aus and Aman. The Aus starts in 
April and harvesting takes place in July-August. However, the main crop is Aman, 
comprising the period from July to December. The Monga occurs during 
September-November when the stock of Aus runs out before the Aman harvesting 
in December. The October-November period is the hardest hit months for the 
poorer households due to severe drop in employment and food scarcity.29 Since 
the extreme poor do not own an asset base and cannot save over the non-lean 
season, they are significantly constrained to cope with the massive employment 
drop during the Monga. 
Because local labor and credit markets do not function properly or are 
absent altogether, governmental and non-governmental transfers become 
important for the subsistence of the extreme poor in the Monga region. The 
government of Bangladesh, along with some NGOs, has undertaken various social 
safety net programs including Vulnerable Group Feeding and Vulnerable Group 
                                                 
28 See Rahman (1995), Hossain (1988), Faridi and Khalily (2008), Rahman, Matsui and 
Ikemoto (2008), Shahriar and Khalily (2008), Khandker, Khalily and Samad (2010), Berg 
and Emran (2011) and Khandker (2011). Rahman (1995) is the pioneering work on the 
Monga. 
 
29 This period is also termed as Mora Kartik. Mora means “dead” in Bengali, and Kartik 
is a month in Bengali calendar (mid-October to mid-November). Mora Kartik thus 
implies the deadliness of the Kartik month.  
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Development programs during the periods of employment and income 
fluctuations. Despite such efforts, 9.3 million poor, including those in the Monga 
region, are still excluded from these safety net programs (World Food Programme 
2010).  
 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Data used in this analysis were collected in 2002 as a part of a baseline 
survey for BRAC’s “Challenging the Frontier of Poverty Reduction/Targeting the 
Ultra Poor (CFPR/TUP)” program30 in three northern districts in Bangladesh 
(Rangpur, Kurigram and Nilphamari). All three districts are in the Monga region. 
The extreme poor in each village were identified through the participatory wealth 
ranking (PWR) exercises by the community members.31 One-third of the program 
villages were randomly selected, and all extreme poor households therein were 
surveyed. The total sample size is 5600 households in 156 villages. The collected 
information included, among others, demographic characteristics, economic 
endowments such as income, consumption, landholding and dwelling conditions, 
social capital, labor force participation, organizational membership and village 
level infrastructure. Data were collected in February-March during the post-
                                                 
30 The households were revisited in 2005 and 2008, but this panel data cannot be used to 
investigate the effect of social capital. The extreme poor were provided, among other 
assistance, support for building social capital for about two years. Therefore, the 
contribution of social capital cannot be disentangled from the program impact. Baseline 
data is immune to this problem. 
 
31 For a detailed discussion on the PWR method and selection of households, see Matin 
and Halder (2007).  
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harvest season after the Monga.32 However, employment data were collected for 
last 12 months that include the previous Monga season. Appendix A4.3 provides a 
detail list of wage- and self-employment activities. Borrowing during the Monga 
is calculated from the information on the timing of borrowing.  
The descriptive statistics on the employment status, lean season borrowing, 
and other key variables are presented in Table 4.1. The number of household 
members employed, full time or part time, during the Monga is 2.15 on average; 
and it is 0.61 when normalized to household size, which is 3.67.33 At first glance, 
it might seem that a large percentage of the household members are employed. 
However, only 1.02 members on average find a wage employment during the 
Monga, and almost an equal percentage are self-employed. There are only 7.7% 
households that have NGO membership. The average age of the household head is 
43 years and 69% of them are male. Only 5% of the households managed to 
receive informal loans while the average amount of such loan is about 1500 
Taka.34 
 
                                                 
32 Since data were collected in one round, consumption and income across seasons cannot 
be compared. 
 
33 We do not have disaggregated employment data, such as number of hours a day and 
number of days a month worked. Therefore, we cannot distinguish full-time and part-time 
employment from the data. Information on location of employment is also not available, 
so we are unable to determine migration patterns during the Monga. However, the poor in 
our sample region hardly migrate considering the associated uncertainty of finding job in 
the new destination and the economic consequences of borrowing and spending money to 
travel to the destination (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2011). 
 
34 In 2002 exchange rate, one US dollar was approximately equal to 60 Taka.  
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4.4 Empirical Analysis 
We estimate the following equation for our examination: 
 
 
i i iY Sα β ε′= + + +iδ X ,     (4.1) 
 
where iS  is social capital and iX  is a vector of control variables. The dependent 
variable iY  includes indicators for two major instruments of consumption 
smoothing: employment obtained, and informal loan received by the households 
during the Monga.  
 
4.4.1 The Mechanisms 
Employment. Households are more likely to escape the Monga if each 
individual at working age contributes to total income. Hence, as the first indicator 
indicating the increased chances of consumption smoothing we use total 
employment at the household level.  
However, total employment does not inform on the type of job 
opportunity, more so how social capital helps with the Monga through this 
particular channel. Thus, we consider employment in two specific categories to 
tease out more specific mechanisms through which social capital may help 
consumption smoothing: wage-employment and self-employment. Finding wage-
employment during the Monga, when economic activity shrinks, requires strong 
social networks. Households with stronger social networks can potentially obtain 
wage-employment more easily than households with weaker or no social network. 
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A vertical social network of the wage-employee with the employer developed 
throughout the year might result in creation of alternative and temporary 
employment opportunities during the Monga. A horizontal network provides 
individuals with better information about the availability of employment. For 
example, information combined with insurance helps the poor migrate to search 
for job outside the Monga region (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2011). Social 
capital has also particular effect on information flow regarding government 
projects such as Food-for-Work, Vulnerable Group Feeding and Vulnerable 
Group Development programs during the period of employment and income 
seasonality (Sulaiman 2006). However, horizontal network may also lead to 
rivalry and competition among the potential job-seekers.  
On the other hand, social network also appears pivotal for non-farm self-
employment35. Success in self-employment requires useful information about 
marketing of goods and services in which social network is of immense 
importance; social network also offers the self-employed a close-established 
market (Borjas 1986; Evans 1989). Furthermore, self-employment often requires 
financing but the extreme poor lack access to the formal lending institutions as 
well as the microfinance institutions. Informal social network enables households 
to receive loan (and also one-off transfer) from networks necessary to start a small 
business even at a zero-interest rate (Fafchamps and Lund 2003). 
An additional important matter is the relative importance of wage-
employment vs. self-employment. A priori, one can expect that social capital can 
facilitate greater self-employment than wage-employment, and therefore, for a 
                                                 
35 Self-employment in agriculture requires cultivable land that the extreme poor 
households do not own.  
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given level of social capital, consumption smoothing is likely to be higher with 
the former. Wage employment, first, depends on others’ economic decisions to 
start and maintain a business. Also, one can remain self-employed even if they 
work temporarily for wage. Moreover, one expects to be more successful as self-
employed if they believe they have sufficient customer base for which social 
networks is an important component. Finally, and related to the previous 
reasoning, ability to generate social capital can be associated with the ability to 
market goods and services as a self-employed entrepreneur. While this 
phenomenon points to the omitted variables bias from econometric point of view, 
a concern that will be addressed below, it implies that a priori social capital is 
more likely to help consumption smoothing through self-employment than the 
reward in the local labor market, which offers only standard wage along the flat 
demand curve in given similar “skill” endowments of the extreme poor. 
Finally, the gender dimension can constitute an alternate mechanism for 
the effects of social capital. Molyneux (2002) argue that women are 
inappropriately excluded from networking relationships in a traditional social 
structure. Hall (1997) and Patterson (1999) further mention that men enjoy more 
social trust and networks compared to women in the society. In our context, when 
employment opportunities shrink drastically during non-lean season, men might 
enjoy greater benefits from social capital in securing wage- and self-employment. 
In support for this argument, empirical literature suggests that men’s wage rates 
are higher (e.g., D’Souza and Chen 1980; Sen 1990, Dréze and Sen 1995) than 
that of women in many agrarian societies—indicating a potential male bias in 
employment outcomes. 
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Given this background, we adopt the following indicators of employment 
in iY : the number of household members employed, ii) the number of household 
members wage-employed, iii) the number of male household members wage-
employed, iv) the number of female household members wage-employment, v) 
the number of household members self-employed, vi) the number of male 
household members self-employed, and vii) the number of female household 
members self-employed.  
Informal Loans. There is evidence that, depending on their social network, 
households receive informal loans and gifts during economic hardships. For 
example, Fafchamps and Lund (2003) document this in the case of rural 
Philippines. The most common reason to accept gift and loans is consumption 
smoothing. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) also show “link” as a strong predictor 
of loans and gifts received by the individuals irrespective of the shocks they 
experienced in rural Philippines. Tolossa (2009), on the other hand, finds that 
people in rural Ethiopia who are not engaged in productive activities are not 
necessarily the victim of chronic food insecurity. Instead, local institutions and 
social capital help improve one’s food security. Therefore, it is expected that 
social capital plays a critical role for the extreme poor for consumption smoothing 
through informal loans during the Monga. Consequently, iY  in equation (4.1) also 
utilizes the amount of loan received from informal sources such as friends, 
relatives, neighbors, landlords and shop owners. 
 
4.4.2. Econometric Model 
In equation (4.1), our main focus is on β . Our social capital measure is an 
outcome-based metric constructed from answers to questions on whether or not a 
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household received any invitation and/or help from the non-relative neighbors and 
whether any household member participated in the community event shalish, all 
in the past one year. Each “yes” answer is assigned “1” and “no” is assigned “0”. 
These indicators are aggregated through principal components to arrive at a 
broader score for social capital. Our index is comparable to the indices of Krishna 
and Uphoff (1999), Narayan and Prichett (1999) and Mallick (2013). 
Nevertheless, we also investigate each component of social capital individually.  
Each of the above indicators is directly related to the concept of social 
capital. Invitation indicates that the individual is included and valued in the 
community, and thus implicitly measures ‘sense of community’ (Baum and 
Ziersch 2003; Goodman et al. 1998). Help represents one’s participation in a 
network that involves care, support, commitment and demand for reciprocity in 
need (Szreter and Woolcock 2004; Harper and Kelly 2003; Heany and Israel 
2002; Coleman 1988). It thus represents one’s possession of social capital in 
terms of ‘trust’, ‘social support’ and ‘reciprocity’. Shalish is a social system to 
settle petty disputes in the community without resorting to costly legal 
procedures; it also punishes and reprimands a person who violates certain norms 
and values of the society. Thus it manifests social capital in terms of ‘collective 
efficacy’, and ‘norms and values’ (Cagney and Wen 2008; Sampson, Morenoff 
and Earls 2008; Baum and Ziersch 2003; Grootaert 1999). 
The vector of controls iX  includes an array of variables in order to provide 
a clean interpretation of β . These variables pertain to demographic and economic 
characteristics of the households, such as gender, age, education (years of 
schooling) and marital status of the household head, family size, amount of land 
owned, health condition (self-reported), women’s mobility outside home and 
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NGO membership. Education is intended to control for human capital, while land 
ownership is intended to control for physical capital. Household size controls for 
labor endowment of the household. Larger household size might also create more 
social capital as it leads to more interactions outside home. Age, health condition, 
marital status and women’s mobility outside home often influence employment 
decision and loans received by the household.  In addition to access to loan, NGO 
membership plays an important role in creating social capital. For example, 
microcredit operations are performed in peer groups, which create and extend 
personal networks among the members.36 Average annual wage rates in the 
village for male and female labor capture the shadow price of labor. Developed 
physical infrastructure facilitates communication and economic opportunities at 
the village level.  To account for this potential effect, we control for the village 
level physical infrastructure, such as, distances of the village from the Upazilla 
(sub-district headquarter) and all-weather road, and availability of electricity. 
Village level variables also account for any non-randomness in program 
placement since the data came from BRAC’s TUP program. 
  
4.4.3. Estimation Strategy 
Our benchmark estimation strategies are OLS and Tobit. The reason for 
the latter choice is the truncation associated with the outcome variables. Our 
sample comprises households with no record of employment or loans from 
informal sources, which might be due to the individuals’ inability to obtain 
employment or loan even if they attempted to, or simply due to the weak supply 
                                                 
36 We control for NGO membership rather than including in social capital index because 
the effect of social capital can also be considered as an “intervention effect.”  
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side of the local economy. As a methodological matter, the Tobit regression is 
efficient but it relies on distributional assumptions. Therefore, we also estimate 
OLS regressions. 
Social capital, however, is likely to be endogenous. A reverse causality 
can arise if previous employment and financial transactions build up social 
networks, affecting, in turn, current employment and borrowing. Moreover, social 
capital may be measured with errors because our proxy may not fully capture the 
concept. Further, the model may suffer from omitted variables given that 
personality traits such as ability or entrepreneurship can influence both the level 
of social capital and the employment opportunities for individuals. All of the 
econometric issues including the directions of possible biases are discussed in 
detail below. Consequently, we adopt the IV strategy.  
Our instrument for social capital is the number of open-access resources 
which extreme poor households can access in their neighborhood. These resources 
include, i) fallow lands, ii) water bodies (ponds or canals), and iii) small forests 
and woodlands. They are privately owned so that the extreme poor cannot relocate 
to these places and establish ownership. Traditionally, in rural Bangladesh, the 
owners of the open-access resources, who are usually relatively rich, allow others 
to use without any formal permission as long as the property is not damaged. 
From the point of instrument validity, note that extreme poor households are not 
concentrated, unlike slums in the cities, in any particular part of the village. 
Bangladesh is very homogenous in terms of language, ethnicity and religion with 
the predominant majority being Muslims. People, even the extreme poor, in rural 
Bangladesh, unlike the (lower caste) Hindus in India or Nepal, are not 
concentrated based on caste (which is prohibited in Islam) or occupation, which 
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rules out any selection in the probability of access to these resources. An 
additional feature of open-access resources is that they exhibit strong within-
village variability in that extreme poor households have variable levels of access 
to these areas given their scattered locations within the village, as well as the 
multiplicity of such resources within a given settlement.   
The above places often serve as informal gathering for the extreme poor 
since other meeting areas in the village, such as shops, tea stalls or playgrounds 
are occupied by the relatively well-off (male) members. The extreme poor interact 
among themselves in this process, thus creating new relationships and cementing 
the existing ties. Social capital of the extreme poor does not also affect the 
number of open-access resources, which is exogenously determined. One concern 
with this instrument might be that extreme poor households can meet potential 
employers or lenders in these open-access platforms because the owners of might 
also be among the employers or lenders in the village. This might constitute a 
direct channel between open-acess resources and Y outside the social capital 
channel. Here we need to stress that the likelihood of the extreme poor meeting 
potential employers or lenders in these platforms is quite low because the owners 
of these resources do not typically visit these places or monitor others’ visits. 
Such likelihood for meeting employers or lenders in another spot in the village is 
no less than meeting them in open-access resources. Therefore we rule out any 
reason to consider a direct relationship between access to open access resources 
and employment or informal loan, thus violating the exclusion restriction due to 
the aforementioned reason. Given the private ownership of the resources, such 
access is also unlikely to create self-employment opportunity for the extreme 
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poor.37 With all these features, our IV resembles a quasi-random experiment 
whereby the extreme poor are grouped along a single dimension in terms of their 
access to open resources, by which the social capital level of different extreme 
poor groups differs given the extent of their access to these resources.  
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Benchmark Results 
We first present the results for the benchmark OLS and Tobit regressions. 
Because the OLS and Tobit results are quite similar, we discuss only the OLS 
findings, and summarize the Tobit results in Appendix A4.4. In addition to 
heteroskedasticity-corrected robust standard errors, we report the standard errors 
clustered at the village level given that the Monga is an aggregate shock, and 
village is the smallest unit experiencing such shocks. Estimating four separate 
specifications corresponding to each social capital measure—the index and the 
three individual components, OLS finds that social capital is significant at 1% 
level in the case of the total number of household members employed (i.e., any 
form of employment) and self-employed (Table 4.2). The results indicate a robust 
a positive effect in all specifications except for attending the shalish. However, 
social capital is insignificant in the case of wage employment, both at the 
                                                 
37 However, villagers in Bangladesh utilize common property resources, if available, for 
subsistence consumption, which are publicly owned as opposed to the open-access 
resources that we consider.  
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aggregate level and when disaggregated by gender. Analogously, social capital 
does not significantly affect the informal loans received during the Monga.38  
 
Insert Table 4.2 here 
 
4.5.2 Endogeneity-corrected Results 
The results for the first-stage regressions of social capital on the 
instrument (and other controls) are presented in Appendix A4.5. The regressions 
document that access to open-resource significantly increases social capital, 
measured both with aggregate index and individual components. The coefficient 
of the IV in the case of aggregate index is 0.10 with a large t-statistic. For all 
cases, the F-statistic is larger than the Stock-Yogo (2002) cut-off value of 8.96, 
thus indicating strength of the instrument.  
The second-stage regression results are presented in Tables 4.3-4.10. The 
endogeneity-corrected Tobit regressions also give us very similar results and are 
presented in Appendix A4.6. 
Total Employment. Presenting the results for the determinants of total 
number of household members employed, Table 4.3 confirms a positive effect of 
aggregate social capital with a coefficient 0.12, significant at 1% level (column 2). 
This implies that for one standard deviation increase in social capital, the number 
of household members employed increases by 0.12 (by construction, the index has 
a zero mean and unit standard deviation). The result is robust to each individual 
                                                 
38 In all cases, the standard error increases (as indicated by the smaller t-value) when 
clustered at the village level, although the statistical significance of the coefficients does 
not change qualitatively. 
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social capital component (columns 3-5). The results for the aggregate index and 
individual components are not comparable. However, the coefficients are 
comparable within the three disaggregate components; the results show that, on 
average, an extreme poor household who received help, or invitation, or 
participated in shalish in the past one year has 0.04 to 0.06 more household 
members employed. While this impact may not be economically very high, it 
suggests that disaggregated forms of employment can provide more information. 
Among the controls, the amount of land owned, family size and female wage rate 
in the village contribute positively to total employment during the Monga.  
Wage Employment. Table 4.4 reports an estimate for aggregate social 
capital index of 0.15, significant at 1%. The effect is slightly larger than that for 
total number of members employed. The result is robust to individual components 
of social capital except invitation. For instance, an extreme poor household who 
received help or participated in shalish in the past one year is estimated to have 
0.16 to 0.18 more people who are wage-employed during the Monga. This effect 
is three to four-folds higher than the total employment case above. 39 
The basic results are similar when wage employment is disaggregated by 
gender (Tables 4.5 and 4.6 for males and females, respectively). The coefficients 
for the aggregate social capital index are 0.13 for males and 0.08 for females. One 
difference is that for male wage-employment the results are robust for all 
measures of social capital except invitation, while for the female the results are 
robust to all measures except help. However, it is worth noting that each 
                                                 
39 Education of the household head and land ownership affect wage employment 
negatively, which is probably because both education and land ownership increase the 
opportunity cost of unskilled wage employment. On the other hand, larger family size and 
higher female wage rate increase the likelihood of finding wage employment. 
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significant individual component is associated with 0.21 more male wage-
employed and 0.22 to 0.27 more female wage-employed in an average extreme 
poor household who owns social capital. It is also very important to note that 
these results are sharply different than the insignificant estimates obtained with 
OLS, which we will return below.   
Self-Employment. The results for self-employment are presented in Table 
4.7. The coefficient of aggregate index is significant at 1% across all 
specifications. One standard deviation rise in the social capital index increases the 
number of households self-employed by 0.39 (column 2). This magnitude is about 
three-fold larger than that for wage employment (which was 0.15). Further, all 
three individual components of social capital (columns 3-5) have positive and 
significant marginal effects lying between 0.22 and 0.26. Where significant, they 
were between 0.16 and 0.18 in the case of wage employment.40  
The findings also broadly hold for both male and female self-employment 
(Tables 4.8 and 4.9), but with some economically meaningful differences 
compared to wage employment above. The results suggest that one standard 
deviation rise in the aggregate social capital index increases male self-
employment by 0.26 (which was 0.13 in the case of wage-employment). 
Individual components are also higher than in the wage-employment case above 
where statistically significant (0.28 compared to 0.21 before).  On the other hand, 
one unit increase in the aggregate index increases female self-employment by 
0.27, which is much higher than 0.08 estimated for female wage employment. 
                                                 
40 Among the controls, larger land ownership and household size increase self-
employment during the Monga. The first result is conceivable as land owners can work 
on their own land. Larger household size increases labor supply, hence the possibility of 
self-employment. 
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Individual components of social capital similarly feature a relatively higher 
interval of marginal effects in the case of self-employment than wage employment 
(0.26 - 0.32 compared to 0.22 - 0.26).41 
Overall, our findings clearly point to the employment-generating role of 
social capital for the extreme poor during the Monga season. Considering that 
mean wage- and self-employment during this period is equal to 1 household (see 
Table 4.1), a help received seems to generate 16% more wage-employment and 
23% more self-employment for an average extreme poor household. Even 
stronger effect is observed with gender disaggregation. For instance, given that 
mean male wage-employment is 0.65 and self-employment is 0.22 in our sample, 
a help can yield 33% higher wage-employment (0.214/0.65) and 125% more self-
employment (0.276/0.22) for males. Invitation is more likely to help females 
statistically. Given that mean female wage-employment is 0.32 and self-
employment is 0.72 in our sample, an invitation increases female wage-
employment in an average household by 60% (0.22/0.32) and self-employment by 
41% (0.32/0.78). It also clear from our results that social capital generates more 
self-employment than wage-employment, with up to three-fold higher effect for 
the whole household, as observed in the case of aggregate social capital. 
An important question is: what sort of consumption smoothing possibility 
do these results point to? Some quantification can be made using wage-
employment findings, because daily wages are available for the Aman season - 
42.31 Taka for males and 28.72 Taka for females (which can be used as proxy for 
                                                 
41 The positive effect of higher female wage rate in the village on self-employment may 
be because the other female cohorts in the village exhaust the available wage work, and 
none is left for extreme poor females.  
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the Monga period). Assuming 45 days of wage work during the three-month 
period, a help received means an extra wage income of 407 Taka for males, while 
an invitation means an extra wage income of 284 Taka for females during the 
Monga. On self-employment, it is not clear whether the extreme poor would 
assess the opportunity cost of wage-employment in terms of the self-employment 
time foregone. However, assuming that our sample reflects this balance well, and 
given the sample means of wage-employment 0.65 and self-employment 0.22 for 
males, and wage-employment 0.37 and self-employment 0.78 for females, there is 
no reason to think that our results should imply lower income from self-
employment than wage-employment owing to social capital during the Monga. 
Further, that social capital helps self-employment considerably more than wage-
employment and that self-employment days can be more than wage-employment 
days, social capital may overall generate an income which may not be ignorable 
during a seasonal shock. 
Informal Loans. The results for informal loan received during the Monga 
are presented in Table 10. The aggregate social capital index is found to be 
insignificant. The reason may be that the extreme poor are not considered 
creditworthy from the lenders point of view, but it may also be the case that the 
‘supply side’ of informal loans is weak in the local economy given widespread 
poverty. On the other hand, invitation and shalish possess positive and significant 
coefficients, indicating that an average extreme poor with these interactions can 
obtain 610 to 715 Taka during the Monga.  However, we do not read much into 
these results because, in our sample, only 5% of the households were able to 
receive informal loans during the Monga. Thus, informal loans may not be 
considered too a strong mechanism for consumption smoothing for the extreme 
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poor. On an important note, however, the results show that possession of land 
contributes positively to obtain informal loan, for which the reason could be the 
perception of land as collateral for loan.  
 
4.5.3. Directions of Endogeneity Bias 
Appendix A4.7 discusses in detail the directions of possible endogeneity 
biases in our estimating equation in order to provide additional insights into the 
corrections made to the coefficient estimates above. Focusing on the aggregate 
social capital index,42 our IV estimates for β in Tables 4.4 to 4.10, where the 
dependent variables are wage employment and self-employment (total, male, and 
female), remarkably consistently indicate higher IV estimates than the OLS 
estimates presented in Table 4.2. The IV estimates are almost three-fold higher in 
the case of self-employment (total, male and female), and depart from zero to 
0.08-0.14 in the case of wage employment. Importantly, these outcomes are 
consistent with Cov(S, ε) <0 discussed in Appendix A4.7, suggesting that the 
extreme poor are most likely introvert, risk-averse, marginalized, unskilled and 
unproductive, characteristics which lead them to have lower social capital levels, 
and consequently, influencing negatively their employment opportunities. 
Insignificant OLS estimates in this scenario are also consistent with measurement 
error in classical sense. 
                                                 
42 Each of the individual component of social capital, i.e., help, invitation, and shalish, 
may have situation-specific relationships with Y (in terms of the direction of the bilateral 
causation between them and Y, or the effect of ability or entrepreneurship, on each 
individual component), but broader social capital measure is more likely to reflect the 
unobservable household characteristics.   
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On the other hand, Tables 4.3 and 4.10, where the dependent variables are 
the total number of households employed and informal loans obtained, 
respectively, show that our IV estimation does not make much correction to the 
OLS estimation. In the case of total number of households employed, this finding 
may confirm that more disaggregated forms of employment can reveal the role of 
unobservables, reverse causation or measurement error, more strongly than any 
form of employment. As per the informal loans, insignificant OLS and IV 
coefficients may point that the weak supply side of these loans is the underlying 
reason for the insignificant relationship, rather than the demand for loan by the 
extreme poor (or their unobservable characteristics, thereof). 
Overall, assuming that our IV strategy is correct, the directions of biases 
obtained in our analysis confirm, yet from another point of view, the weak 
economic potential and “un-economic” lives of the extreme poor in Bangladesh. 
 
4.5.4 Exploring Temporal Heterogeneity 
So far we have emphasized the role of social capital in consumption 
smoothing in the Monga period. Social capital may be relevant for all seasons. If 
its effect is indeed significant in all seasons, both lean and non-lean, then we 
cannot really argue too strongly for its ‘particular’ role in mitigating the Monga 
problem. To address this issue more systematically, we carry out our investigation 
for the periods three months before and after the Monga season. This exercise not 
only helps us understand whether social capital can be isolated for only a 
particular period, but also enables to observe whether there is any persistent effect 
of social capital due to the network created between the employer and employee. 
Policy implications can also be sharpened with this exercise. 
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The findings, obtained with IV estimation, are presented in Table 4.11. 
Social capital seems to help find wage employment three months after the Monga 
(Panel A). Its effect is positive and significant in all specifications for wage 
employment and its disaggregation by gender. It is also significant for each of the 
individual components of social capital in the case of female wage employment. 
However, we find no evidence of the significance of social capital index in the 
case of wage employment three month before the Monga (Panel B). In the case of 
individual components, the effect is significant in some specifications but not 
robust; in the case of female wage employment and aggregated by gender, the 
sign even changes across some specifications. This result, i.e., social capital helps 
find wage employment during the Monga (with the effect persisting for some time 
after the Monga), but much less robustly in the non-lean season, suggests temporal 
heterogeneity in the effect of social capital. One can also suggest that the effect 
does not persist for very long. If it indeed persisted, then it would be observed 
nine months later (which is in fact three months before the next Monga). In terms 
gender, social capital has a slightly higher effect on male wage-employment 
during the Monga (0.13) than after the Monga (0.10). But, social capital helps 
female wage-employment relatively less during the Monga (0.08) than that after 
the Monga (0.13).  
 On the other hand, the coefficient for self-employment is always 
significant in the case of both three months before and after the Monga and robust 
to all specifications. This result suggests that social capital helps the self-
employed create a close-established market that they can access across the 
seasons. The result above that males benefit relatively more than females from 
social networks prevail in the case of self-employment too.  
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Based on these results, we can thus emphasize the prominence of social 
capital in facilitating wage employment specifically during the Monga season. 
The effect continues onto the next period, pointing to the strength of links created 
between the employer and the employee under harsh circumstances. On the other 
hand, it is apparent that the social capital-self-employment linkage is likely to rely 
on the ability to generate networks or to maintain a customer base under more 
general circumstances, but also including the Monga. 
 
4.5.5 Additional Robustness Check 
There might be the possibility, one can argue, that the instrument of this 
study (open access resources) might have correlation with unobserved factors 
affecting both social capital and the indicators of Monga. For example, open 
access resources in a village may affect the income of the households and hence 
their ability to cope with Monga. It is, therefore, essential to verify that the 
estimated effects of social capital are not due to the income effect. To examine 
this hypothesis we estimate equation 4.1 excluding the indicators of income such 
as ‘land’, ‘male wage’ and ‘female wage’. The estimated OLS results, presented 
in Table 4.12, show that the effects of social capital remain quite similar 
compared to the results including all controls (Table 4.2) for all outcome 
indicators of Monga. For example, the estimated results with all controls in Table 
4.2 show that social capital is likely to increase total employment of the 
households by 11.8%, while this effect is 12.9% when we exclude the income 
controls (Table 4.12). The results hold for all Monga indicators and across all four 
measures of social capital used in the study. The results also hold for endogeneity-
corrected estimations without income controls (presented in Table 4.13) compared 
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to the results with all controls presented in Tables 4.3 to 4.10. The results, thus, 
establish that the effects of social capital on the indicators of Monga are robust 
and are not due to the income effect. 
 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the effect of important and previously undocumented 
role of social capital in alleviating the Monga, a unique type of extreme 
seasonality that occurs every year in the pre-harvesting period of the Aman crop in 
northern Bangladesh. Monga is characterized by significantly reduced income and 
employment opportunities, and is a result of under-development or total absence 
of the labor and credit markets, which severely constrains the scope for 
consumption smoothing, consequently causing a near-famine situation for the 
extreme poor.  
 Interpreting the improved employment and credit opportunities of the 
extreme poor during the Monga period as indicating their increased likelihood of 
consumption smoothing and reduced exposure to hunger and famine, the paper 
investigates employment and access to informal loan as two mechanisms through 
which social capital can help with consumption smoothing. The employment 
channel is further categorized into wage- and self-employment, with both 
disaggregated into gender. Our detailed analysis robustly documents that, in the 
absence of other functional assets, the extreme poor households with higher levels 
of social capital have greater success with finding wage- and self-employment. 
We also find that social capital generates relatively more self-employment than 
wage-employment. All these results are prominent for both males and females. A 
further evidence of the role of social capital in alleviating the Monga problem is 
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temporal heterogeneity, whereby strong social networks are found to improve 
more powerfully wage employment during the seasonal shock, but not before. All 
of our results point to statistically and economically significant amounts of extra 
income generated by social capital, role of which cannot be ignored in 
consumption smoothing during a severe economic hardship. Nevertheless, our 
analysis does not find any significant or robust effect of social capital on informal 
borrowing, in which case it is unlikely to constitute a strong mechanism for 
consumption smoothing. Our finding suggests that lack of credit-worthiness, 
together with weak supply side of the economy, seem to pose considerable 
challenges for the extreme poor to take advantage of informal credit markets.  
A key feature of our analytical approach is the addressing of the 
endogeneity of social capital, a problem which has been categorically ignored in 
the related previous work. Our instrument exploits the exogenous differences in 
the number of open-access resources that the extreme poor can access. This 
instrument randomly separates the extreme poor into different groups based on the 
availability of the number of social capital construction platforms to identify the 
unbiased effect of social capital. The significant discrepancies that we observe 
between our OLS estimates and those that are corrected for endogeneity raise 
concerns when the endogeneity of social capital is left unaddressed. Importantly, 
the directions of possible endogeneity biases suggest that the extreme poor are 
likely to be introvert, risk-averse, marginalized, unskilled and unproductive 
agents, leading them to have lower social capital levels, and these characteristics 
significantly underlie their “un-economic” lives. 
The central conclusion of this paper is that social capital increases the 
employment opportunities for the extreme poor during the Monga period, and thus 
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helps better cope with extreme seasonality. But Monga is an aggregate economic 
shock, and individuals with higher social capital are likely to find employment at 
the expense of those with lower social capital. Therefore, in the present context 
we do not argue for a general equilibrium effect of social capital. Recent studies 
indicate that information combined with insurance in the form of loan to migrate 
outside the region for employment during the Monga has significant impact on 
income and consumption (Bryan, Chowdhury and Mobarak 2011). Our results 
indicate that social capital mitigates the information problem but not the insurance 
problem for the extreme poor, thus suggesting an area of intervention.   
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Tables 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable  Notation Mean Std. Dev 
Number of hh members employed  TOTALEMPL 2.02 1.34 
Number of hh members wage-employed  WAGEMPL 1.02 0.81 
Number of male hh members wage-employed  MALWGEMP 0.65 0.68 
Number of female hh members wage-employed  FEMWGEMP 0.37 0.58 
Number of hh members self-employed  SELFEMP 1.00 1.16 
Number of male hh members self-employed  MALSELF 0.22 0.57 
Number of female hh members self-employed  FEMSELF 0.78 0.91 
Amount of loan received (Taka) LOAN 75.63 521.01 
Social capital score (constructed by the PCA) SOCIALCAP 0.00 1.11 
% of households received help from non-relative 
neighbours 
HELP 0.16 0.37 
% of households received invitation from non-
relative neighbours 
INVITATION 0.27 0.44 
% of households attended shalish SHALISH 0.13 0.34 
Education of the household head (years of 
schooling) EDUHH 0.50 1.68 
Land owned by the household (acre) LAND 0.04 0.14 
Household size FSIZE 3.67 1.74 
Health condition of the household head (1= good; 
0 = otherwise) HEALTH 0.42 0.49 
If women can visit outside alone (1 = yes; 0 = no) VISIT 0.01 0.08 
% of households with NGO membership NGO 0.08 0.27 
% of the Male household head GENDER 0.65 0.48 
Age of the household head (years) AGE 43.21 13.34 
% of the married household head MARITAL 0.69 0.46 
If the village has electricity connection ELECTR 0.75 0.43 
Distance of the village from all-weather road (km) ROAD 1.92 1.82 
Distance of the village from thana (km) THANA 7.57 4.02 
Average daily male wage in the village (Taka) MALWAG 43.12 7.96 
Average daily female wage in the village (Taka) FEMWAG 29.37 6.59 
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Table 4.2: Indicators of the Monga during lean season: OLS regression 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Indicators Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
Total employment 0.118 (6.90)*** 
[5.24]*** 
0.238 (4.37)*** 
[3.04]*** 
0.275  (6.43)*** 
[4.18]*** 
0.081 (1.55) 
[1.06] 
Wage-employment 0.017 (1.55) 
[1.30] 
0.000 (0.00) 
[0.00] 
0.063 (2.29)** 
[1.56] 
-0.003 (-0.11) 
[-0.08] 
Male wage-
employment 
0.005 (0.61) 
[0.55] 
-0.016 (-0.64) 
[-0.45] 
0.038* (1.83) 
[1.62] 
-0.014 (-0.56)  
[-0.58] 
Female wage-
employment 
0.012 (1.63) 
[1.33] 
0.016 (0.68) 
[0.52] 
0.025 (1.40) 
[0.96] 
0.011 (0.49) 
[0.39] 
Self-employment 0.101 (6.81)*** 
[4.84]*** 
0.238 (4.95)*** 
[2.83]*** 
0.212 (5.58)*** 
[3.81]*** 
0.085 (1.83)* 
[1.36] 
Male self-
employment 
0.024  (3.22)*** 
[2.64]*** 
0.065 (2.67)*** 
[1.99]** 
0.064 (3.23)*** 
[2.73]*** 
0.005 (0.22) 
[0.19] 
Female self-
employment 
0.077 (6.31)*** 
[4.31]*** 
0.173 (4.38)*** 
[2.56]** 
0.148 (4.86)*** 
[3.15]*** 
0.080 (2.11)** 
[1.52] 
Informal loan 
received 
0.436 (0.07) 
[0.07] 
9.418 (0.42) 
[0.48] 
12.50 (0.67) 
[0.65] 
-32.03(-2.09)** 
[-2.13] 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression.  
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Table 4.3: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of total number 
of household members employed during the Monga  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social Capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
SOCIALCAP 0.119 0.042 0.056 0.039 
 (3.79)*** (14.07)*** (8.58)*** (17.73)*** 
 [2.14]** [10.45]*** [5.74]*** [9.84]*** 
EDUHH -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.40) (0.55) (0.07) (-0.56) 
LAND 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (3.33) (6.31) (5.46) (7.09) 
FSIZE 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
 (5.02) (11.35) (11.06) (11.87) 
HEALTH 0.000 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.03) (4.45) (2.86) (2.82) 
VISIT 0.020*** 0.006 0.003 0.006 
 (4.76) (0.66) (0.23) (0.568) 
NGO -0.003 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 
 (-0.25) (4.09) (3.19) (3.84) 
MALWGE 0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (0.68) (-0.60) (-7.64) (-3.05) 
FEMWGE 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (3.84) (2.28) (8.32) (6.60) 
GENDER -0.000 0.007 -0.003 0.000 
 (-0.05) (1.23) (-0.69) (0.10) 
AGE 0.001 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (1.20) (4.70) (5.14) (3.70) 
AGE2 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-1.47) (-4.22) (-4.42) (-3.13) 
MARITAL 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.011* 
 (0.38) (0.74) (1.50) (1.93) 
ELECTRI -0.015*** -0.005** -0.006** 0.002 
 (-2.97) (-2.07) (-2.43) (0.58) 
ROAD -0.005** 0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (-2.36) (1.29) (-0.66) (0.54) 
THANA 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (1.52) (2.73) (4.76) (6.48) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
 Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal   component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression.  
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Table 4.4: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of lean season 
wage-employment during the Monga 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
     
SOCIALCAP 0.146 0.158 0.043 0.183 
 (2.72)*** (9.10)**** (1.44) (29.55)*** 
 [1.10] [7.41]*** [0.98] [19.14]*** 
EDUHH -0.007*** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 (-2.90) (-2.31) (-2.87) (-3.75) 
LAND -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-6.19) (-6.35) (-5.91) (-4.81) 
FSIZE 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
 (7.39) (9.24) (10.24) (9.48) 
HEALTH -0.002 0.010 0.010* 0.004 
 (-0.25) (1.53) (1.67) (0.57) 
VISIT 0.065* 0.038 0.023 0.042 
 (1.74) (1.12) (0.65) (1.32) 
NGO -0.034* -0.010 -0.011 -0.020 
 (-1.85) (-0.80) (-0.89) (-1.46) 
MALWGE 0.001 0.002** -0.001* 0.001 
 (1.20) (2.29) (-1.95) (1.08) 
FEMWGE 0.002*** -0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (2.59) (-0.44) (2.96) (3.29) 
GENDER -0.010 0.005 -0.008 -0.010 
 (-0.56) (0.33) (-0.58) (-0.62) 
AGE 0.003* 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003* 
 (1.67) (2.97) (3.52) (1.76) 
AGE2 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** 
 (-2.15) (-3.24) (-3.56) (-1.99) 
MARITAL 0.012 0.008 0.016 0.024 
 (0.62) (0.50) (1.04) (1.40) 
ELECTRI -0.019* -0.009 0.002 0.012 
 (-1.69) (-1.27) (0.23) (1.50) 
ROAD -0.010*** -0.004* -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (-2.92) (-1.83) (-2.75) (-3.42) 
THANA 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 
 (4.61) (4.82) (6.84) (7.61) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the principal 
component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model is 
estimated by bivariate probit regression.  
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Table 4.5: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of lean season 
male wage-employment during the Monga 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
     
SOCIALCAP 0.125 0.214 0.025 0.213 
 (2.45)** (17.03)*** (1.36) (16.25)*** 
 [1.32] [13.34]*** [0.93] [14.90]*** 
EDUHH -0.007*** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 (-2.89) (-2.35) (-2.71) (-3.62) 
LAND -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-3.98) (-3.06) (-3.59) (-2.66) 
FSIZE 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (8.80) (9.64) (10.93) (10.25) 
HEALTH -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 
 (-1.37) (-0.16) (-0.13) (-0.97) 
VISIT 0.044 0.022 -0.000 0.022 
 (1.06) (0.62) (-0.006) (0.67) 
NGO -0.016 0.003 0.003 -0.007 
 (-0.87) (0.19) (0.24) (-0.45) 
MALWGE 0.002** 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 
 (2.16) (4.71) (0.31) (2.75) 
FEMWGE 0.001 -0.002** 0.001 0.001* 
 (1.61) (-2.11) (1.49) (1.90) 
GENDER 0.117*** 0.135*** 0.119*** 0.116*** 
 (6.03) (7.35) (7.23) (6.71) 
AGE 0.001 0.002 0.002** 0.001 
 (0.70) (1.48) (1.96) (0.49) 
AGE2 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 
 (-1.05) (-1.71) (-1.89) (-0.63) 
MARITAL 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.068*** 
 (2.83) (2.68) (3.72) (3.92) 
ELECTRI -0.022** -0.019** -0.006 0.002 
 (-2.05) (-2.34) (-0.82) (0.29) 
ROAD -0.006* -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
 (-1.80) (-0.21) (-0.50) (-1.40) 
THANA 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (3.56) (2.86) (5.22) (6.16) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression.  
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Table 4.6: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of lean season 
female wage-employment during the Monga 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
SOCIALCAP 0.081 -0.002 0.220 0.268 
 (1.79)* (-0.18) (6.64)*** (26.97)*** 
 [0.72] [-0.10] [6.08]*** [20.09]*** 
EDUHH -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004** 
 (-1.29) (-0.52) (-1.52) (-2.25) 
LAND -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-6.20) (-7.85) (-6.64) (-4.83) 
FSIZE 0.004 0.005** 0.003 0.005** 
 (1.34) (2.02) (1.35) (2.00) 
HEALTH 0.010 0.016*** 0.010 0.009 
 (1.28) (2.69) (1.55) (1.30) 
VISIT 0.064 0.034 0.048 0.061* 
 (1.59) (1.02) (1.13) (1.69) 
NGO -0.034** -0.018* -0.036*** -0.031*** 
 (-2.37) (-1.78) (-2.93) (-2.58) 
MALWGE -0.001 -0.001*** -0.004*** -0.000 
 (-0.59) (-2.66) (-4.90) (-0.16) 
FEMWGE 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (2.58) (2.35) (4.69) (3.354) 
GENDER -0.142*** -0.140*** -0.152*** -0.143*** 
 (-9.13) (-9.08) (-10.01) (-8.63) 
AGE 0.003* 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002 
 (1.96) (2.68) (2.77) (1.26) 
AGE2 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-2.34) (-2.77) (-2.91) (-1.56) 
MARITAL -0.044** -0.041** -0.044*** -0.036** 
 (-2.55) (-2.45) (-2.58) (-1.96) 
ELECTRI -0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.020** 
 (-0.34) (1.25) (-0.35) (2.54) 
ROAD -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.008*** 
 (-3.05) (-2.78) (-5.26) (-4.25) 
THANA 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (3.71) (4.41) (3.83) (5.52) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression.
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Table 4.7: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of lean season 
self-employment during the Monga 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
SOCIALCAP 0.389 0.228 0.261 0.221 
 (3.75)*** (26.45)*** (13.80)*** (36.07)*** 
 [2.52]** [20.31]*** [9.28]*** [19.80]*** 
EDUHH -0.002 0.005* 0.005 0.003 
 (-0.41) (1.94) (1.48) (0.83) 
LAND 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (6.42) (8.65) (7.18) (8.65) 
FSIZE 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 
 (2.94) (6.11) (5.84) (6.84) 
HEALTH 0.003 0.034*** 0.017* 0.017* 
 (0.17) (3.81) (1.94) (1.86) 
VISIT 0.092** 0.012 -0.005 0.010 
 (2.06) (0.28) (-0.09) (0.21) 
NGO 0.022 0.088*** 0.075*** 0.086*** 
 (0.61) (4.53) (3.78) (4.41) 
MALWGE 0.001 -0.000 -0.007*** -0.002** 
 (0.29) (-0.01) (-7.72) (-2.51) 
FEMWGE 0.009*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.006*** 
 (3.86) (1.08) (7.76) (5.78) 
GENDER 0.008 0.039* -0.008 0.008 
 (0.23) (1.69) (-0.40) (0.40) 
AGE 0.003 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004** 
 (0.76) (3.04) (3.65) (1.99) 
AGE2 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-0.87) (-2.50) (-2.84) (-1.32) 
MARITAL 0.006 0.003 0.022 0.034 
 (0.17) (0.11) (1.00) (1.55) 
ELECTRI -0.056*** -0.025** -0.030*** 0.003 
 (-2.77) (-2.45) (-2.96) (0.25) 
ROAD -0.011* 0.007** 0.002 0.006** 
 (-1.67) (2.56) (0.68) (2.01) 
THANA -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003*** 
 (-0.43) (-1.62) (0.72) (2.86) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression.
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Table 4.8: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of lean season 
male self-employment during the Monga 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
SOCIALCAP 0.275 0.276 0.069 0.285 
 (3.48)*** (16.37)*** (0.48) (25.28)*** 
 [2.12]** [16.40]*** [0.36] [22.91]*** 
EDUHH -0.002 0.003 0.005* 0.002 
 (-0.62) (1.11) (1.65) (0.62) 
LAND 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
 (5.78) (7.33) (7.23) (9.04) 
FSIZE 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (2.62) (4.87) (5.06) (5.20) 
HEALTH -0.005 0.018** 0.012 0.005 
 (-0.36) (2.43) (1.64) (0.74) 
VISIT 0.024 -0.052*** -0.078*** -0.052** 
 (0.48) (-2.87) (-3.45) (-2.02) 
NGO 0.001 0.047** 0.047** 0.038** 
 (0.03) (2.54) (2.03) (2.11) 
MALWGE 0.001 0.001 -0.003** -0.001 
 (0.82) (1.07) (-2.11) (-1.04) 
FEMWGE 0.004*** -0.000 0.003* 0.003*** 
 (2.91) (-0.20) (1.76) (4.02) 
GENDER 0.051** 0.073*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
 (2.03) (4.35) (3.18) (3.47) 
AGE -0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000 
 (-0.38) (0.78) (1.43) (-0.04) 
AGE2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.30) (-0.38) (-0.61) (0.59) 
MARITAL -0.004 -0.007 0.004 0.012 
 (-0.14) (-0.38) (0.28) (0.74) 
ELECTRI -0.032* -0.009 -0.003 0.010 
 (-1.83) (-1.04) (-0.21) (1.12) 
ROAD -0.008* 0.004* 0.005 0.003 
 (-1.66) (1.89) (1.36) (1.52) 
THANA -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.001 
 (-2.79) (-5.41) (-3.53) (-1.33) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression.
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Table 4.9: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of lean season 
female self-employment during the Monga 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
SOCIALCAP 0.268 0.260 0.323 0.264 
 (3.33)*** (16.26)*** (25.44)*** (31.18)*** 
 [2.45]*** [17.49]*** [22.90]*** [21.96]*** 
EDUHH -0.007 0.004 0.002 0.000 
 (-0.18) (1.61) (0.67) (0.17) 
LAND 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (5.48) (7.00) (3.31) (5.67) 
FSIZE 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 
 (2.65) (4.19) (3.78) (5.03) 
HEALTH 0.007 0.029*** 0.012 0.013 
 (0.54) (3.19) (1.21) (1.42) 
VISIT 0.107** 0.059 0.049 0.058 
 (2.23) (1.37) (0.83) (1.19) 
NGO 0.026 0.070*** 0.054*** 0.071*** 
 (0.95) (4.06) (2.85) (4.00) 
MALWGE -0.000 0.001 -0.007*** -0.001 
 (-0.13) (0.53) (-7.34) (-1.60) 
FEMWGE 0.005*** 0.000 0.009*** 0.005*** 
 (3.91) (0.43) (7.91) (5.07) 
GENDER -0.029 -0.002 -0.050** -0.031 
 (-1.09) (-0.09) (-2.38) (-1.51) 
AGE 0.004 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004* 
 (1.46) (3.09) (3.43) (1.94) 
AGE2 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 
 (-1.58) (-2.77) (-2.91) (-1.53) 
MARITAL 0.010 0.004 0.024 0.035 
 (0.36) (0.16) (1.00) (1.55) 
ELECTRI -0.047*** -0.030*** -0.038*** -0.001 
 (-2.83) (-2.95) (-3.53) (-0.05) 
ROAD -0.007 0.005* -0.002 0.003 
 (-1.39) (1.85) (-0.67) (1.10) 
THANA 0.002 0.001 0.003** 0.006*** 
 (1.34) (0.62) (2.50) (4.87) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression.
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Table 4.10: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of lean season 
informal loan during the Monga 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
SOCIALCAP 83.90 2.75 610.60 714.70 
 (0.65) (0.06) (4.28)*** (10.99)*** 
 [0.77] [0.07] [0.59] [-2.17]** 
EDUHH 9.215 11.04 5.88 2.59 
 (1.29) (1.62) (0.87) (0.37) 
LAND 2.43** 2.60** 0.627 2.461** 
 (2.11) (2.14) (0.52) (2.26) 
FSIZE 10.99 11.83* 8.538 12.33* 
 (1.46) (1.69) (1.22) (1.68) 
HEALTH -31.07 -24.61 -40.83** -42.63** 
 (-1.61) (-1.47) (-1.98) (-2.36) 
VISIT 257.4 226.1 265.5 290.8 
 (1.29) (1.15) (1.26) (1.47) 
NGO 38.13 54.37 -1.187 17.16 
 (0.74) (1.02) (-0.02) (0.33) 
MALWGE 0.380 -0.554 -5.007** 3.336** 
 (0.17) (-0.38) (-2.17) (1.97) 
FEMWGE 0.285 -0.228 6.200** 1.447 
 (0.15) (-0.12) (2.15) (0.73) 
GENDER 12.49 13.90 -19.45 6.303 
 (0.30) (0.38) (-0.41) (0.15) 
AGE 3.987 4.935** 5.334* -0.369 
 (1.59) (2.19) (1.85) (-0.13) 
AGE2 -0.051** -0.057** -0.065** -0.009 
 (-2.14) (-2.45) (-2.17) (-0.32) 
MARITAL 22.29 24.65 20.72 38.95 
 (0.56) (0.65) (0.49) (0.95) 
ELECTRI -29.71 -17.87 -51.29** 3.474 
 (-1.04) (-0.84) (-1.99) (0.15) 
ROAD -14.82* -10.70** -22.32*** -15.44** 
 (-1.73) (-1.97) (-3.63) (-2.57) 
THANA 3.952 4.270 3.798 7.808*** 
 (1.47) (1.63) (1.40) (2.74) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the principal 
component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model is 
estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 4.11: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Coefficient of Social Capital 
during non-lean season (3 months off Monga) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Indicators Social 
capital index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
Panel A: Effect of Social capital 3-months after the Monga  
Total 
employment 
0.171*** 
(3.726) 
0.0478*** 
(7.987) 
0.0594*** 
(3.288) 
0.0518*** 
(14.15) 
Wage 
employment 
0.142*** 
(2.916) 
0.0641 
(0.424) 
0.0351** 
(2.013) 
0.151*** 
(29.32) 
Male wage 
employment 
0.0995* 
(1.871) 
0.137** 
(2.014) 
0.0238 
(1.512) 
0.177*** 
(5.494) 
Female wage 
employment 
0.129** 
(2.153) 
0.0375* 
(1.905) 
0.226*** 
(4.159) 
0.269*** 
(10.65) 
Self-
employment 
0.370*** 
(3.725) 
0.217*** 
(25.31) 
0.223*** 
(6.488) 
0.211*** 
(35.72) 
Male self-
employment 
0.203*** 
(3.269) 
0.212*** 
(6.774) 
0.206*** 
(5.368) 
0.249*** 
(16.96) 
Female self-
employment 
0.320*** 
(3.332) 
0.283*** 
(9.660) 
0.345*** 
(19.35) 
0.303*** 
(30.67) 
     
Panel B: Effect of Social capital 3-months before the Monga  
Total 
employment 
0.192*** 
(3.645) 
0.0626*** 
(7.900) 
0.0906*** 
(6.267) 
0.0586*** 
(8.672) 
Wage 
employment 
0.0464 
(1.091) 
-0.00850 
(-0.474) 
0.0246* 
(1.956) 
0.175*** 
(27.85) 
Male-wage 
employment 
0.0349 
(0.684) 
0.176*** 
(3.924) 
0.0181 
(1.048) 
0.182*** 
(5.000) 
Female wage 
employment 
0.0272 
(0.539) 
-0.0288* 
(-1.876) 
0.223*** 
(3.992) 
0.280*** 
(15.90) 
Self-
employment 
0.430*** 
(3.878) 
0.216*** 
(25.27) 
0.246*** 
(10.96) 
0.209*** 
(30.70) 
Male self-
employment 
0.282*** 
(3.602) 
0.191*** 
(2.633) 
0.256*** 
(13.02) 
0.244*** 
(12.09) 
Female self-
employment 
0.351*** 
(3.454) 
0.280*** 
(9.419) 
0.357*** 
(21.79) 
0.296*** 
(19.51) 
     
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the principal 
component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively, and the model is 
estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Table 4.12. OLS regression without income controls 
Indicators Social 
capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
Total 
employment 
0.129*** 
(7.56) 
0.284*** 
(5.19) 
0.278*** 
(6.59) 
0.103** 
(1.97) 
Wage-
employment 
0.018* 
(1.69) 
0.016 
(0.46) 
0.058** 
(2.16) 
-0.010 
(-0.33) 
Male wage-
employment 
0.004 
(0.45) 
-0.016 
(-0.68) 
0.036* 
(1.83) 
-0.023 
(-0.98) 
Female wage-
employment 
0.015** 
(2.02) 
0.032 
(1.39) 
0.021 
(1.22) 
0.013 
(0.63) 
Self-employment 
0.111*** 
(7.38) 
0.268*** 
(5.49) 
0.220*** 
(5.75) 
0.113** 
(2.43) 
Male self-
employment 
0.026*** 
(3.51) 
0.068*** 
(2.80) 
0.076*** 
(3.78) 
0.006 
(0.25) 
Female self-
employment 
0.084*** 
(6.97) 
0.200*** 
(5.06) 
0.144*** 
(4.86) 
0.107*** 
(2.87) 
Informal loan 
received 
0.844 
(0.14) 
10.80 
(0.49) 
12.91 
(0.69) 
-33.83** 
(-2.32) 
Observations 4,692 4,700 4,920 4,930 
All regressions include a constant and limited controls (land, male wage and 
female wage are not controlled). 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
***, **, and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
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Table 4.13. Endogeneity-corrected estimation without income controls 
Indicators Social 
capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
Total 
employment 
0.106*** 
(4.76) 
0.044*** 
(16.21) 
0.057*** 
(9.01) 
0.041*** 
(20.47) 
Wage-
employment 
0.100*** 
(2.75) 
0.036 
(0.80) 
0.043* 
(1.74) 
0.184*** 
(32.34) 
Male wage-
employment 
0.076** 
(2.15) 
0.213*** 
(17.25) 
0.024* 
(1.74) 
0.212*** 
(16.39) 
Female wage-
employment 
0.068** 
(2.03) 
0.013 
(0.97) 
0.217*** 
(6.83) 
0.274*** 
(33.52) 
Self-
employment 
0.371*** 
(4.70) 
0.234*** 
(30.26) 
0.253*** 
(10.50) 
0.228*** 
(40.44) 
Male self-
employment 
0.254*** 
(4.31) 
0.290*** 
(21.59) 
0.207** 
(2.43) 
0.298*** 
(31.29) 
Female self-
employment 
0.257*** 
(4.17) 
0.263*** 
(17.13) 
0.319*** 
(24.79) 
0.270*** 
(36.77) 
Informal loan 
received 
103.8 
(1.026) 
776.2*** 
(9.43) 
621.2*** 
(4.88) 
708.2*** 
(11.35) 
Observations 4,692 4,700 4,920 4,930 
All regressions include a constant and limited controls (land, male wage and 
female wage are not controlled). 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
***, **, and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.  
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Appendix 
 
A4.1: Comparison of some selected socio-economic indicators between the 
NGO-targeted poor and the extreme poor.  
 
Socio-economic indicators NGO-targeted 
poor 
Extreme poor*  
Average year of schooling of the 
adult members  
1.85a 0.86 
Year of schooling of the household 
head 
2.82a 0.53 
Amount of land owned (in acre) 0.87a 0.04 
Value of the living room excluding 
land (in Taka) 
7,968b 1,200 
Household using toilet (%) 20c 13.5 
Per capita calorie consumption per 
day 
2,284b Only 47.5 % of 
household can 
feed twice a day 
Share of fish and meat in total 
consumption (%) 
15.56b 5.77 
* The authors’ calculation from the dataset of this study;  
a  Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006); 
b  Halder (1998);  
c  Mallick (1998). 
 
A4.2: GDP per capita in the three northern districts of Bangladesh 
 Per capita GDP (nominal) Share of Manufacturing 
in per capita GDP (% of 
country  average) 
 in Taka % of country  
average 
Kurigram 13757 74.3% 12.5% 
Nilphamari  13292 71.8% 9.7% 
Rangpur  14936 80.7% 30.1% 
Bangladesh 18511 100% 100% 
Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Year Book, 2002. 
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A4.3: List of employment during Kartik month 
Types of employment 
Percentage 
A). Wage employment:  
Day labourer in agriculture (including those working only for 
food) 21.1 
Day labourer in formal non-agricultural (such as road repairing, 
construction including government programs for the poor)  13.1 
Day labourer in informal non-agricultural (such as restaurants, 
shops, informal workshops, sweeper)  8.5 
Housemaid 7.0 
Formal service (such as orderly that does not require formal 
education)  0.7 
B). Self-employment:  
Livestock and poultry rearing (such as  cow, goat, chicken, 
ducks) 30.2 
Farming (vegetables)  4.2 
Farming (crops)  3.3 
Petty trade (such as fish, vegetable, fruits, spices, betel leaf, 
bamboo products, eggs, logs, honey) 4.3 
Begging 3.1 
Feriwalla (mobile trader selling door to door items such as  
pots, used utensils, biscuits, puffed rice, sweetmeat, bangles, 
lace, oil) 1.5 
Semi-skilled (such as tailoring, repairing bicycle and watch, 
locksmith, blacksmith, hair dressing) 1.1 
Faria (middlemen in small trade) 0.5 
Others  0.4 
Total 100 
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A4.4: Tobit regression of Monga indicators on social capital 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variables Social 
capital index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
Total employment 0.126 0.252 0.292 0.096 
(6.95)*** (4.35)*** (6.45)*** (1.70)* 
[5.20]*** [3.08]*** [4.20]*** [1.17] 
Wage employment 0.021 -0.008 0.069* 0.014 
(1.43) (-0.17) (1.96) (0.34) 
[1.20] [-0.12] [1.37] [0.28] 
Male wage employment 0.012 -0.024 0.059 0.001 
(0.79) (-0.52) (1.70)* (0.03) 
[0.73] [-0.37] [1.56] [0.03] 
Female wage 
employment 
0.025 0.028 0.057 0.012 
(1.21) (0.43) (1.06) (0.18) 
[0.98] [0.32] [0.75] [0.15] 
Self-employment 0.171 0.377 0.345 0.184 
(7.47)*** (5.22)*** (5.92)*** (2.57)** 
[5.27]*** [3.12]*** [4.07]*** [1.98]** 
Male-self employment 0.142 0.308 0.381 0.079 
(3.89)*** (2.67)*** (4.10)*** (0.66) 
[2.98]*** [1.91]* [3.65]*** [0.62] 
Female-self 
employment 
0.145 0.298 0.279 0.186 
(7.01)*** (4.54)*** (5.33)*** (2.89)*** 
[4.76]*** [2.72]*** [3.49]*** [2.12]** 
Informal loan received 106.1 288.2 341.8 -378.6 
(1.00) (0.85) (1.29) (-1.09) 
[0.92] [0.86] [1.22] [-1.07] 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.  
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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A4.5: First-stage regression of social capital on the instrument 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
INSTRUMENT 0.096*** 0.026*** 0.017** 0.021*** 
 (4.07) (3.37) (2.00) (2.96) 
EDUHH 0.021** 0.002 0.006 0.010*** 
 (2.02) (0.56) (1.36) (2.73) 
LAND 0.002 -0.000 0.002*** -0.001** 
 (1.31) (-0.92) (4.25) (-2.27) 
FSIZE 0.013 0.004 0.006 -0.001 
 (1.08) (0.87) (1.26) (-0.15) 
MALEWGE -0.010*** -0.009*** 0.008*** -0.005*** 
 (-2.91) (-8.77) (6.27) (-4.18) 
FEMWGE -0.007* 0.008*** -0.011*** -0.003** 
 (-1.75) (6.80) (-7.15) (-2.31) 
VISIT -0.355** -0.083* -0.057 -0.084 
 (-2.35) (-1.71) (-0.71) (-1.61) 
NGO 0.186*** 0.019 0.798*** 0.042* 
 (2.79) (0.85) (3.04) (1.91) 
GENDER 0.022 -0.055** 0.060** 0.016 
 (0.29) (-2.05) (2.06) (0.71) 
MARITAL 0.021 0.034 -0.001 -0.027 
 (0.27) (1.22) (-0.02) (-1.18) 
AGE 0.011 0.002 -0.002 0.006** 
 (1.31) (0.69) (-0.56) (2.58) 
AGE2 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** 
 (-0.65) (0.02) (0.72) (-2.12) 
HEALTH 0.076** -0.002 0.028** 0.025** 
 (2.16) (-0.17) (2.07) (2.27) 
THANA 0.001 0.005*** 0.000 -0.006*** 
 (0.15) (3.34) (0.11) (-3.95) 
ROAD 0.053*** 0.003 0.020*** 0.009*** 
 (4.65) (0.89) (4.82) (2.64) 
ELECTRI 0.161*** 0.056*** 0.064*** -0.021 
 (4.00) (4.51) (4.16) (-1.56) 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.036 0.038 
F statistics 9.98 10.55 10.85 10.45 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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A4.6: Endogeneity-corrected Tobit regression of Monga indicators on social 
capital 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent 
variables 
Social 
capital index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
Total employment 0.135 0.041 0.057 0.040 
 (3.76) ***  (8.88) ***  (6.25) ***  (12.8) *** 
[2.12] ** [7.20] *** [4.26] *** [8.69] *** 
Wage employment 0.182 0.032 0.056 0.133 
  (2.43) ** (1.17)  (1.96) **  (3.49) *** 
[1.00] [0.57] [1.27] [2.71]*** 
Male wage 
employment 
0.263 0.095 0.182 0.073 
 (2.44)** (2.27)** (0.83) (1.47) 
[1.34] [1.07] [0.76] [0.99] 
Female wage 
employment 
0.165 0.021 0.253 0.281 
(2.57)** (0.92)   (14.73)***   (31.82)*** 
[0.64] [-0.38] [10.75]*** [23.96]*** 
Self-employment 0.864 0.379 0.406 0.348 
  (3.71) ***  (12.44) ***  (6.99) ***  (9.39) *** 
[2.42]** [8.04]*** [4.44]*** [6.46]*** 
Male-self employment 0.175 0.341 0.234 0.19 
 (2.82)***  (2.59)***  (2.43)** (1.15) 
[1.51] [1.93]* [2.07]** [0.79] 
Female-self 
employment 
0.583 0.377 0.417 0.351 
(3.23)***  (7.90) ***  (5.40) ***  (6.05) *** 
[2.28] ** [4.47] ** [4.33] *** [3.82] *** 
Informal loan received -896.5 -1,298 2,298 6,721 
(-0.50) (-1.08) (-0.49) (-3.57) *** 
[-0.47] [-1.00] [0.48] [3.05]*** 
Observations 4,345 4,353 4,566 4,576 
All regressions include a constant and the control variables but not reported. 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics.  
Figures in the brackets are t-statistics based on clustering at the village level. 
***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by IV probit regression.    
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Invitation, Help and Shalish respectively and the model 
is estimated by bivariate probit regression. 
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Appendix A4.7.  Directions of Endogeneity Bias 
Omitted variables. If the estimating relationship is Y = α + βS + δX+λO+ε 
where O denotes the omitted variable, then failure to control for O will result in  
Y = α + βS + δX+λO+ε*  where ε*= λO+ε, and subsequently, Cov(S, ε*) ≠ 0. O 
can include unobservables like the ability, entrepreneurship, and risk-taking 
features of the household, which can affect both social capital and the 
employment or loan opportunities. Moreover, Cov(S, ε*) > 0 if ability, 
entrepreneurship, and risk-taking affect the social capital level positively. In this 
case, the OLS estimate of β will be biased upwards. In a perhaps more likely 
situation, we would observe Cov(S, ε*) < 0 if the extreme poor household is 
introvert, risk-averse, mentally weak, or marginalized, resulting in lower levels of 
social capital. The latter are not very far possibilities for the extreme poor, not 
only in Bangladesh, but anywhere in the world. In this situation, the OLS estimate 
of β will be biased downwards. 
Reverse causation. In this case, there will be co-existing relationships of 
the following sort: Y = α + βS + δX +ε  and S = η + θY + πX + u. An important 
indicator of the direction of bias associated with β is the sign of Cov(S, ε). To find 
this sign, solve for the reduced form equation for S. Cov(S, ε) is of the same sign 
as θ/(1-θβ). Given that both θ and β are lower than 1 in absolute value, the sign of 
Cov(S, ε) depends on the sign of θ. That is, Cov(S, ε) >0 if Y (for instance, 
employment) creates positive social capital such that θ>0, which would lead to an 
upwardly biased OLS estimate of β. However, there is no guarantee that Y would 
create more social capital. If extreme poor are unproductive, unskilled, or are 
perceived to be defaulting on loans, then they would be earning negative social 
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capital from employment or loan relationships. The resulting Cov(S, ε) <0 would 
bias the OLS estimate of β downwards. 
Measurement error. Measurement error in classical sense biases the 
coefficient estimates towards zero. There are strong reasons to believe that 
measurement error in classical sense is the most prominent possibility here, 
among other reasons. 
 
  
 CHAPTER FIVE SOCIAL CAPITAL AND WOMEN EMPOWERMENT IN RURAL BANGLADESH 
 
“The extensive reach of women’s agency is one of the more 
neglected areas of development studies and most urgently 
in need of correction” 
—Amartya Sen, Development As Freedom, 1999: 203. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Empowering women is emphasised by scholars, policy makers, 
development practitioners and donor agencies as a means to eliminate 
discrimination and injustices in the society and to combat poverty from the bottom 
up. The literature (e.g., UNDP 1995; Sen 1999; Duflo 2012) stresses the 
importance of equal participation opportunity for women in the decision-making 
process, both in the private and in the public sphere of life, asserting that women’s 
empowerment is imperative for the alleviation of poverty and social injustice and 
to enhance human development and democracy. However, there are numerous 
institutional and social barriers to the empowerment of women including the 
internalisation of traditional gender roles by women and a lack of women’s 
critical mass and networks (Kabeer 1994; 2001; Sen 1999). The internalisation of 
traditional gender roles is particularly deeply rooted because of the age-old 
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misconception and social settings (Meer and Sever 2004). Challenging gender 
inequality in such a situation requires elimination of social stigma and of 
internalisation of traditional gender role in which social capital might play a vital 
role.  
A growing body of literature (e.g., Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; Collier 
1998; Woolcock 2001) emphasises the role of social capital in empowering 
women by facilitating informational flow and eliminating society’s 
misconceptions and prevailing prejudice. Social capital is also argued to be 
capable of restoring trustful relationships and helping during times of conflict and 
confrontation. In addition, social capital promotes cognitive and psychological 
development essential for women’s agency in household bargaining and 
empowerment. However, empirical literature investigating role of social capital 
on women’s empowerment is still scant.  
Among the few studies that have done so, Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 
(1996), Kabeer (2001), Mahmud (2003) and Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2006) 
explore the role of social capital and women’s empowerment, largely through 
women’s participation in micro-credit programmes. Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 
(1996) and Kabeer (2001) state that women’s participation in micro-credit groups 
help them to acquire greater social networks, which in turn assist in reducing 
domestic violence against women. In addition, Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 
(2006) argue that participation in micro-credit programmes leads women to enjoy 
greater mobility and increases their bargaining power in household decision 
making. The literature also argues that the solidarity group that women form 
through microfinance not only creates social and economic capital but also fosters 
women’s collective consciousness and promotes mobilisation against oppression 
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(Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 1996; Kabeer 2001; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 
2006; Haile, Bock and Folmer 2012). The argument is that participation in micro-
credit programmes not only offers economic payoffs but also empowerment 
payoffs for marginalised women through bridging and linking social capital 
arising from women’s participation and interaction in the network of borrower’s 
group. However, these studies suffer from a limitation in that they explore the 
effect of social capital as it derives from women’s participation in micro-credit 
programmes. As such, the effects of social capital are obscured by the effect of 
microfinance intervention and the true effect of social capital remains 
unexplored.43  
This essay attempts to investigate the effect of social capital on the 
empowerment of women among extreme poor households in rural Bangladesh. It 
contributes to the literature in three major respects. First, it focuses on the extreme 
poor, rather than on the poor in general. This is crucial because the poor are 
heterogeneous and the extreme poor who comprise nearly 30% of the population 
in rural Bangladesh, are mostly illiterate, cannot read newspapers, do not own 
radios or televisions and are largely excluded from government and NGO-based 
development and social awareness programmes. This offers a unique opportunity 
to separate the effect of social capital from other confounding sources of 
informational flow. Second, this study represents a methodological advancement 
over others in that it addresses the endogeneity of social capital. The endogeneity 
may arise from measurement error in social capital, or reverse causality in which 
                                                 
43 The empirical literature has found evidence in the United States (US) that social capital 
reduces violence against women and protects against sexual offence (see, Bursik and 
Grasmick 1993; Browning 2002; Zolotor and Runyan 2006; Kruger, Hutchison and 
Monroe 2007; Burchfield and Mingus 2008).  
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women’s restricted access to public sphere results in limited social capital for 
them. We employ heteroskedasticity-based identification proposed by Lewbel 
(1997; 2012) and Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) to estimate the unbiased and 
consistent estimates of social capital. Third, we consider an array of 
empowerment indicators some of which have not been explored in prior studies. 
Our indicators of women empowerment are:  
(i) purchasing necessary items for the household by women, 
(ii) women’s participation in household decision making, 
(iii) violence against women by husband, and  
(iv) an overall index of women’s empowerment, constructed through 
principal component analysis (PCA) from (i) to (iii). 
The index for purchasing necessary items is constructed from women’s 
purchasing of five different items, namely, staple foodstuffs such as rice, pulse 
and salt; biscuits, candies and small toys for children; clothing for children and 
Saree44 for herself; and small cosmetic items for daily use such as coconut oil, 
soap and bangles. The indicator for women’s participation in household decision 
making encompasses relatively major decisions in household matters such as the 
buying and selling of land and trees; the marriage and schooling of children; and 
treatment options in the event of sickness. As for the indicator of violence against 
                                                 
44 Saree is a Bengali word referring to the traditional clothing for women in Bangladesh 
(and South Asia). It is usually a 5–6-yard-long strip of unstitched cloth. It is usually worn 
over a blouse and petticoat. Traditionally, the first end of the Saree is wrapped around the 
waist and the loose end is dragged over the shoulder. 
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women, we consider number of violent events by husbands.45 These include 
physical torture; preventing wife from visiting her parents; forcibly taking wife’s 
money; threatening divorce; and threatening second marriage. Finally, the overall 
empowerment index is constructed using PCA and these aforementioned 
indicators. Meanwhile, it must be mentioned that the social capital endowment in 
this essay is the one that belongs to the woman in the household. 
The study is important for various reasons. First, Bangladesh is a 
developing country with a strong patriarchy. As such, women in Bangladesh are 
often neglected and marginalised, with their lives confined to the domestic sphere. 
According to the UNDP (2010), Bangladesh stands at one hundred and sixteenth 
out of 169 countries on the Gender Inequality Index. For example, only 30.8% of 
women have a secondary education, female labour force participation is 61% as 
compared to 86% for men and as many as 82% of births are unattended by skilled 
health personnel. Generally, women are considered unequal to men, their voices 
and mobility are severely restricted and they are forced to wear purdah46 (Khan 
2005; Kabeer 2011).   
In regard to rural Bangladesh, Anderson and Eswaran (2009) find that 
93% of women have never been to their local market and only 68% moved out of 
their home compound once a week. Throughout Bangladesh, Muslim women are 
                                                 
45 Only violence by husbands is considered because the focus is on exploring women’s 
decision-making agency within the household. Violence by others could be due to various 
factors other than women’s agency in household decision making. 
46 Purdah is meant to cover head and the body of woman by a loose garment to wear over 
the dress. The practice of Purdah is seen as an act of modesty by woman in the traditional 
social order for when they go into public. Only close family members can see women out 
of Purdah, and the practice is more common and strict among Muslims.  
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entitled a share in parental property (equivalent to half of brother’s) but they are 
effectively forced to waive this right in favour of their brothers and thus, become 
economically dependent to their husbands (Kabeer 1999; 2001; Khan 2005). 
Indeed, a range of strong patriarchal practices tie women to their husband’s family 
after marriage (Kabeer 2011).  Further, women are treated in accordance with 
their reproductive outcomes and they face great difficulty if fail to produce male 
children (Zaman 1999; Khan 2005; Kabeer 2011). Food provision and treatment 
in the event of sickness are also unfavourable towards women, resulting in 
substantially higher mortality rates among women than among men (D’Souza and 
Chen 1980; Sen 1990). Violence against women is endemic in Bangladeshi 
society, with the poor the most at risk (ADB 2001). The incidence of fatwa47 
against women is alarming; there are 503 incidences of fatwa from 1995 to 2010 
and at least 15 women are killed by stoning or whipping as a result of fatwa (ASK 
2011).  
Women’s empowerment in the household, however, is imperative to attain 
Millennium Development Goals and to eradicate poverty. Different literatures 
find evidence that women empowerment brings benefits for the family including 
increased fertility, better pre-natal care, improved child birth, reduction in infant 
and maternal mortality rates and the allocation of resources for children’s 
                                                 
47 Fatwa is an Islamic decree issued by religious scholars in line with Sharia law to 
govern daily issues whose scope or details have not been covered by the Quran or 
Prophet Muhammad’s tradition, Sunnah (i.e., how to perform prayer on an aeroplane). 
The term is also used to refer to a judicial decree in some Muslim countries, including 
Bangladesh, by a religious judiciary as a verdict for a wrong-doing, which may include 
theft, extra-marital affair, and so on. The decrees under Fatwa are often binding and may 
be harsh, with the latter generally being driven by the 6th century Arab practices, or strong 
interpretations of some Quranic verses or the Prophetic tradition.  
 Chapter Five 
 
~ 169 ~ 
 
wellbeing (Dyson and Moore 1983; Sen 1999; Anderson and Eswaran 2009). 
Engle (1993) and Strauss, Mwabu and Beegle (2000) mention that women 
allocate more of their income regularly than do men for family needs and 
children’s welfare. Thomas (1994), Lancaster, Maitra and Ray (2006) and Gitter 
and Barham (2008) opine that when women rather than men control the household 
finances a large impact on family health and especially on child survival 
probabilities can be seen. In contrast, patriarchal norms and the exclusion of 
women from household decision-making negatively affect the welfare of both 
women and children in terms of the provision of basic needs, mortality and child-
birth rate (Kabeer 1994; 2001; Dréze and Sen 1995). Therefore, the empowerment 
of women is mentioned as a precondition for a country’s sustainable development 
and improvements in health, nutrition, literacy and physical and mental health.  
As detailed in Chapter 2, social capital is a broad concept. The essence of 
social capital is that the participation of people in informal and formal social 
networks modifies their behaviours and attitudes as compared to what these would 
be in the absence of this participation (Durkheim 1895).48 Such a broad spectrum 
has resulted in a lack of consensus on the definition and measurement of social 
capital. The empirical literature, therefore, commonly use some proxies to capture 
individual’s attachments in society.49 In this essay, we follow Glaeser, Laibson 
                                                 
48 Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) are the pioneers in popularising the concept of 
social capital. They define social capital as a feature of the social structure, encompassing 
levels of inter-personal trust and norms of reciprocity and mutual aid, all of which act as 
resources for collective action. For a review on social capital, see Durlauf and Fafchamps 
(2006). 
49 The following are some examples of the proxies for social capital. Huda, Rahman and 
Guirguis (2008): participation in groups; Zolotor and Runyan (2006): participation in 
social activities; Janssens (2010): different measures of trust; Johnson, Honnold and 
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and Sacerdote (2002) and Karlan (2005) to define social capital as those social 
characteristics such as social skills and networks that enable individuals to 
overcome imperfect information problems and reap market and non-market 
returns from interaction with others. We construct an index of social capital for 
woman in the household out of frequent social interactions, including invitation 
received from non-relative neighbours, help received from non-relative 
neighbours, and participation in social informal adjudication (shalish). As a 
robustness check, we also study each individual component separately. Our 
measure of social capital has a significant advantage over other measures in the 
literature in that its effect on the empowerment of women is not contaminated by 
the intervention effect of NGO membership.50 
We employ OLS estimation as the benchmark. However, the use of any 
proxy metric for social capital is susceptible to the problem of error in variables. 
Further, reverse causality as mentioned in Introduction and any other 
                                                                                                                                     
Threlfall (2011): emotional, financial and instrumental services; Ganapati (2012): 
participation in civic networks; Gotschi, Njuki and Delve (2008): measures of 
cooperation and social protection among households; Larance and Porter (2004): 
measures of trust and social network. 
 
50 For instance, Ganapati (2012), one of the notable exceptions studying social capital and 
women empowerment in a developing country (Turkey), measures social capital in terms 
of membership in civic associations. However, these associations can be considered to 
bring an ‘intervention effect’, thereby obscuring the social capital effect. This is because 
the purpose of these associations is to organise women for lobbying to decision makers 
and to provide services such as start-up funds for female entrepreneurs, job training and 
legal counselling. Association members receive repeated training and materials, which 
also requires funding.  
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unobservable factors that affect both social capital and women empowerment51 
may lead to bias in the estimation. To overcome this issue, we employ the 
instrumental variable (IV) method. Our empirical strategy, discussed in detail in 
Section 5.4, exploits the heteroskedasticity-based identification method proposed 
by Lewbel (1997; 2012) and Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) in the absence of 
exclusion restrictions.  
Our dataset comprises household survey data from 5600 households in 156 
villages across three districts of northern Bangladesh. After controlling for a rich 
set of explanatory variables such as demographic characteristics, economic 
conditions and village-level infrastructure, we do not find robust evidence of 
social capital on the indicators of women empowerment. The results are 
remarkably interesting considering a number of studies (e.g., Hashemi, Schuler 
and Riley 1996; Kabeer 2001; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2006) emphasizing 
that women’s network, mobilisation and solidarity especially in the form of 
microcredit group, empower women. Since our measure of social capital excludes 
NGO intervention, our findings can be seen as free from the intervention effects 
evidenced in prior literature.  
Our results offer significant policy implications. Improvement in 
individual’s and society’s attitude towards women and their inclusion in 
mainstream economic and social channels is imperative, as explained above. 
However, promoting social capital alone may not necessarily result in women’s 
greater freedom in the household. Although women’s empowerment may improve 
                                                 
51 Unobservable factors such as the beauty/appearance of the woman, religiosity and 
personal traits (e.g., if the woman is an introvert or extrovert) can affect both her social 
networks and her agency in household bargaining.  
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maternal and child health, nutrition, sanitation and literacy–emphasising 
particularly on women’s social capital as a panacea may not help. Our findings, 
thus, suggest that any development interventions attempting to empower women 
through the creation of women’s social capital and solidarity (for example, 
through self-help groups) may not offer any sizeable improvement. Instead, such 
interventions should be bundled with other initiatives to bring the beneficial 
effects of increased social capital.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 5.2 provides a brief 
outline on how social capital might affect women’s empowerment. Section 5.3 
describes the data. Section 5.4 explains our estimation strategy. Section 5.5 
presents the results, and finally Section 5.6 concludes the study.  
 
5.2 Social Capital and Women Empowerment 
Much literature argues for the role of social capital in the transformation of 
social settings and gender relations. This literature argues that social capital 
advances informational flow and eliminates misconceptions and superstitions 
prevailing in a society (Coleman 1988; Collier 1998; Grootaert 1999; Woolcock 
2001). Improved informational flow and the elimination of superstitions are 
preconditions for changing the internalisation of traditional gender roles that are 
subversive to women’s position in society (Kabeer 2001; Meer and Sever 2004). 
This is particularly relevant in the context of the extreme poor in Bangladesh, 
most of whom are illiterate (with less than one year of schooling), are unable to 
read newspapers and do not own radios or televisions (only 1% own a radio or 
television). In this situation, social capital appears pivotal as a source of 
informational flow for the elimination of prejudice and superstition. 
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The proponents of social capital (e.g., Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993; 2000; 
Kawachi, Kennedy and Wilkinson 1999) also argue that it helps disadvantaged 
and marginalised people, including women and the extreme poor, to access 
market and non-marketable resources. Such access is critical for shaping roles in 
household decision making. Moreover, social networks are held to be important in 
advancing women’s cognitive and psychological development and raising their 
self-esteem, competence and authority to challenge patriarchal norms and 
practices (Sen 1999; Kabeer 2001). The literature further argues that social 
networks help to set certain norms and practices for agents to act with (Collier 
1998; Grootaert 2001). In this way, social capital advances collective action 
through coordination and the imposition of sanctions in the case of violation of 
these norms; for example, in the event of violence against women, dowry 
practices, divorce, polygamy and acid-throwing (Silver and Teasdale 2005; 
Morash et al. 2007). The establishment of norms in relation to such patriarchal 
practices is important for enhancing women’s empowerment in a developing 
country like Bangladesh.  
The literature also emphasises the role of social networks in dispensing 
personal support, advice and shelter for women in crisis. Social connections help 
women by easing the impact on them of stressful events, usually by offering the 
emotional, material and informational support necessary to overcome disputes and 
disagreements (Cobb 1976; Budde and Schene 2004; Silver and Teasdale 2005). 
In contrast, social isolation alienates women from their networks and 
consequently prevents them from accessing external intervention in the case of 
abuse (Sullivan et al. 2005; Choi, Cheung and Cheung 2012). In this way, social 
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capital can be seen as a protective factor against deprivation, discrimination and 
injustice (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Collier 1998; Grootaert 2001).  
However, some literatures question on the efficacy of social capital in 
increasing women’s agency in the household. Agarwal (1997), for example, 
claims that in traditional societies like India the stability of the familial institution 
hinges on the traditional belief of unequal gender power relations. In such 
situations the patriarchal norms and the internalisation of traditional gender norms 
are viewed as given and the effect of social networks runs counter to enhancing 
women’s agency. Women in such may act to perpetuate the systematic gender 
inequalities prevailing in society rather than contesting them. Bourdieu (1997) 
terms this as ‘doxa’, in which an individual accepts certain social orders as natural 
and inevitable and does not contest them. By way of example, Shell-Duncan et al. 
(2011) point to social capital as promoting the practice of female circumcision 
among younger women in sub-Saharan Africa. By engaging in this practice these 
women are showing submission to traditional norms in an effort to be included in 
the greater female social networks of their elders. Agarwal (1997) also explains 
that social norms may deter women’s agency in various ways; for example, 
through restrictions on their earning opportunities, mobility out of home, share in 
parental property and presence in public spaces. Sen (1987) further argues that in 
social settings in which woman attach less value to their well-being, the outcome 
of bargaining is likely to go against them. 
It is also important to note that the notion of empowerment is often 
considered as a ‘zero-sum game’ in the feminist literature in which one party’s 
gain may appear as another party’s loss. As Kabeer (1999) argues, women’s 
enhanced agency has to be considered with the process of change; that is, a 
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change in women’s ability to make strategic life choice where such choices were 
previously denied. Thus, women’s position and bargaining in household decisions 
indicates the declining authority and control of their husbands. The non-
cooperative household bargaining models (e.g., Lundberg and Pollak 1993; 
Kanbur and Haddad 1994; Chen and Woolley 2001) also show that intra-
household interaction may be characterised by conflicting elements reaching for 
equilibrium. ‘Empowerment’ is, thus, a pure private good with strong rivalry 
among agents. Social networks, in this case, may benefit either party involved in 
the bargaining and do not necessarily increase women’s agency within the 
household. 
 
5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data were collected as part of a baseline survey for BRAC’s52 
‘Challenging the Frontier of Poverty Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP)’ 
programme in 2002. Three northern districts in Bangladesh (Rangpur, Kurigram 
and Nilphamari) were chosen for launching this programme. In each village, a 
complete household listing and ranking was conducted through participatory 
wealth ranking (PWR) exercises to select the potential programme participants.53 
Households ranked as the poorest in these PWRs were considered as the 
‘community defined extreme poor’. According to these wealth rankings, just over 
25% of the households were identified as extreme poor, which is consistent with 
the national statistics. The survey was conducted among these extreme poor prior 
                                                 
52 BRAC is one of the largest NGOs in the world. Previously, BRAC stood for 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. Now it is a brand name. 
53 Matin and Halder (2007) discuss in detail the selection of programme participants by 
the PWR.  
 Chapter Five 
 
~ 176 ~ 
 
to launching the TUP programme, to create a baseline and evaluate the 
programme’s impact in the future.54 The total sample size is 5600 households in 
156 villages. The collected information included individual and household 
characteristics, economic endowments, labour force participation, social capital 
and awareness, organisational membership, health, hygiene and reproductive 
behaviour, decision making in the household, violence against women and 
village-level infrastructure.  
 
Insert Table 5.1 here 
 
The descriptive statistics of the indicators for women’s empowerment at 
the household level are presented above in Table 5.1. As can be seen, 57% of 
women participated in household decision making, including building/repairing 
the house, buying/selling cows and goats and leasing/selling land. Only 19.6% of 
women reported purchasing necessary items for household consumption, such as 
rice and pulses; bangles, coconut oil and lace for themselves; biscuits, chocolates 
and sweets for children; clothes for children; and Saree for themselves. Thirty per 
cent of women reported incidents of violence by their husbands, including 
physical torture, being obstructed from visiting their parents, having their money 
taken against their will and being threatened with divorce or their husband taking 
another wife. The average age difference between husband and wife was 8.3 years 
and 88% of the sample households were Muslim. Looking at the social capital 
                                                 
54 The households were revisited in 2005 and 2008, but this panel data cannot be used to 
investigate the effect of social capital. The extreme poor were provided, among other 
assistance, with support for building social capital for about two years. Therefore, the 
contribution of social capital cannot be disentangled from the programme impact. 
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constructs, 16% of women reported receiving help from non-relative neighbours, 
27% had received an invitation and 13% had been invited to attend Shalish.  
 
5.4 Estimation Strategy  
5.4.1 Model Specification 
To investigate the role of social capital, we estimate the following equation: 
 
        𝐸𝑖 = ∝  + 𝛽 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖   (5.1) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖 is the indicator for women’s empowerment in the household i, 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the index of social capital for woman in the household and the 
iX  vector consists of a range of controls.  
The dependent variable, 𝐸𝑖, includes the following indicators of women 
empowerment: the ability to purchase a necessary items for the household; ability 
to participate in the household decision making; whether or not faced violence of 
some sort by husband; and the aggregated index of women’s empowerment 
combining all three of these indicators.   
For the first empowerment indicator above, i.e., the ability to purchase a 
necessary item for the household, five different purchasable items are considered: 
staple foodstuffs such as rice, pulse and salt; biscuits, candies and small toys for 
children; clothing for children; Saree for herself; and small cosmetic items for 
daily use such as coconut oil, soap and bangles. For each purchased item, the 
value 1 is assigned if a purchase was made by woman in the last one year and zero 
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otherwise. Then, these values are aggregated over all five purchased items (hence, 
the highest value of the purchasing index is 5 and 0 is the lowest) 
The indicator for women’s participation in household decision making 
captures the major decisions typically made in a household in rural Bangladesh; 
that is, buying and selling land and trees; the marriage of children; the schooling 
of children; and treatment in the event of sickness. Female respondents were 
asked if they had participated in such decisions in the last one year. A value of 1 is 
assigned for each ‘yes’ answer and zero otherwise. The final indicator for 
women’s participation in household decision making is the sum of all decisions, 
giving a highest value of 4.  
For the violence indicator, five kinds of offence that women may face 
were used: physical torture; being obstructed from visiting their parents; having 
their money taken against their will; being threatened with divorce; and being 
threatened with their husband taking another wife (that is, a second marriage). A 
value of 1 is assigned for each ‘yes’ answer, and zero otherwise. The index for 
violence against women by their husbands is constructed by aggregating the 
responses, giving an index maximum value of 5 and a minimum of 0.  
Finally, the principal component analysis (PCA) using all three indices is 
employed to construct the overall empowerment index. However, considering that 
the index of violence by husband reflects the disempowerment of women, the 
inverse of the violence index is used in the construction of the overall index for 
women’s empowerment.  
The measure of social capital is constructed from the answers to the 
following three questions: i) if the woman received any invitation from non-
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relative neighbours in the past one year, ii) if she received any help from non-
relative neighbours in the past one year55, and iii) if she was invited to participate 
in Shalish. A value of 1 is assigned for each ‘yes’ answer and 0 otherwise. The 
social capital index is then constructed by aggregating these answers by PCA. 
Similar index has been employed in Krishna and Uphoff (1999), Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) and Mallick (2013) among others. To check the robustness of the 
results, each component of social capital is also investigated separately. 
The control vector iX  contains a rich set of variables, including 
demographic characteristics, economic conditions and village characteristics. 
Specifically, these are: age of the woman, age difference between the woman and 
her spouse, household size, number of children, education of the woman, 
education of the husband, land and non-land assets, religion and village-level 
infrastructure. Education level is a means of acquiring information and as a 
marker of likely cognitive development and bargaining power in the household. 
Age captures the wisdom and experience of women, while age difference may 
reflect spouses’ relative authority in household decision making (Kabeer 2001; 
Anderson and Eswaran 2009). The amount of land and non-land assets accounts 
for the economic endowments of the household. Religion affects one’s norms and 
values towards gender relations (Sen 1999; Anderson and Eswaran 2009). The 
availability of paid employment in the village may affect women’s mobility and 
freedom (Kabeer 2001; Mahmud 2003). In this regard, the presence of a Food-for-
Work programme, a common government initiative in rural Bangladesh for 
                                                 
55 ‘Help’ includes: i) giving cooked food or food items such as rice, salt, eggs, pulses and 
spices as a gift or loan; ii) accompanying the respondent to visit the doctor, hospital or 
pharmacy; iii) assisting in buying/selling productive assets such as a cow and tree; and iv) 
providing information about jobs, relief or informal loans. 
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creating work opportunities for extreme poor, is considered. Moreover, developed 
physical infrastructure facilitates communication among people (Collier 1998). To 
account for this potential effect we control for village-level physical 
infrastructure, represented by distance from thana (sub-district) headquarters and 
distance from all-weather road. In addition, BRAC may have selected programme 
villages non-randomly based on poverty incidence. Physical infrastructure also 
accounts for the potential non-randomness of programme placement at the village 
level.  
NGO membership is not included in the social capital index because it 
would confound the true effect of social capital via the intervention effect. 
Another reason for excluding NGO membership is that it is an endogenous 
variable, as women that are already more mobile and empowered are likely to join 
NGO initiatives.  
 
5.4.2 Econometric Method 
The benchmark estimation is OLS regression. It is expected that the effect 
of social capital will be positive and statistically significant for all but violence 
against women. The main focus of the estimation is on β , the coefficient of social 
capital. As social capital is a broad concept, our index, although similar to others 
used in the literature, may be measured with errors. Further, social capital can be 
affected by dependent variables, leading to reverse causality. As Larance and 
Porter (2004) argue, women who are victims of domestic violence may be isolated 
from supportive networks by their abusers to keep them secluded and dependent. 
In contrast, women enjoying greater freedom and mobility may command larger 
social networks. Other unobservable factors such as women’s abilities and traits 
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(beauty, appearance and whether she is an introvert or extrovert), might affect 
their empowerment and social capital, leading to endogeneity. For example, an 
introvert woman is likely to have less attachment with others and be less likely to 
challenge existing gender norms and vice versa.56 This is likely to bias estimates 
because of a non-zero correlation between social capital and the residual in the 
regression equation. For this reason, a valid instrument is required that has no 
independent effect on women’s empowerment among the extreme poor but that 
works through social capital—the endogenous variable. Note that the instrument 
used in Chapters 3 and 4 (that is, the number of open access resources) cannot be 
used here due to the problem of exclusion restrictions.57  
A growing body of literature shows that, in the absence of a valid 
instrument to address endogeneity, heteroskedasticity can be employed for 
identification (Lewbel 1997; 2012; Rigobon 2003; Klein and Vella 2009; 2010). 
As Rigobon (2003) argues, heteroskedasticity can be considered as a 
‘probabilistic shifter’ of the endogenous variables, equivalent to the conventional 
instrumental variable approach. We use Lewbel (1997; 2012) and Klein and Vella 
(2009; 2010) estimation techniques to exploit heteroskedastic identification. The 
Monte Carlo simulation results in various studies confirm that the Lewbel (1997; 
                                                 
56 Anderson and Eswaran (2009) find that 70% of rural Bangladeshi women have not 
visited their next door neighbours more than once a week. Individual traits appear very 
important in nurturing attachment and networks in this situation. Similarly, Jahan (2005) 
documents individual traits (such as ability and judgement) as affecting women’s 
endeavours to seek greater mobility and challenge submissive gender norms and violence 
against women.  
57 Open access places (for example, fallow lands, water bodies and woodlands) offer a 
platform for extremely poor women to meet and interact with others. However, visiting 
such places requires women to have mobility out of the home, which in turn requires their 
empowerment.  
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2012) and Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) approaches are effective in eliminating 
endogeneity bias (Lewbel 1997; 2012; Klein and Vella 2009; 2010; Ebbes, Wedel 
and Böckenholt 2009; Millimet and Tchernis 2012).  
The Lewbel (1997; 2012) estimation uses heteroskedasticity to construct a 
vector of instrument for identification when no valid instrument is available. In 
the first stage, the endogenous variable is regressed on a set of exogenous 
variables, Z, where Z is a subset of X or even Z= X. From this, the residual vector 
𝑢�  is retrieved. For this study, the first-stage regression is: 
 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 = ∝  + 𝛿𝑍𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖          (5.2) 
 
The vector of instrumental variables is constructed as:  
 
Instrument = (Z- ?̅?) 𝑢�        (5.3) 
 
where ?̅? is the mean of Z.  Identification requires that 𝑢�  is heteroskedastic.   
As the Lewbel (1997; 2012) method can only be used when the 
endogenous variable is continuous, it is necessary to use an alternate method for 
the individual components of social capital which are binary endogenous 
variables. For this, the Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) method was chosen. As 
Klein and Vella argue, in a triangular model with binary endogenous variables, 
heteroskedasticity induces exclusion restriction even though standard exclusion 
restriction does not exist. The identification requires here is that the first-stage 
probit regression of the binary endogenous variables yields heteroskedastic 
residuals. Provided heteroskedasticity exists in the treatment equation, the 
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predicted probability of the binary endogenous variable satisfies exclusion 
restriction and can be used as an instrument in the second stage. Consider the 
triangular model: 
 
𝐸𝑖 = ∝  + 𝛽 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖 +  𝛿𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖                                             (5.4) 
𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 = ∝  + 𝛿𝑋𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖                                                          (5.5) 
 
where 𝐸𝑖 is the indicator of women’s empowerment and 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 is the 
binary endogenous variable. The model does not satisfy exclusion restriction. 
Assume that residuals in the first-stage regression are heteroskedastic of the 
following form: 
 
  𝑢𝑖 = 𝑆𝑢(𝑋𝑖�)𝑢�𝑖                                                  (5.6) 
 
where 𝑢�𝑖 is the homoskedastic residuals with zero mean,  𝑋𝑖� may or may not 
include all 𝑋𝑖, and 𝑆𝑢�𝑋𝑖�� is a non-constant positive function. The probability of 
the binary endogenous indicator is given by: 
 Pr(𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑝 = 1) = 𝑃 � 𝑋�𝑖𝑆𝑢𝑋�𝑖�     (5.7) 
 
where P(.) is the distribution function for  𝑢�𝑖. Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) argue 
that, with homoskedastic residuals, 𝑆(𝑋�𝑖) is constant and identification requires 
the non-linearity of P(.), which comes from a small portion of the data, 
challenging the credibility of the estimation. However, with heteroskedastic 
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errors, 𝑆(𝑋�𝑖) is not a constant function and consequently, identification comes 
from a greater segment of data with linear P(.). Therefore, the predicted 
probability of equation (5.7) works as a valid instrument of the binary endogenous 
indicator provided that there is heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
Since the Lewbel (1997; 2012) and Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) approach 
rely on heteroskedasticity, identification is credible only if there is: (i) a rigorous 
theoretical foundation identifying the variables responsible for such 
heteroskedasticity; and (ii) formal proof of substantial heteroskedasticity in the 
data. It can be argued that variables such as woman’s age, family size, education, 
wage, distance from all-weather road and distance from thana affect the variance 
of social capital across respondents. For example, if building social capital 
requires financial and non-financial cost and the investment of time, the age of the 
household head and that of the spouse might affect the variance of social capital. 
Moreover, younger individuals are likely to have closer social networks as 
compared to their older counterparts. Therefore, variance in social capital 
indicators is likely to be less for younger age groups as compared to older age 
groups, with the diversity of one’s social connections increasing over the lifespan.  
Regarding the other variables, family size can also affect the variance of 
social capital. Families with more members might possess a wider range of social 
networks, with variance of social capital being a positive function of size of 
family. Similarly, village-level infrastructure such as distance from all-weather 
road and distance from thana can affect the variance of respondents’ social 
interaction. Remote households, located far from thana and all-weather roads, are 
likely to have closer social bonds and less variance in social capital as compared 
to households closer to thana and roads. In contrast, these latter households are 
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more likely to possess a mixture of institutional and market links in addition to 
social bonding. Finally, higher female wage rates in a particular village indicate a 
greater opportunity for women to go outside the home for paid employment and 
hence to have more diverse social networks. Variance of social capital is, thus, 
likely to be a positive function of better female wages.  
Other variables are unlikely to have any effect on social capital variance in 
the context of rural Bangladesh. Education, for example, is typically considered to 
increase one’s social skills across diverse dimensions and consequently, to affect 
variance in social capital. However, since this study deals with the extreme poor 
who are mostly illiterate, education is not likely to be a significant factor here. 
Likewise, the extreme poor are mostly homogenous in terms of their land 
holdings (that is, they are mostly landless in the agrarian setting) and non-land 
assets. Consequently, evidence of any impact of these resources on the variance of 
social capital among the respondents is unlikely. Religion is a binary indicator and 
is unlikely to affect the variance of social capital. Finally, variables related to the 
husband of the female respondent (for example, age, education, male wage rate) 
are not emphasised, as women’s social networks are more likely to be affected by 
their own characteristics and indicators at the village-level rather than by the 
characteristics of their husbands. 
While these theoretical arguments can explain the possibility of variables 
yielding heteroskedasticity, identification depends on formal evidence 
documenting heteroskedasticity in the data; that is, unobserved heterogeneity in 
the social capital of the respondents. The empirical results of applying the Klein 
and Vella and Lewbell approaches are presented in Appendix A5.1. The results 
indicate that heteroskedasticity in the treatment equation is driven significantly by 
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age of the woman, family size, female wage rates in the village, distance from 
thana and distance from all-weather roads.  
 
5.5 Results and Discussion 
5.5.1 Benchmark Results 
We start with OLS regressions as the benchmark. The results for all 
women’s empowerment indicators are summarised in Table 5.2. We report here 
only the coefficient of social capital in equation (5.1). We estimate four models 
for each dependent variable; that is, one for the aggregate social capital index and 
one for each of the three individual components of the aggregate social capital 
index. The coefficient of the aggregate social capital index is presented in column 
2 of Table 5.2. In the case of participation in household decision making and for 
the overall index of empowerment, the effect of social capital is positive and 
statistically significant (see column 2 of Table 5.2). In the case of the purchasing 
of necessary items and violence by husband, the effect of social capital is 
insignificant (see column 2 of Table 5.2).  
 
Insert Table 5.2 here 
 
In columns 3-5 we present coefficient of the individual components of social 
capital. The results for the social capital index presented in column 2 are robust 
for the determinants of women’s decision making in household matters and for the 
overall index of women’s empowerment. The sign of the coefficient of social 
capital changes for the determinants of violence against women. However, in all 
cases, the effect is very small and close to zero. Note that these estimates are 
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likely to be biased because of endogeneity. Therefore, the bias is corrected by 
employing IV regression, as detailed in the following section. 
 
5.5.2 Endogeneity-corrected Results 
As mentioned in Section 5.4, we use heteroskedasticity based 
identification to address endogeneity in social capital. We use equation (5.3), 
following Lewbel (1997; 2012), to construct a vector of instruments for the social 
capital index. We regress the social capital index on four exogenous variables: age 
of woman, family size, wage difference between husband and wife and distance 
from thana. The Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity at the 1% level confirming the heteroskedasticity essential to 
satisfy the condition of identification. We retrieve residuals from this regression to 
construct instruments following equation (5.3), and we obtain four instruments. 
For the individual components of social capital, which are binary, equation (5.7) 
is used to construct an instrument following Klein and Vella (2009; 2010). To this 
end, heteroskedastic-probit regressions are run for each of the endogenous 
indicators—‘help’, ‘invitation’ and ‘shalish’—on all controls, and the predicted 
values of each following (5.7) are extracted to be used as instruments in the 
second stage. 
The first-stage results presented in Appendix A5.2 show that the 
coefficients of the instruments for the regression of the social capital index (see 
column 2) are all significant at the 5% level or above. The F-statistic is 63.38, 
which is much higher than the Stock-Yogo (2002) cut-off level of 9.86. The 
coefficients of the instruments for the individual components of social capital are 
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also significant at the 1% level (see columns 3–5). However, the Stock-Yogo cut-
off is not appropriate for these binary indicators. 
The endogeneity-corrected IV regression results are presented in Tables 
5.3–5.6. The results for the determinants of women’s participation in household 
decision making are presented in Table 5.3. As shown in this table, the coefficient 
of social capital is positive and significant at the 5% level (see column 2). At 
0.075, the coefficient of social capital implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in social capital will increase the likelihood of women’s participation in 
household decision making by 0.075 percentage points.  However, the results are 
not robust when social capital is measured by the individual components (see 
columns 3 to 5), whereas the benchmark results are positive and significant.  
Regarding the other variables, age affects women’s agency in household 
decision making, with a significant positive effect showing that women’s agency 
increases with age. In contrast, the greater the age difference between husband 
and wife the less likely women are to participate in the decision-making process. 
This indicates that younger women with elderly husbands are in a weak position. 
The presence of the Food-for-Work programme has a negative effect on women’s 
agency in household decision making. While the reason for this is unclear, this 
finding recalls the argument of Rahman (1999) and Kusakabe (2001) that the 
economic opportunity for women may be associated with increasing patriarchal 
control and weakening position of women in the household decision-making.  
Table 5.4 presents the results for the determinants of women’s position in 
purchasing necessary items for their households. The effect of social capital is 
positive but insignificant. The results are also insignificant for the individual 
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components of social capital. Age of the woman has a positive effect implying 
women’s greater control in household purchasing over time. The presence of the 
Food-for-Work programme also returned positive and significant results, 
reflecting the positive effect of this initiative in providing income for women 
which they can then use to purchase necessary items for their household.  
The determinants of violence against women are presented in Table 5.5. 
The effect of social capital is insignificant for reducing the incidence of domestic 
violence against women. Violence against women decreases with women’s 
increasing age. This might reflect women’s greater authority in the household 
with increasing experience and wisdom. However, the greater the age difference 
between husband and wife the higher is the incidence of violence by husband. 
This reflects the subordination, oppression and vulnerability of younger wives and 
can be argued as evidencing the problem of child and unequal marriage in 
Bangladesh.  
Wage appears as an important variable in predicting violence against 
women. In those villages with unfavourable wages for women’s work (that is, a 
wage difference between men and women, in favour of men), there is a greater 
incidence of violence against women. This potentially indicates that weaker 
economic opportunities for women lead to their increasing vulnerability in the 
household as well. Further, violence against women is higher in villages with the 
Food-for-Work programme. This indicates that where opportunities exist for 
women to undertake paid employment, tensions might arise between husband and 
wife for control over income leading to an increased incidence of violence against 
women. Supporting this point, Rahman (1999) and Kabeer (2001) document a 
growing rate of violence against women as a result of conflict over control of 
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assets acquired through micro-credit. Other demographic factors also influence 
the rate of violence against women in rural Bangladesh, with incidences of 
violence significantly larger in Muslim households and those in remote areas.  
Finally, as shown in Table 5.6, the effect of social capital is found to be 
insignificant for the determinants of the overall index of women’s empowerment. 
It is evidenced that women’s age affects their empowerment positively, reflecting 
their greater voice and control in household decision making over time. In 
addition, Muslim women are found to be more empowered than the non-Muslims. 
This may stem from the fact that in a patriarchal society like Bangladesh in which 
women are marginalised, the position of women from the minority groups is 
lower as compared to those from the majority group—in this case, Muslims.  
The endogeneity-corrected empirical results thus show no significant 
effect of social capital on empowering women in rural Bangladesh. These results 
contrast with those of previous studies (e.g., Hashemi, Schuler and Riley 1996; 
Kabeer 2001; Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright 2006), which find a positive effect 
for social capital, generated through micro-credit intervention, on empowering 
women in rural Bangladesh. As such, the results of the current study should be 
taken into consideration by development practitioners and donor agencies 
combating poverty and gender inequality through solidarity and self-help groups 
across the world.  
So what makes the difference? Why our results deviate from those of the 
previous studies? The reason the results of this study differ from those found in 
the previous literature is that previous studies have failed to control for the 
contaminating effect of NGO intervention on the effect of social capital. Mahmud 
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(2003), for example, argues that the empowerment effect of NGO interventions 
with a special focus on women’s agency is much higher than for those focusing on 
general welfare and poverty alleviation. England and Kilbourne (1990) and 
Agarwal (1997) further argue that cash flows earned by women enable them to 
exercise greater agency in household decision making as society places more 
value on visible income. By limiting the risk of contamination in measuring social 
capital, the present study is free from such intervention effects.  
Moreover, micro-credit intervention shifts ‘empowerment’ from being a 
‘zero-sum game’ to being a ‘win-win’ situation. With micro-credit intervention, 
women enjoy greater mobility out of the home and an increased say in household 
decision making, while at the same time, husbands gain access to larger financial 
and non-financial resources. In such a case, empowerment remains as a private 
good with potential rivalry among agents and women are ‘buying’ it at the price 
of financial and non-financial resources accessed by their husbands from micro-
credit groups. This is not the case in the present study.  
The effect of social capital on empowering women may also remain 
unnoticeable for the following two reasons: (i) women with lower social capital 
may understate their relative deprivation and vice versa. This is described by 
Festinger (1957) as ‘cognitive dissonance’, whereby ‘people filter information 
that conflicts with their own beliefs so as to render them more compatible’; and 
(ii) women’s internalisation of traditional norms and practices of womanhood may 
impede their efforts at bargaining at the household and community levels, what 
Bourdieu (1977) calls as ‘doxa’.  
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It is also important to note that the measure of social capital in this paper is 
essentially ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ in nature (see Chapter 2 for detail). It does 
not capture the ‘linking social capital’. The results, thus, can be considered as 
inefficacy of bonding and bridging social capital empowering women among the 
extreme poor households in Bangladesh. Put other way, this results indicate the 
scope and implication for potential government and non-government intervention 
to empower extreme poor women. 
Overall, only age of the woman and age difference between husband and 
wife show any consistent effect on the indicators of women’s empowerment. 
Women enjoy greater freedom, mobility and authority with increasing age and 
experience, but the greater the age difference between husband and wife the 
greater control the husband has in household decision making. It is also found that 
non-Muslim women, who are a minority in Bangladesh, enjoy less freedom as 
compared to their Muslim counterparts, although Muslim women experience more 
violence. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, educational attainment shows no 
effect, most likely because the extremely poor households in this dataset are 
largely illiterate, with an average of less than one year of schooling. 
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This essay investigates the role of social capital in empowering women 
among the extreme poor households in rural Bangladesh. Empowerment of 
women is emphasised by scholars to eliminate poverty and to foster democracy 
from the bottom. Studies identify numerous social and institutional barriers to the 
attainment of women’s empowerment. It is also argued that social network 
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enables cognitive development, facilitates informational flow to overcome certain 
constraints and renders material and non-material benefits.  
Controlling for a rich set of explanatory variables (including education, 
land and non-land assets, religion and work opportunities), this essay is unable to 
document any statistically significant effect of social capital on women’s 
empowerment. This important result indicates that social capital alone is not 
adequate for empowering destitute women and that it should be bundled with 
other policy interventions, such as micro-credit. It is also important to note that 
the measure of social capital in this paper captures the bonding and bridging but 
not linking features of social network. In the event of such drawback of bonding 
and bridging social networks of the marginalised poor the results, thus, indicate 
the necessity for building linking social capital through possible external 
intervention in order to empower women at the grassroots. This finding is 
important for governments and NGOs working towards empowering women and 
achieving the MDGs. 
Methodologically, this study features important advances over the 
previous work in its addressing of endogeneity of social capital due to reverse 
causality and measurement error. In the absence of a valid instrument satisfying 
exclusion restriction, this study exploits heteroskedasticity based identification 
due to Lewbel (1997; 2012) and Klein and Vella (2009; 2010). The results 
document significant heteroskedasticity in the treatment equation due to certain 
variables justifying our identification and enabling to obtain unbiased effect of 
social capital in the second stage. The significant differences between the 
benchmark estimates and that of endogeneity corrected estimates warrant 
potential care for addressing the endogeneity of social capital in future research. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Notation Mean Std. Dev. 
Decision making by women in 
household matters (%) 
DECISION 0.57 1.12 
Purchasing necessary items by women 
(%) 
PURCHASE 0.196 1.55 
Violence against women (%) VIOLENCE 0.30 1.12 
Overall empowerment index (%) EMPOWER 0.274 2.06 
Education of wife (in years) EDUSPOUSE 0.52 1.58 
Education of husband (in years) EDUHUSBND 0.50 1.68 
Age difference between husband and 
wife (years) 
AGEDIFF 8.31 7.49 
Square of the age difference AGEDIFF2 125.41 198.24 
Family size FSIZE 3.67 1.74 
Number of children (aged below 10 
years) 
CHILD 1.02 1.09 
Land owned (in acres) LAND 0.04 0.14 
Value of main bedroom (thousand 
Taka) 
LIVROOM 1.21 2.23 
Difference in wage for men and 
women (in Taka) 
WAGEDIFF 49.78 23.13 
If the village has any Food For Work 
programmes 
FRW 0.51 0.50 
NGO members from the household 
(%) 
NGO 0.076 0.27 
Religion (=1 if Islam) RELIGION 0.88 0.322 
Distance from Thana (in kilometres) DSTHANA 7.57 4.02 
Distance from all-weather road 
(kilometres) 
DSROAD 1.92 1.81 
Social capital score SOCIALCAP 0 1 
If household received any help from 
non-relative neighbour 
HELP 0.159 0.366 
If household received any invitation 
from non-relative neighbour 
INVITATION 0.267 0.44 
If invited attending Shalish  SHALISH 0.133 0.34 
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Table 5.2: Benchmark Probit/OLS regression 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Indicators Social 
capital 
Help Invitation Shalish N 
Determinants of women’s 
position in household 
decision-making 
0.073*** 
(4.00) 
0.144** 
(2.55) 
0.066 
(1.52) 
0.230*** 
(4.02) 
2921 
Determinants of women’s 
position purchasing 
necessary items 
0.005 
(0.19) 
0.115 
(1.24) 
-0.068 
(-1.00) 
-0.039 
(-0.43) 
1299 
Determinants of violence 
against women 
0.023 
(1.24) 
0.159** 
(2.72) 
-0.093** 
(-2.04) 
0.093 
(1.56) 
2633 
Determinants of women’s 
overall empowerment 
0.079* 
(1.94) 
0.295** 
(2.18) 
0.030 
(0.28) 
0.220* 
(1.64) 
503 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
level, respectively.  
Column 2: Social capital is measured as the aggregate social capital index. 
Columns 3-5: Social capital is measured by individual components, e.g., Help, 
Invitation and Shalish, respectively. 
Regressions include all controls and constant, but are not reported. 
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Table 5.3: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of women’s 
participation in household decision-making 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
     
SOCIALCAP 0.075** -0.303 0.122 0.916** 
 (2.17) (-1.18) (0.405) (2.32) 
EDUSP 0.021 0.020 0.024* 0.028* 
 (1.46) (1.380) (1.703) (1.926) 
EDUHH 0.008 0.011 0.012 0.004 
 (0.75) (0.972) (1.21) (0.315) 
AGESP 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.005** 
 (3.26) (3.70) (3.39) (2.39) 
AGEDIFF -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
 (-5.75) (-5.65) (-5.85) (-6.17) 
FSIZE 0.026 0.0315 0.025 0.028 
 (1.31) (1.601) (1.29) (1.46) 
CHILD -0.004 -0.007 -0.011 -0.012 
 (-0.135) (-0.242) (-0.405) (-0.44) 
LANDOWN -0.003** -0.003** -0.002 -0.001 
 (-2.17) (-1.99) (-1.49) (-1.37) 
LIVROOM -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 
 (-0.72) (-0.82) (-0.887) (-0.83) 
WAGEDIFF 0.002** 0.001 0.002 0.002** 
 (2.15) (1.19) (1.63) (2.02) 
FOODWORK -0.099** -0.094** -0.093** -0.095** 
 (-2.32) (-2.16) (-2.205) (-2.25) 
RELIGION 0.040 0.038 0.056 0.024 
 (0.67) (0.62) (0.868) (0.41) 
DSTHANA -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.019*** 
 (-4.19) (-3.69) (-4.15) (-3.28) 
DSROAD 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.033*** 
 (2.59) (2.84) (3.11) (2.83) 
Observations 2,762 2,766 2,915 2,921 
Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by Lewbel (1997; 2012) 
estimation technique.  
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Help, Invitation and Shalish respectively, and the models 
are estimated using Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) technique. 
Regressions include constant, but are not reported. 
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Table 5.4: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of purchasing 
household items 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
     
SOCIALCAP 0.032 -1.733* -0.196 -0.741 
 (0.978) (-1.88) (-0.67) (-1.03) 
EDUSP 0.021 0.027 0.024 0.022 
 (0.712) (0.86) (0.83) (0.73) 
EDUHH 0.010 0.013 0.0061 0.019 
 (0.53) (0.63) (0.32) (0.88) 
AGESP 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 
 (4.99) (4.84) (5.38) (5.10) 
AGEDIFF -0.014* -0.013 -0.010 -0.007 
 (-1.67) (-1.48) (-1.22) (-0.86) 
FSIZE -0.128*** -0.105** -0.133*** -0.145*** 
 (-3.40) (-2.44) (-3.58) (-3.61) 
CHILD 0.058 0.053 0.078* 0.088* 
 (1.29) (1.04) (1.72) (1.86) 
LANDOWN -0.003 -0.004* -0.002 -0.004* 
 (-1.40) (-1.82) (-1.16) (-1.88) 
LIVROOM -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 
 (-0.67) (-0.80) (-0.56) (-0.59) 
WAGEDIFF 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.0008 
 (0.51) (-1.21) (0.78) (0.59) 
FOODWORK 0.196*** 0.182** 0.173*** 0.160** 
 (2.94) (2.35) (2.66) (2.40) 
RELIGION 0.056 0.045 0.047 0.083 
 (0.64) (0.45) (0.53) (0.91) 
DSTHANA 0.005 0.027* 0.005 0.003 
 (0.63) (1.77) (0.57) (0.305) 
DSROAD -0.004 -0.020 0.002 0.007 
 (-0.25) (-0.86) (0.13) (0.41) 
Observations 1,234 1,237 1,295 1,299 
Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by Lewbel (1997; 2012) 
estimation technique.  
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Help, Invitation and Shalish respectively, and the 
models are estimated using Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) technique. 
Regressions include constant, but are not reported. 
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Table 5.5: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of violence 
against women 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
     
SOCIALCAP 0.027 0.936*** 0.112 -0.297 
 (0.78) (3.39) (0.33) (-0.83) 
EDUSP -0.014 -0.011 -0.022 -0.022 
 (-0.89) (-0.68) (-1.36) (-1.39) 
EDUHH -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 
 (-0.17) (-0.42) (-0.20) (0.04) 
AGESP -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.019*** 
 (-10.18) (-10.37) (-10.44) (-9.79) 
AGEDIFF -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-3.64) (-3.22) (-4.16) (-3.93) 
FSIZE -0.020 -0.027 -0.019 -0.019 
 (-1.11) (-1.43) (-1.04) (-1.02) 
CHILD 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.037 
 (1.43) (1.41) (1.45) (1.39) 
LANDOWN 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.12) (0.06) (-0.19) (-0.032) 
LIVROOM 0.009 0.011 0.008 0.012 
 (0.86) (1.08) (0.81) (1.10) 
WAGEDIFF -0.004*** -0.002** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.34) (-2.01) (-3.92) (-4.09) 
FOODWORK 0.102** 0.098** 0.092** 0.094** 
 (2.22) (2.09) (2.03) (2.06) 
RELIGION 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.240*** 0.231*** 
 (3.50) (3.41) (3.83) (4.09) 
DSTHANA 0.014*** 0.009 0.016*** 0.015** 
 (2.71) (1.60) (2.88) (2.55) 
DSROAD 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 
 (3.15) (3.13) (2.87) (3.22) 
Observations 2,516 2,520 2,657 2,663 
Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by Lewbel (1997; 2012) 
estimation technique.  
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Help, Invitation and Shalish respectively, and the 
models are estimated using Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) technique. 
Regressions include constant, but are not reported. 
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Table 5.6: Endogeneity-corrected estimation: Determinants of women’s 
empowerment  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
     
SOCIALCAP 0.089* -0.99 -0.141 0.296 
 (1.89) (-1.14) (-0.29) (0.27) 
EDUSP 0.040 0.047 0.043 0.041 
 (0.89) (0.97) (0.949) (0.91) 
EDUHH 0.017 0.031 0.023 0.015 
 (0.58) (0.88) (0.74) (0.35) 
AGESP 0.023** 0.026** 0.025*** 0.023* 
 (2.57) (2.55) (2.74) (1.90) 
AGEDIFF -0.018 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 
 (-1.41) (-1.11) (-1.29) (-1.36) 
FSIZE -0.099 -0.104 -0.096 -0.096 
 (-1.58) (-1.51) (-1.49) (-1.43) 
CHILD -0.015 -0.021 -0.012 -0.004 
 (-0.21) (-0.26) (-0.17) (-0.051) 
LANDOWN -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-0.41) (-0.62) (-0.37) (-0.29) 
LIVROOM -0.025 -0.02 -0.023 -0.027 
 (-1.08) (-1.05) (-0.96) (-1.17) 
WAGEDIFF 0.004* 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (1.89) (0.95) (1.55) (1.58) 
FOODWORK 0.139 0.118 0.091 0.068 
 (1.31) (0.98) (0.85) (0.57) 
RELIGION 0.464*** 0.50** 0.466** 0.470*** 
 (2.61) (2.56) (2.54) (2.64) 
DSTHANA -0.025* -0.013 -0.023 -0.024* 
 (-1.77) (-0.67) (-1.64) (-1.68) 
DSROAD 0.046* 0.049* 0.055** 0.047 
 (1.81) (1.66) (2.00) (1.33) 
Observations 472 473 502 503 
Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by Lewbel (1997; 2012) 
estimation technique.  
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Help, Invitation and Shalish respectively, and the 
models are estimated using Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) technique. 
Regressions include constant, but are not reported. 
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Appendix 
 
 
A5.1: Determinants of heteroskedasticity using Lewbell (1997; 2012) and 
Klein-Vella (2009; 2010) estimation 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
     
EDUSP -0.0179 0.0276 -0.146*** 0.0857 
 (-0.708) (0.802) (-3.071) (1.406) 
AGESP 0.00677** -0.00208 0.00735 0.0131*** 
 (2.137) (-0.415) (0.755) (2.621) 
FSIZE 0.0836*** 0.201*** 0.0603 0.108** 
 (3.334) (4.499) (0.410) (2.459) 
LANDOWN -0.00154 -0.00714*** 0.00917 -0.00458 
 (-0.563) (-3.424) (0.780) (-1.605) 
LIVROOM 0.000393 -0.0374** 0.0458 0.0206 
 (0.0243) (-2.226) (0.840) (0.736) 
FEMWAGE -0.0156*** 0.000992 -0.0220* -0.0209** 
 (-2.707) (0.122) (-1.913) (-2.011) 
FRW -0.0343 -0.188 0.0126 -0.272 
 (-0.448) (-1.588) (0.0674) (-1.567) 
RELIGION -0.0544 -0.563* 0.0257 0.113 
 (-0.493) (-1.873) (0.0617) (0.508) 
DSTHANA 0.0188* 0.0748*** 0.0411 0.0381** 
 (1.875) (4.239) (1.622) (1.979) 
DSROAD 0.0121 -0.141*** -0.110 -0.113*** 
 (0.566) (-4.250) (-0.797) (-2.962) 
     
Observations 2,810 2,814 2,964 2,971 
Figures in the parentheses are robust z-statistics. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively.  
Column 2:  Social capital is the aggregate index constructed by the principal component 
analysis, and the model is estimated by Lewbel (1997; 2012) estimation technique.  
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Help, Invitation and Shalish respectively, and the models 
are estimated using Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) technique. 
Regressions include constant, but are not reported. 
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A5.2: First-stage regression using Lewbel (1997; 2012) and Klein-Vella (2009, 
2010) approach 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables Social capital 
index 
Help Invitation Shalish 
INSTRUMENT 1 0.288*** 1.018*** 1.015*** 0.992*** 
 (29.91) (10.87) (7.75) (7.76) 
INSTRUMENT 2 0.003**    
 (2.39)    
INSTRUMENT 3 -0.005***    
 (-6.34)    
INSTRUMENT 4 0.024***    
 (5.84)    
EDUSP 0.002 -0.001 0.005 -0.001 
 (0.120) (-0.195) (0.83) (-0.14) 
EDUHH 0.012 -0.002 0.001 0.000 
 (1.23) (-0.45) (0.32) (0.008) 
AGESP 0.006*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (3.49) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-0.61) 
AGEDIFF 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.040) (-0.27) (-1.06) (-0.22) 
FSIZE 0.047*** 0.002 0.004 0.005 
 (2.70) (0.312) (0.46) (0.91) 
CHILD -0.022 -0.003 -0.013 -0.006 
 (-0.91) (-0.32) (-1.13) (-0.75) 
LANDOWN 0.003** -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (2.43) (-0.08) (0.64) (0.40) 
LIVROOM 0.014* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.76) (-0.16) (-0.26) (-0.49) 
WAGEDIFF -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
 (-1.36) (0.018) (-1.24) (0.66) 
FOODWORK 0.035 0.007 0.005 0.004 
 (0.93) (0.56) (0.30) (0.32) 
RELIGION -0.078 -0.002 0.005 0.010 
 (-1.43) (-0.098) (0.17) (0.53) 
DSTHANA 0.009* -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (1.86) (-0.36) (-0.84) (-0.31) 
DSROAD 0.039*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (3.65) (0.31) (0.099) (0.25) 
Observations 2,810 2,814 2,964 2,971 
R-squared 0.494 0.070 0.046 0.029 
F-statistics 63.38 15.12 10.21 6.38 
Figures in the parentheses are robust t-statistics. ***, ** and * are 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively.  
Column 2: SOCIALCAP is the aggregate social capital index constructed by the 
principal component analysis, and the model is estimated by Lewbel (1997; 2012) 
estimation technique.  
Columns 3-5: Social capital is Help, Invitation and Shalish respectively, and the 
models are estimated using Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) technique.  
Regressions include constant, but are not reported.
 CHAPTER SIX CONCLUSION  
This thesis, comprising three essays, empirically investigates the role of 
social capital in the wellbeing of extreme poor households in rural Bangladesh. In 
particular, it investigates the effects of social capital on some pertinent aspects of 
living and doing of the extreme poor, namely, the health behaviour and hygienic 
practices; coping with employment and income seasonality, and empowerment of 
women within household. In this context, a wide range of econometric techniques 
and a unique cross-sectional data of 5,600 extreme poor households from 156 
villages in three northern districts have been employed. These data were collected 
by BRAC in 2002 as a baseline survey prior to launching a specially tailored 
poverty alleviation programme, entitled ‘Challenging the Frontier of Poverty 
Reduction/Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP)’.  
Theoretically, social capital is believed to enhance the material and non-
material wellbeing of households in various ways. Like physical and human 
capital, social capital is a productive asset and makes certain things possible that 
may not be attainable in its absence. Social networks, relationships and cohesion 
are particularly emphasised in the rural social setting in which formal institutions 
seldom operate and economic contracts are based on trust, solidarity and 
reciprocity.  
The empirical findings of the first essay document the significant positive 
effect of social capital in improving certain health behaviours and hygienic 
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practices of the extreme poor; in particular, the use of sanitary latrines, hand-
washing with soap after defecation, safe water for drinking, safe water for 
cooking, wearing shoes/sandals at home for cleanliness and the use of family 
planning methods by eligible married couples. This indicates the positive 
implications of social capital in barring common diseases through preventive 
health behaviour and hygienic practices for the extreme poor who cannot afford 
medical expenses in the event of sickness.  
The second essay investigates the role played by social capital in 
employment and informal loan opportunities of the extreme poor during the 
Monga, a near-famine situation in the lean season that occurs almost every year 
from mid-September to mid-November and which is mainly because of mal-
functioning labour and credit markets leading to plummeting employment and 
loan opportunities in the pre-harvesting period of the Aman (main rice crop in 
Bangladesh). The findings of the essay evidence the benefit of social capital for 
the extreme poor in securing wage-employment, as well as for self-employment 
for both men and women during the said period. However, there is no evidence 
that social capital helps the extreme poor with obtaining informal loans, possibly 
because they are not found credit-worthy, even in informal terms. Findings of the 
thesis, thus, document role of social capital to heal imperfections of local labour 
markets, but not the local capital markets, and to help the extreme poor to a 
degree cope with the seasonal famine. 
 The third essay examines the role of social capital in women 
empowerment among the extreme poor. Surprisingly, the essay identifies no 
statistically significant effect across a wide array of indicators that represent 
women empowerment. With the possible reverse causality due to restricted 
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opportunities for women limiting the opportunities to build social capital 
addressed; this finding indicates that social capital plays no role in the household 
bargaining or decision making process. 
 Overall, the findings of this thesis can be summarised as twofold. First, it 
documents the positive role of social capital in improving the health behaviour 
and hygiene practices of the extreme poor and for securing wages and self-
employment during times of economic hardship. Second, it finds no significant 
effect of social capital in empowering women within the household. Thus, the 
empirical findings of the thesis indicate an efficiency-enhancing and welfare-
gaining effect of social capital for households in rural northern Bangladesh, but no 
role in improving the bargaining position of women within those same 
households. 
This thesis contributes to the literature in various unique ways. To name a 
couple, first, it focuses on the extreme poor rather than on the poor in general. 
This is important considering that the poor are heterogeneous and the extreme 
poor are mostly illiterate, do not own radios or televisions and are often excluded 
by NGO programs. In studying social capital, this cohort offers the advantage that 
the effects of social capital on the aspects of living/doing investigated are not 
contaminated by factors such as channels of informational flow. This focus is 
unique in the literature. Second, this study improves upon the methodology of 
previous studies by addressing endogeneity in social capital through instrumental 
variable regression to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates. In addition to 
standard IV regression, the recently developed heteroskedasticity-based 
identification of Lewbell (1997; 2012) and Klein and Vella (2009; 2010) is also 
used in the absence of a valid instrument that can satisfy exclusion restrictions.  
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 These findings offer certain policy implications. First, they indicate the 
usefulness of social capital for eliminating contagious diseases such as cholera 
and diarrhoea by improving health behaviour and hygienic practices through the 
building of purposeful social networks and associations. Considering that 
prevention is better than cure, mobilising social capital can help to prevent 
transmissible diseases and enhance efficiency in the delivery of health services. 
Moreover, the findings indicate that socially alienated people can be the worst 
victims of economic hardship, which would be of significant relevance to those 
working in any program targeting poverty alleviation and hunger. The thesis does 
not find any effect of social capital in empowering women. This indicates that any 
program aimed at the empowerment of women through the creation of solidarity 
and social networks may not be effective, unless bundled with efficiency-
enhancing efforts. 
 This thesis can also be considered as a pathway to the study of the 
implications of social capital, networks and relationships on the material and non-
material wellbeing of marginalised groups of people in general. While the 
findings of this thesis are only directly relevant for the extreme poor in rural 
Bangladesh, extensions of this study involving different social settings are 
recommended. Another topic of further research would be to investigate the 
relative importance of social capital types, such as bonding, bridging and linking 
social capital. 
 
